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New Trends and Perspectives on Case Management: Proposals on Procedural Agreements and Case Assignment Management

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On Judicial Management from Comparative Perspective

Part of the book series: Contemporary Chinese Civil and Commercial Law ((CCCCL))

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Abstract

The yearning for a more adequate, speedy and effective judicial process has driven legal systems all around the world to rethink its rules and practices. Among the attempts of improval, case management consolidated itself in several jurisdictions as a tool to improve efficiency in civil procedure. And in many ways it has proven to be effective.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Jeuland (2017, pp. 7–8).

  2. 2.

    Many authors still depict the judge as a passive umpire or a detached decisionmaker, but the increasing discretion related to case management powers show that the judge becomes more and more another ‘strategic player in the litigation game,’ as Bone highlights: Bone (2007, pp. 1996–1997).

  3. 3.

    Jeuland (2017, pp. 17ff), Röhl (1998, pp. 242ff).

  4. 4.

    Ferejohn (1999, pp. 353–384).

  5. 5.

    Mainly in the USA, but also in England since the reforms resulting from the Woolf Report. See Flood et al. (2007, p. 143). The full content of Woolf’s final report can be seen in: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm. Judicial powers are exemplified in Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In legal literature, Clarke (2009, pp. 33–49). In the United States of America, there was no provision in statutory law, but the constant concerns of legal scholars and of the Judiciary with economic aspects led to a progressive acceptance of judges’ procedural management powers, always with regard to greater efficiency of the results. See Resnik (1982, pp. 374 ff, 419–431), Marcus (2008, pp. 2274–2275). In Brazil, Gajardoni (2008a, b, pp. 162ff), Ono (2016, p. 3).

  6. 6.

    According to Van Rhee, ‘(1) The specific nature of the case should determine to a large extent the rules, directions and orders that govern the proceedings; (2) The rules, directions and orders of proceedings should to a large extent be determined by the judges, parties and attorneys involved in the case and not by detailed legal provisions; (3) The court should have the necessary procedural discretionary powers to manage the case; (4) The court’s direction should be discretion in the weak sense, that is to say, the court should use its powers for a specific goal, i.e., to achieve the disposition of the dispute fairly, efficiently, and with reasonable speed.’ Van Rhee (2008a, b, pp. 3–4). About the subject, Andrews (2003, p. 333), Sorabji (2017, pp. 1ff), Resnik (1986, pp. 524, 534–535 (with strong criticism)), Dodge (2014, p. 333), Almeida (2011, p. 289), Barbosa Moreira (2001, pp. 185–186), Amendoeira (2006, p. 55), Cabral (2010a, b, pp. 150–153).

  7. 7.

    Jeuland (2011, p. 98), Papier (2001, p. 1093), Gajardoni (2008a, b, pp. 119ff), Shetreet (1989, pp. 295, 299, 303–304), Silva (2010, pp. 137ff), Carvalho (2015, pp. 273ff), Didier (2016, pp. 118ff), Cahali (2013, pp. 44, 203ff).

  8. 8.

    In the USA, professional court administration began soon in the first half of the twentieth century, enabled by the broad normative power of the judiciary to regulate its own activities, even in many aspects of its budget. Congress holds a sort of ‘veto power’ by producing statutes that revoke provisions of the courts. An interesting approach of the US system in a civil law perspective can be found in Röhl (1998, pp. 243–244).

  9. 9.

    Bone (1999, p. 917). About the different systems regarding discretionary case management powers of the judge, see Sorabji (2017, pp. 38ff).

  10. 10.

    Bone (2007, p. 1968).

  11. 11.

    If no other evidence is needed, the Code of Civil Procedure grants the judge the power to decide the case on the merits (whether totally or partially) by summary judgments, i.e., without a trial hearing or taking of testimonial or expert evidence (Arts. 354 and 356). In Brazilian legal literature, see Marinoni et al. (2015a, b, p. 47), Gajardoni et al. (2015, p. 72). Didier (2001). Didier Jr. speaks of a ‘jurisdictional adaptation of the procedure.’ Didier (2016, p. 119), giving other examples of normative provisions that reinforce the normative basis of this adaptability. In the same sense, Bedaque (2006, pp. 63ff, 109–112), Oliveira (2013), Cabral (2010a, b, p. 63). This principle of adaptability is provided for in the Portuguese Civil Procedure Law for quite some time, allowing the judge a more flexible management of procedural formalities. This flexibility exists in Portugal since the previous Code of Civil Procedure (Art. 265.º-A (princípio da adequação formal): ‘Quando a tramitação processual prevista na lei não se adequar às especificidades da causa, deve o juiz oficiosamente, ouvidas as partes, determinar a prática dos actos que melhor se ajustem ao fim do processo, bem como as necessárias adaptações’), and the new Code of Civil Procedure from 2013 introduced an intense duty of judicial case management for the judge (Art. 6). In the Portuguese legal literature, Geraldes (2012, p. 93). In France and Norway one can note this progressive quest for flexibility in the last decades. See Cornu (1998, pp. 391–393), Valguarnera (2008, pp. 888, 891, 893–894).

