Abstract
This chapter, which is mainly based on Forrest and Anderson (Customers’ indecisiveness: A pricing strategy approach, Pennsylvania Economic Association 2017 Conference Proceedings, 80–95, 2017) and Forrest and McCarthy (Sales associates’ compensations: A game theoretic approach. Pennsylvania Economic Association 2017 Conference Proceedings, 52–64, 2017), investigates (a) the characteristics of market competition by employing the thinking logic of systems science, and (b) the problem of sales associates’ compensation (or sales force compensation). The importance of these topics is manifested in the fact that competition is one spirited characteristic of the market economy and continuously finding a new profitable market niche, an entrepreneurial behavior that makes competition increasingly intensive, is the key for success in running business enterprises. Rigorous deductions are provided in the language of game theory. Among other results, this chapter shows when market competition will intensify, under what conditions the existing loyal consumer base of an established firm will start to deteriorate, and how a firm should motivate and compensate its sales force to achieve additional success. The established results and the reasoning employed in this chapter can be directly applied to design new strategies for competition between firms in order for them to optimize their profits.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Antonietti, R. (2006). Human capital, sport performance, and salary determination of professional athletes. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.888535
Arai, A., Ko, Y. J., & Ross, S. (2014). Branding athletes: Exploration and conceptualization of athlete brand image. Sport Management Review, 17(2), 97–106.
Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G. (2015). Delegating disclosure and production choices. The Accounting Review, 90(3), 835–857.
Basu, A., Lal, R., Srinivasan, V., & Staelin, R. (1985). Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic perspective. Marketing Science, 4, 267–291.
Belu, M., & Caragin, A. R. (2008). Strategies of entering new markets. The Romanian Economic Journal, 11(27), 1–16.
Chan, T. Y., Li, J., & Piece, L. (2014a). Compensation and peer effects in competing sales teams. Management Science, 60(8), 1965–1984.
Chan, T. Y., Li, J., & Pierce, L. (2014b). Learning from peers: Knowledge transfer and sales force productivity growth. Marketing Science, 33(4), 463–484.
Chang, Y. K., Chen, Y. L., Chou, R. K., & Huang, T. H. (2015). Corporate governance, product market competition and dynamic capital structure. International Review of Economics & Finance, 38, 44–55.
Chung, D. J., Steenburgh, T., & Sudhir, K. (2013). Do bonuses enhance sales productivity? A dynamic structural analysis of bonus-based compensation plans. Marketing Science, 33(2), 165–187.
Daljord, Ø., Misra, S., & Nair, H. S. (2016). Homogeneous contracts for heterogeneous agents: Aligning sales force composition and compensation. Journal of Marketing Research, 53(2), 161–182.
Debruyne, M., & Reibstein, D. J. (2005). Competitor see, competitor do: Incumbent entry in new market niches. Marketing Science, 24(1), 55–66.
Fizel, J., McNeil, C., & Smaby, T. (2008). Athlete endorsement contracts: The impact of conventional stars. International Advances in Economic Research, 14(2), 247–256.
Forrest, J. Y. L., Amatucci, F., & Markman, G. D. (2017). Dynamics of the firm population within an established market, Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the Decision Sciences Institute, Washington, DC., November 18 – 20, 2017.
Forrest, J. Y. L., & Anderson, M. (2017). Customers’ indecisiveness: A pricing strategy approach, Pennsylvania Economic Association 2017 Conference Proceedings, 80-95.
Forrest, J. Y. L., & McCarthy, L. (2017). Sales associates’ compensations: A game theoretic approach. Pennsylvania Economic Association 2017 Conference Proceedings, 52-64.
Forrest, J. Y. L., & Orvis, B. (2016). Principles of management efficiency and organizational inefficiency. Kybernetes: The International Journal of Cybernetics, Systems and Management Sciences, 45(8), 1308–1322.
Frenzen, H., Hansen, A. K., Krafft, M., Mantrala, M. K., & Schmidt, S. (2010). Delegation of pricing authority to the sales force: An agency-theoretic perspective of its determinants and impact on performance. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 27(1), 58–68.
