Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that decision analysis, as a normative theory, is consistent with Dennett's philosophy of mind, and amounts to a necessary but not sufficient criterion for rationality. I have shown that by exploiting tools for assessment, and by emphasizing the role of sensitivity analysis, this normative theory may be used, and useful, for prescription. I have pointed out how with this perspective DA may be of value for aiding group decision making, and also how many criticisms of DA may be answered. To conclude I shall look at the implications this has for directions for further research.
First, since a normative theory is not a sufficient condition for rationality, research on alternative normative theories might lead to a presrciptive theory with easier assessments. Such a theory would be “better” than DA to the extent that it was more useful. Research within decision analysis should concentrate on solving the “design problem”. The emphasis should be on the development of tools to improve the skills of the analyst and her ability to help the decision maker. An example of such work is the development of techniques to help the DM to reconcile his inconsistent judgements, rather than simply pointing them out (Brown and Lindley, 1982; Lindley et al., 1979; Freeling, 1980, 1981b). Another such area concerns the development of techniques and theories of inference from evidence. There is a Bayesian approach to the incorporation of new evidence and prior beliefs to provide the betting odds required in a decision analysis. However, some researchers have argued that there are situations, such as in courts of law, where prior beliefs (which form an integral part of the Bayesian framework) should be ignored, and they have developed alternative theories of belief. These may also be of use in decision analysis to improve the construction of beliefs. I examine the potential value of this research in a forthcoming Ph.D. thesis. It should be clear that this value will be in terms of their usefulness, and that it is incorrect to contend, as has Lindley (1982a), that a DM who followed one of these theories would be assured of irrationality by the Dutch Book argument. Indeed, Tocher (1978) has aptly summed up the position: “If we accept we don't know all the answers, we might progress”.
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Freeling, A.N.S. A philosophical basis for decision aiding. Theor Decis 16, 179–206 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125877
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125877