  12. 12.

    Oliveira and Mitidiero (2012, pp. 74ff), Medina (2015, p. 115).

  13. 13.

    Peckham (1981, pp. 770–773).

  14. 14.

    Molot (2003, pp. 29ff).

  15. 15.

    McGovern (1997, p. 1869).

  16. 16.

    It’s important to remember that, even in the common law tradition, where a greater passivity of the judge could be seen in the past, the behavior and the role of the judge have been modified more recently in light of the cooperation principle.

  17. 17.

    Machado Alves (2016, pp. 73, 76).

  18. 18.

    Fix-Fierro (2003).

  19. 19.

    Cabral (2017b, pp. 342–359).

  20. 20.

    Cabral and Cunha (2016, pp. 471ff).

  21. 21.

    This trend has been highlighted in several of the reports written for this IAPL conference. See Sorabji (2017, pp. 39ff), Chan (2017, pp. 16ff), Perez-Ragone (2017, pp. 18ff).

  22. 22.

    Jeuland (2017, p. 1).

  23. 23.

    ‘Court management’ may be an inaccurate term because this variant seeks to innovate not only within the judiciary itself, but also in institutions that are connected to the justice system, such as lawyers’ associations, public defenders’ services, the public prosecutor’s office, mediation and conciliation centres etc. Some scholars reported some misunderstanding over the expression. Jeuland (2017, pp. 10ff). See also Perez-Ragone (2017, pp. 16–17). The term brings some confusion in a comparative analysis of the Chinese speaking countries, which have different traditions (some influenced by civil law jurisdictions such as Portugal and Germany, some with English background). See Chan (2017, pp. 9ff), Wang (2017, p. 1).

  24. 24.

    Resnik (1982, pp. 391, 413–414). The differences are not only in terms of purposes; according to Resnik, they are observed also in respect to initiative and effects: ‘In both, judges Interact informally with the litigating parties and receive information that would be considered inadmissible in traditional courtroom proceedings. Management at both ends of the lawsuit takes time and increases judges’ responsibilities. Nevertheless, the two management stages are dissimilar in many respects. Predecision management is initiated usually by the judge; postdecision supervision begins more often at a litigant’s request. Pretrial management occurs much more frequently, but posttrial intervention tends to be more far reaching in its effects. Unlike pretrial management, post-trial activity occurs within a framework of appellate oversight, public visibility, and institutional constraints that inhibits overreaching.’

  25. 25.

    Resnik (1982, pp. 391, 413–414).

  26. 26.

    Didier (2008, p. 41).

  27. 27.

    Sorabji (2017, pp. 45ff), Chan (2017, pp. 13ff), Wang (2017, pp. 23ff).

  28. 28.

    Resnik (1986, p. 523).

  29. 29.

    Uzelac (2008, pp. 87–88).

  30. 30.

    Davis and Garrett (2014, pp. 483, 488–489), Wang (2017, pp. 22–23).

  31. 31.

    Hurst (2009, pp. 171–181), Machado Alves (2016, p. 194).

  32. 32.

    Cabral (2016c, pp. 263–281).

  33. 33.

    This is the tone of the procedural system proposed by Marinoni et al. (2015a, b, pp. 39ff). See also Sodan (2005, p. 766), De Cristofaro (2010, pp. 282–305). In a perspective that I consider outdated, Thomas Roth sees a contradiction between procedural effectiveness and the principle of the lawful judge, giving priority to fixed statutory rules of competence, understanding that the legislator decided that they were ‘more effective’ for certain sort of cases. Roth (2000, pp. 95–100).

  34. 34.

    Pflughaupt (2011, p. 28). Marcus says: ‘one may resist the siren song of efficiency.’ Marcus (2008, p. 2255).

  35. 35.

    Carvalho (2015, pp. 273ff), Barber (2013, p. 567).

  36. 36.

    It is interesting to observe how judges’ independence is frequently invoked more as an individual right of the magistrate than from a systemic perspective of its relevance for the functioning of the judiciary. We must see the aspects of the lawful judge not only from a unique prism, but considering all the aspects in which the principle of the lawful judge actually protects individuals (control of arbitrariness, security, equality, impartiality, previsibility, coherence, efficiency). In this sense, Röhl (1998, pp. 245–246, 249).