Fultz, D., Long, R.R., G.V. Owens, , Bohan, W., Kaylor, R., & Weil, J. (1959). Studies of thermal convection in a rotating cylinder with some implications for large-scale atmospheric motion. Meteorol. Monographs (American Meteorological Society), 21, 4.
Guo, W. C., Lai, F. C., Liu, C. J., & Mai, C. C. (2012). Symbiotic production and downstream market competition. Atlantic Economic Journal, 40(3), 329–340.
Hauser, J. R., & Shugan, S. M. (1983). Defensive marketing strategies. Marketing Science., 2(4), 319–360.
Hide, R. (1953). Some experiments on thermal convection in a rotating liquid. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 79(339), 161–161.
Homburg, C., Jensen, O., & Hahn, A. (2012). How to organize pricing? Vertical delegation and horizontal dispersion of pricing authority. Journal of Marketing, 76(5), 49–69.
Inderst, R., & Ottaviani, M. (2009). Misselling through Agents. The American Economic Review, 99(3), 883–908.
Jane, W. J. (2015). Peer effects and individual performance. Journal of Sports Economics, 16(5), 531–539.
Joseph, K., & Thevaranjan, A. (1998). Monitoring and Incentives in Sales Organizations: An Agency-Theoretic Perspective. Marketing Science, 17(2), 107–123.
Kockesen, L. (2007). Unobservable contracts as precommitments. Economic Theory, 31(3), 539–552.
Kockesen, L., & Ok, E. (2004). Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 71(2), 397–424.
Kopalle, P. K., & Lehmann, D. R. (2006). Setting quality expectations when entering a market: What should the promise be? Marketing Science, 25(1), 8–24.
Kräkel, M., & Schöttner, A. (2016). Optimal sales force compensation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 179–195.
Kumar, K. R., & Sudharshan, D. (1988). Defensive marketing strategies: An equilibrium analysis based on decoupled response function models. Management Science, 34(7), 805–815.
Lal, R., & Srinivasan, V. (1993). Compensation Plans for Single- and Multi-product Salesforces: An Application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Model. Management Science, 39(7), 777–793.
Lo, D., Ghosh, M., & Lafontaine, F. (2011). The incentive and selection roles of sales force compensation contracts. Journal of Marketing Research, 4(4), 781–798.
McWilliams, G. (2004). Minding the store: Analyzing consumers, best buy decides not all are welcome. The Wall Street Journal, 8, A1.
Misra, S., & Nair, H. S. (2011). A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 9(3), 211–257.
Mittal, V., Sarkees, M., & Murshed, F. (2008). The right way to manage unprofitable consumers. Harvard Business Review, April, 2-10.
Rosca, V. (2010). The coach-athlete communication process: Towards a better human resources management in sport. Management Research and Practice, 2(3), 275–283.
Sheth, J. N., & Sharma, A. (2008). The impact of the product to service shift in industrial markets and the evolution of the sales organization. Industrial Marketing Management, 37(3), 260–269.
Shin, J., Sudhir, K., & Yoon, D. H. (2012). When to “fire” consumers: Consumer cost-based pricing. Management Science, 58(5), 932–947.
Siebert, R. (2015). Entering new markets in the presence of competition: Price discrimination versus cannibalization. Journal of Economics and Management Strategies, 24(2), 369–389.
Tiago, T., Tiago, F., Faria, S. D., & Couto, J. P. (2016). Who is the better player? Off-field battle on Facebook and Twitter. Business Horizons, 59(2), 175–183.
Zhou, B., Mela, C. F., & Amaldoss, W. (2015). Do firms endowed with greater strategic capability earn higher profits? Journal of Marketing Research, 52(June), 325–336.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Forrest, J.YL., Anderson, M., McCarthy, L. (2023). Indecisive Customers and Sales Associates with Elevated Competitiveness. In: Systemic Principles of Applied Economic Philosophies II. Translational Systems Sciences, vol 39. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7939-4_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7939-4_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-99-7938-7
Online ISBN: 978-981-99-7939-4
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)