Abstract
This essay reports the results of ninety 3-person and 5-person bargaining experiments using several alternative vote trading scenarios. These experiments are designed to test: (1) Riker and Brams' controversial hypothesis that vote trading can yield inferior outcomes as against the alternative hypothesis that vote trading induces ‘market-like’ efficiency in voting bodies; (2) the relative adequacy of several game theoretic solution concepts for vote trading games without a Condorcet winner (core); and, (3) the adequacy of the core itself.
First, on the basis of eighteen experiments with binding commitments, we find some support for Riker and Brams' hypothesis: in nine trials, subjects first trade to a Pareto dominated outcome. In five of these trials, however, these outcomes are eventually displaced by Pareto efficient ones. Without binding commitments, however, we find little support for the ‘paradox of vote trading’ hypothesis. Specifically, while six of seven trials of a 3-person game yield ‘equitable’ outcomes, seventeen trials of several 5-person games without binding commitments strongly support the competitive solution as a cooperative game solution concept, and suggest that the V-set and M 1 bargaining set are either redundant or useless. Seven trials each of six 5-person games with a condorcet winner (core), however, suggest that usual static solution concepts may be inadequate for treating games with any interesting degree of strategic complexity.
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This research is supported by a National Science Foundation grant. We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Rod Gretlein and Mark Winer.
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McKelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C. Vote trading: An experimental study. Public Choice 35, 151–184 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140840
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140840