  37. 37.

    Eidenmüller (1995, pp. 320–321).

  38. 38.

    Greco (2012, p. 24).

  39. 39.

    Cunha (2014, p. 79).

  40. 40.

    Pflughaupt (2011, p. 313).

  41. 41.

    Bettermann (1959, pp. 558ff), Marx (1969, p. 73). About the subject, Storme and Hess (2003).

  42. 42.

    Câmara (2013, pp. 42–43).

  43. 43.

    Diez-Picazo Gimenez (1991, p. 116).

  44. 44.

    Tatiana Alves remembers that a case management approach exclusively focused on the judge’s activity does not exhaust the subject. Machado Alves (2016, p. 84).

  45. 45.

    Cabral (2016a, 2016b).

  46. 46.

    For example, among all general reporters, only Sorabji mentioned the subject. Sorabji (2017, pp. 62–63). In China, Wang reports that there is little space for the parties to convene on proceedings, for the judges tend to play a leading role in the definition of procedural rules. Wang (2017, pp. 20ff).

  47. 47.

    Another aspect of the topic which has been little explored concerns the fact that these procedural agreements represent a rearrangement of the relationship between substantive law and procedural law. Litigation agreements can, indirectly, increase or reduce the costs of the implementation of rights, by rendering their enforcement more or less difficult; and they can establish a new evidentiary logic (burden of proof, evaluation of evidence, etc.), causing an impact on substantive law because they change the prognosis of spontaneous compliance with the rules. In the normal exchanges of any contract, an improvement in the procedural legal position of one party could represent an advantage gained by the opposing party in another point of the negotiations, e.g., in aspects of substantive law, such as a price reduction. A consumer could negotiate a lower price by agreeing to clauses that allow greater ‘seizability’ of her assets or easier attachment in execution proceedings. Therefore, it may not deal merely with the choice of more efficient procedures: the parties frequently agree on procedure against a backdrop of the expectation of the impact of those provisions on substantive law. And, mainly in contracts signed prior to the emergence of the dispute, contractually designing the future in-court proceedings may generate incentives for individual behaviour. By undertaking obligations and regulating procedure, the parties are indirectly delineating incentives that favour compliance with their legal obligations. This aspect of litigation agreements has been little studied (a fortunate exception is the interesting analysis carried out by Dodge (2011, pp. 727, 731–732, 739), but indicates that litigation agreements is not only a form of conventional case management, but also a means of reshaping or remodelling the interactions between procedure and substantive law.).

  48. 48.

    The movement has started in the early 1980s. See Santos (1985, p. 125).

  49. 49.

    Hoffmann-Riem (1997, pp. 4ff), Scott and Sturm (2006, p. 566).

  50. 50.

    Hess (2006, pp. 143ff), Hoffmann-Riem (1997, p. 5), Eifert (1997, pp. 75ff), Contini and Carnevali (2010, pp. 1–2, 6, 12).

  51. 51.

    Contini (2010, pp. 111ff), Fabri et al. (2005), Ng et al. (2008, pp. 58–64), Porcelli (2009), Sodan (2005, pp. 766–767), Pauliat (2008, p. 108), Röhl (1998, p. 241), Loth and De Werd (2003, pp. 318–319).

  52. 52.

    Costa (2016, p. 317).

  53. 53.

    Langbroek (2007, pp. 112–113), Contini and Carnevali (2010, pp. 7–8).

  54. 54.

    In Germany, Röhl (1998).

  55. 55.

    Loth and De Werd (2003, pp. 318ff), Hoffmann-Riem (1997, pp. 5–6), Langbroek and Fabri (2007, p. 16).

  56. 56.

    Loth and De Werd (2003, p. 319).

  57. 57.

    A growing practice in the field of execution proceedings. See Uzelac (2010, pp. 86–87), Yarkov and Abolonin (2010, p. 225), reporting on several countries where that happens: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Macedonia and Slovenia among others.

  58. 58.

    Mäurer (2000, p. 68), Langbroek (2007, pp. 112–113). It is important to highlight that court management does not need to be carried out necessarily by the judiciary itself (judge-only). We could imagine commissions or committees formed by members of both the judiciary and parliament. In the traditional debate, judicial independence and judges’ accountability are values considered to be clashing values. Trying to tackle this issue, Contini and Mohr (2007, pp. 28, 39ff). About the relationship between judiciary budget and judges independence, Douglas and Hartley (2003, pp. 441–453), Baar (1999, pp. 399–351), Wheeler (1979, pp. 134–149).

  59. 59.

    Karpen (1999, pp. 993ff), Papier (2002, pp. 2587–2590), Pauliat (2008, pp. 96, 99, 101, 108), ContinI and Carnevali (2010, pp. 7–9), Jeuland (2017, pp. 21ff).

  60. 60.

    Kramer (2001, p. 3449), Loth and De Werd (2003, p. 318).

  61. 61.

    In similar sense, Uzelac (2014, p. 148).

  62. 62.

    See different acceptances for the term specialisation in Baum (2009, pp. 1671–1675).

  63. 63.

    Uzelac (2014, p. 148), Mak (2008, p. 2).

  64. 64.

    In some countries, as in Germany, there are lots of specialised courts. There is, in federal level, a common justice (civil and criminal) and other branches of administrative justice, a general (or residual) branch, the Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, with subspecialisation in social security, tax and financial and labor. Lately, a court specialised in trademarks and patents was created (Bundespatentgericht). In France, there is specialisation based on concentration, with exclusivity, of commercial causes (tribunaux de commerce), and labor causes (conseils des prud’hommes). Foignet (1932, pp. 11–13), Perrot (2006, pp. 3–11, 123ff), Vincent and Guinchard (2003, pp. 330ff), Solus and Perro (1991, pp. 435ff), Couchez (2008, pp. 34ff), Héron and Le Bars (2006, pp. 499ff, 757–758). In Brazil, it’s common to question the maintenance of certain judiciary branches which are too expensive and maybe could be fused to other courts. The best example, without any doubt, is the Military Justice, which number of processes absolutely does not justify its existence.

  65. 65.

    In Brazil, within State jurisdiction, the division of competences between the Tax, Civil, Family, and Commercial Courts is well known. Within the Federal jurisdiction, in the various circuits, there are specific courts for social security, environmental, agrarian, tax and tax foreclosure, intellectual property and trademark, home loan system matters, or matters regarding the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, among others.

  66. 66.

    Rottman (2000, p. 23), Zimmer (2009, p. 2), Mac, Kerošius et al. (2014, pp. 209ff).

  67. 67.

    Zimmer (2009, pp. 1–2).

  68. 68.

    Fabri and Langbroek (2007, p. 312), Zimmer (2009, p. 1).

  69. 69.

    Baum (2009, pp. 1675–1676), Gramckow and Walsh (2013, p. 6), Zimmer (2009, p. 2).

  70. 70.

    Baum (2009, pp. 1677ff).

  71. 71.

    The term is used in economic law to refer to superspecialised organs’ characteristic of not tackling problems from a larger perspective.

  72. 72.

    This is the discussion found in Oldfather (2012, pp. 848, 858ff, 871ff).

  73. 73.

    Mak (2008, p. 6). Posner remembers that specialisation restricts a cross-exchange of ideas between courts. Posner (1983, p. 787).

  74. 74.

    Komesar (1994, pp. 145–146), Zimmer (2009, pp. 3–5). About lobby groups and the external influence that could produce this capture, Baum (2009, p. 1679), Posner (1983, pp. 783–784). Speaking not about capture, but actually of corruption, Gramckow and Walsh (2013, p. 8).

  75. 75.

    Uzelac (2014, p. 154). One should notice that some authors question whether specialisation makes the judge more prestigious. In their opinion, broader competences mean more power, and prestige. Oldfather (2012, pp. 860–861).

  76. 76.

    Damle (2005, p. 1275).

  77. 77.

    That is a problem that can become alarming in a continental-size country as Brazil, as already observed in Russia: Terekhova (2014, pp. 178–179).

  78. 78.

    For example, it is said that decisions from specialised judges tend to be more complex and not so understandable to the general public. Kerošius et al. (2014, p. 220), Silvestri (2014, pp. 166ff). See critics to specialisation in Rottman (2000, pp. 22–27).

  79. 79.

    Carpi (2014, pp. 73ff), Santos (1985, pp. 129–130). A critical view that deserves reference is that of Uzelac (2014, pp. 155, 160), asserting that there is no evidence that specialisation actually leads to more quality and efficiency.

  80. 80.

    McGovern (1986, pp. 440ff).

  81. 81.

    Sabatini (1961, p. 953), Mitidiero (2013, p. 13).

  82. 82.

    That is Elaine Mak’s definition (Mak 2008, p. 2), along with Hol and Loth (2004, pp. 67–89).

  83. 83.

    Scott and Sturm (2006, p. 566). Describing this court management process in USA, Finland, Holland, Singapore and later in the European Union, Albers (2009, pp. 58ff), Langbroek and Fabri (2007, p. 16).

  84. 84.

    About this issue, Karpen (1999, pp. 989–990), Eifert (1997, p. 81).

  85. 85.

    Kramer (2001, p. 3449).

  86. 86.

    Harmonizing efficiency and fundamental guarantees of the parties is also a concern of Mak (2008, p. 4).

  87. 87.

    Renoux (1993, p. 169).

  88. 88.

    Loth and De Werd (2003, p. 318), Contini and Mohr (2007, p. 35), Langbroek (2007, p. 105). The described indicators and statistics show that this was a fruitful experience. Van Dijk (2014, pp. 10–12, 15). Information in English about the Dutch legal system in https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English. Accessed 1 Dec 2020.

  89. 89.

    Van Dijk (2014, p. 6).

  90. 90.

    Fabri and Langbroek (2007, p. 296), Mak (2008, p. 3). This mobility is a characteristic of Dutch judicial organization. Langbroek (2007, p. 108).

  91. 91.

    Voet (2014, p. 137).

  92. 92.

    Voet (2014, p. 140).

  93. 93.

    Section 14 of the Crown Court Manual, p. 2, available in https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Protocols/listing_crown_court_manual_050705.pdf. Accessed 1 Dec 2020.

  94. 94.

    Müssig (2009, pp. 377–379).

  95. 95.

    Eser (1995, pp. 263–264).

  96. 96.

    Didier (2008, p. 41).

  97. 97.

    Greco (1999, p. 62).

  98. 98.

    Pflughaupt (2011, p. 23).

  99. 99.

    Mettenheim (1970, pp. 15–17). About the subject, Schumann (1973, p. 277). In page 279–280, he says: ‘Die Prozessökonomie ist (…) miβverstanden, wenn sie vom je einzelnen Prozeβ her begriffen wird. Prozeβökonomisch ist nur die Gestaltung, die sich mit den institutionellen Zielen des Prozesses verträgt. Manch Prozedieren mag im Einzelfall sehr ‘ökonomisch’ sein, bringt aber insgesamt nur Nachteile oder sogar den Prozeβ als Institution in Gefahr.’

  100. 100.

    This point has already been noted by scholars of the so called ‘structural litigation,’ in procedures in which the judiciary, in order to provide appropriate relief, must engage in cooperative activities in partnership with many social and State players. About the subject, in Brazil, Arenhart (2015b, pp. 211ff), Ferraro (2015, pp. 56–61).

  101. 101.

    Pflughaupt (2011, pp. 282, 291–294).

  102. 102.

    Didier (2008, pp. 36–37), Ávila (2005, pp. 19–24).

  103. 103.

    Theodoro (2011, p. 33). Some authors consider jurisdiction a ‘public service.’ In this sense, Redenti and Vellani (2000, pp. 138–139). This vision is usually followed by more prominent considerations about procedural efficiency. Remo Caponi affirms: ‘(…) Essa mudança de perspectiva – a Justiça de função estatal a serviço público – faz com que o sistema político seja chamado hoje, mais urgentemente do que no passado, a responder às expectativas de eficiência provenientes dos usuários do serviço judiciário e, portanto, a medir e a incentivar a sua qualidade, a sua produtividade etc. Essa perspectiva reage ainda com a própria elaboração e conformação dos princípios jurídicos do processo que tendem, hoje mais do que no passado, a extrair de seu bojo a visão de uma gestão eficiente, em que pese a escassez de recursos dedicados à Justiça. Um exemplo sobressai nesse campo: a inclusão na Itália da duração razoável do processo entre as garantias constitucionais (Art. 111, § 2.º, da Constituição) pode e deve representar de forma direta a constitucionalização do princípio da eficiência. (…).’ (Caponi 2011, pp. 400–401). This perspective is very frequent in French legal literature. Bandrac (2003, pp. 1096–1097). Cadiet and Jeuland say: ‘À côté des principes d’organisation, l’ordonnancement judiciaire comporte des principes de fonctionnement qui sont essentiellement fondés sur la notion de service public. Fonction étatique, la justice est, naturellement, un service public; elle l’est souvent dans les deux sens du terme, organique (l’institution) et matériel (l’activité) lorsque la fonction de juger est exercée par une juridiction étatique (…). Mais parce qu’elle est un service public, la justice doit fonctionner conformément aux principes communs à tous les services publics: la continuité et l’égalité.’ Cadiet and Jeuland (2013, p. 40). We do not think this idea to be essential to defend that the judge, while exercising his jurisdictional powers, should be guided by efficiency criteria.

  104. 104.

    Jacobs (2011, p. 899).

  105. 105.

    Van Rhee (2008a, b, pp. 58–59), Leisner (1995, p. 287), Bohn (2011, p. 16): ‘Gegen den ‘Perfektionismus’ des gesetzlichen Richters werden Argumente wie die Praktikabilität und Zweckmäβigkeit einer flexibleren Fallzuteilung bemüht. Ziel ist es, das bestehende Spannungsverhältnis zwischen formalisierter Fallzuteilung und effizienter, ermessensgebundener Fallzuteilung zu erörtern und kritisch zu würdigen.’

  106. 106.

    Bruns (1964, p. 1887).

  107. 107.

    Arndt (1959, p. 171).

  108. 108.

    See the critical view of Jeuland (2011, p. 88). With some concessions to flexibility.

  109. 109.

    Schulze-Fielitz (2008, p. 660).

  110. 110.

    Gelsi Bidart (1958, p. 256).

  111. 111.

    Gelsi Bidart (1958, p. 257). In public law, see the opinion of Jellinek (1969, pp. 41ff).

  112. 112.

    The delegator judge does not loose jurisdiction. That is why one should reject Heinrich Triepel’s thesis that delegation would always be translative, and would lead to the loss of competence, through its exercise by the delegatee in her own name. Triepel (1942, pp. 23–24, 36–38, 41–42, 51). Supporting Obermayer (1956, p. 625). Against Triepel (1997, pp. 498–499).

  113. 113.

    Triepel (1942, pp. 10–13), Heinz (1997, pp. 496–497), Chiovenda (1993, p. 79), Pérez López (2011, pp. 134ff). Some passages of Roman sources point to the same conclusion. Digest (book I, 21, ‘De officio eius, cui mandata est iurisdictio,’ or ‘The office to whom jurisdiction is delegated’), divided state powers that would be transmissible from those that could not; and admitted jurisdiction delegation ‘Quaecumque specialiter lege vel senatus consulto vel constitutione principum tribuuntur, mandata iurisdictione non transferuntur: quae vero iure magistratus competunt, mandari possunt.’

  114. 114.

    The iudex pedaneus, to whom the practice of some procedural legal acts was delegated, could be pointed out as a similar type of delegation. See Tucci and Azevedo (2001, p. 140). The commentators and glossators used to draw a distinction between the delegation of competence for all cases (ad universitatem causarum) and the delegation restricted to one case (ad unam causam). Picardi (1985, pp. 766–767).

  115. 115.

    Picardi (1985, pp. 775–777), Triepel (1942, pp. 17–19). In Canonic Law, the Pope had the adjudication power and he could delegate (and order a transfer back) every case submitted to ecclesiastical courts. Tucci and Azevedo (2001, pp. 99–100).

  116. 116.

    Van Bynkershoek (1737).

  117. 117.

    Schönke (1951, p. 145), Gelsi Bidart (1958, p. 242).

  118. 118.

    Carneiro (1980, p. 13), Didier (2016, pp. 179–180).

  119. 119.

    Chiovenda (1993, p. 79), Kern (2017, p. 117), Greco (2015, pp. 114–115), Cunha (2013, pp. 28–29), Didier (2016, pp. 177ff).

  120. 120.

    Marinoni et al. (2015a, b, p. 148).

  121. 121.

    Some authors have studied the possibility of judical competences being transferred by outsourcing and other types of partnerships. Cf. Hoffman-Riem (2001, pp. 36–46), Gilles (2000, pp. 1388, 1418).

  122. 122.

    Yarkov and Abolonin (2010, p. 228).

  123. 123.

    See Barioni (2016, pp. 2266ff), Cramer (2016, pp. 1431–1432).

  124. 124.

    Marques (1974, p. 75), Greco (2015, pp. 82, 115).

  125. 125.

    See Perez-Ragone (2014, pp. 648–649).

  126. 126.

    Jellinek (1892, p. 238).

  127. 127.

    Subdelegation is a subsequent transfer of competences from the delegatee to the subdelegatee. Cf. Obermayer (1956, p. 625), Triepel (1942, pp. 121ff), Rasch (1957, p. 338).

  128. 128.

    Donnier and Donnier (2003, pp. 38, 58–60, 169–174), Hippeli (2013, pp. 182–186), Couchez (2003, p. 60).

  129. 129.

    Jellinek (1892, pp. 234, 238).

  130. 130.

    Hess (2010, p. 44).

  131. 131.

    In England and Wales, the experience with the High Court Enforcement Officers has been reported as an enormous success. See Turner (2010, pp. 137ff).

  132. 132.

    Brazil (1986, pp. 394ff).

  133. 133.

    That is what happens with the Dutch court bailiffs. See Jongbloed (2010, p. 181).

  134. 134.

    Arenhart (2015a, p. 362).

  135. 135.

    Arenhart (2015b, pp. 224–229).

  136. 136.

    Brazil (1986, p. 394ff), Resnik (1991, p. 63).

  137. 137.

    Perez-Ragone (2017, p. 29), Jeuland (2017, p. 20).

  138. 138.

    In Brazil, for instance, there is an express constitutional restriction: all jurisdictional legal acts but can be delegated to clerks or civil servants of the judiciary except decisions and sentences. See Art. 93, XIV of the Brazilian Constitution.

  139. 139.

    Of course there would be cases in which no delegation could be implemented, especially if the competence would interfere with subject matters that can only be decided by judges (‘reserva de jurisdição,’ Richtervorbehalt). That varies a lot from country to country, but are usually linked to arrest, emprisonment, coercitive measures, etc. Cabral (2017c).

  140. 140.

    Triepel (1942, p. 95), Sabatini (1961, p. 956), Gimeno Sendra (1988, p. 56), Schenke (1977, p. 121). In common law countries, jurisdiction delegation is much more frequent. See Chayes (1976, pp. 1300–1301).

  141. 141.

    Marinoni et al. (2015a, b, p. 148), Didier (2016, p. 177).

  142. 142.

    Gelsi Bidart (1958, pp. 261–262).

  143. 143.

    Pinho (2000, p. 13).

  144. 144.

    Santos (2007, p. 72).

  145. 145.

    Jacobs (2011, p. 890), Henkel (1968, p. 13).

  146. 146.

    Jauernig and Hess (2011, p. 41), Wilke (2007, p. 639).

  147. 147.

    Canotilho (2002, pp. 651ff), Dinamarco (2016, pp. 545, 552).

  148. 148.

    Gajardoni et al. (2015, p. 168).

  149. 149.

    Guinchard (2003, p. 1104), Wilke (2007, p. 637), Cabral (2014, pp. 562ff), Küster (1949, pp. 402ff).

  150. 150.

    Hesse (1995, p. 211): ‘Den damit gegebenen verschiedenartigen Erfordernissen der Aufgabenbewältigung entsprechend unterscheidet die Verfassung die drei Grundfunktionen der Gesetzgebung, der Vollziehung und der Rechtsprechung. Diese Unterscheidung hat keinen Ausschließlichkeitscharakter. Sie bezeichnet bestimmte Grundtypen der Art der Aufgabenerfüllung. Sie enthält keine abschließende Umschreibung der verfassungsmäßigen Funktionen, sondern läßt Raum für weitere wie etwa die der Kontrolle, der Mitwirkung der politischen Parteien bei der politischen Willensbildung oder der Bildung und des Wirkens der öffentlichen Meinung. Sie darf auch im Blick auf die einzelnen Funktionen nur in einem typisierenden Sinne verstanden warden, weil die sachgemäße Erfüllung der Aufgaben starre Grenzziehungen nicht zuläßt.’

  151. 151.

    Cabral (2014, p. 564).

  152. 152.

    Pinho (2000, pp. 11–13).

  153. 153.

    Perez-Ragone (2017, p. 29).

  154. 154.

    Mbazira (2009, pp. 222–223), Roach and Budlender (2005, pp. 325ff), Resnik (1982, pp. 391, 394), Mcgovern (2005, pp. 1387–1388), Cole (2000, p. 1217) (despite defending an administrative nature of the supervision task); Gilles (2000, p. 1434).

  155. 155.

    Verbic (2013, pp. 275ff). The judicial supervision can be corrective of the activity of the delegatee. In Sweden, for example, the National Enforcement Agency is monitored by the judiciary. See Hess (2010, p. 53).

  156. 156.

    Roach and Budlender (2005, p. 335). One can envisage supervision performed by other branches. In some countries, there are executive agencies in charge of this monitoring functions. See Jongbloed (2010, pp. 194–196).

  157. 157.

    In similar sense Rodotà (1985, p. 184).

  158. 158.

    Brazil (1986, pp. 411, 417ff).

  159. 159.

    Strong (2013), Roque (2014).

  160. 160.

    The idea is to foster relief for a larger number of people at once. Mcgovern (1983, pp. 5–9).

  161. 161.

    Cabral (2017a).

  162. 162.

    Aggregation in a broad sense occurs in any case in which more than one person or entity is a plaintiff or a defendant. Resnik (1991, p. 23). On the other hand, Yeazell (1989, p. 44), rejects such a wide approach because it would mask ‘an important distinction between voluntary joinder and involuntary participation,’ which brings questions regarding ‘free riders’ and ‘kidnapped’ participants.

  163. 163.

    Resnik (1991, p. 37).

  164. 164.

    And more and more, class actions, that in their origin, were seen as an empowerment, are starting to be looked at as a management tool as well. See Resnik (1991, pp. 47–48).

  165. 165.

    Machado Alves (2016, p. 193).

  166. 166.

    Voermans (2007, pp. 148–159).

  167. 167.

    Contini (2007, p. 27), Corder (2001, p. 202ff). In another text, Contini and Mohr try to differentiate judges’ accountability. See Contini and Mohr (2008, pp. 61, 86).

  168. 168.

    An important example on this subject is the Swedish legal system. See Hagsgård (2014, pp. 993–1014). In a more general perspective, see Contini (2010, pp. 111ff).

  169. 169.

    The topic is too broad to be dealt with here. In fact, there are new and diverse roles that can take part in a procedure, such as that of the amicus curiae, a non-interested third-party. Social participation in public hearings starts to come up more often, and the possibility of switching roles (in which the same player changes roles in the same claim, sometimes supporting the interests of the plaintiff, sometimes supporting the interests of the defendant). Cabral (2009, pp. 7ff).

  170. 170.

    Some plaintiffs and defendants have already an aggregative form before they enter litigation. That is the case for corporations, voluntary associations and governamental units and bodies. See Resnik (1991, p. 23). Here I would like to emphasise the eventual gathering and the formation of structures just for the purposes of litigation.

  171. 171.

    McGovern (2005, p. 1316), Resnik (1991, p. 38), Hensler (1990, p. 175), Peterson (1990, p. 113).

  172. 172.

    Dodge (2014, p. 368).

  173. 173.

    McGovern (1986, pp. 440ff).

  174. 174.

    Tushnet (2008, pp. 36–42), Roach and Budlender (2005, p. 325), Chayes (1976, p. 1292).

  175. 175.

    Technology in case management has been reported in many countries. See Wang (2017, pp. 31ff).

  176. 176.

    This was already implemented in the U.S. multidistrict litigation. See Mcgovern (1997, p. 1864). On cooperation and facilitative judging, Dodge (2014, pp. 342–344).

  177. 177.

    Rothstein and Borden (2011, p. 8).

  178. 178.

    In Brazil there were a few cases in which informative hotsites e websites were created on line, but this initiative is very recent. In criminal matters, see the Operation Car Wash (‘Operação Lava a Jato,’ the biggest corruption case in the world) website (http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br); in the field of class actions, a good example is the collective action of coal mines (‘Ação civil pública do carvão’) (https://www.jfsc.jus.br/acpdocarvao/index.php).

  179. 179.

    The traditional opinion is expressed by Thiedemann (2003, p. 233).

  180. 180.

    Gramckow and Walsh (2013, pp. 1ff).

  181. 181.

    Guiliani (1988, pp. 603–604, note 15). Some say it resulted from the historical evolution of the principle of the lawful judge (the process that led to ‘permanent’ courts becoming ‘established’ or ‘natural’ or ‘ordinary’ courts gave rise to a ‘career’ of the judge). Picardi (1985, p. 781). There is a concern of the magistracy with seeing this ‘profissionalisation’ as a ‘functional improvement,’ not as a loss of power, a bureaucratization of the judges that would bring them next to the other public servants, what could reduce their function in the frame of State’s institutional arrangements, sterilising the judiciary in a political sense. About this subject, Giuliani and Picardi (1987, pp. 272, 283).

  182. 182.

    In Brazil, professional career judges are selected by means of public civil service exams, which already focus the assessment of candidates on the content deemed useful for the performance of their judicial functions.

  183. 183.

    Nunes and Bahia suggest training of judges should precede statutory reforms. Nunes and Bahia (2009, pp. 121–122).

  184. 184.

    Studies on the impact of the number of employees and productivity of judicial staff on the overall court performance are inconclusive. See Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis (2007, pp. 219–244), Rosales-López (2008, pp. 231–251), Gomes et al. (2016, p. 13).

  185. 185.

    In some countries like The Netherlands, efficiency turned to be an objective due to budgetary constraints. Van der Grinten (2012, pp. 279, 285ff).

  186. 186.

    Oldfather (2012, pp. 854ff). Specialisation is a very difficult subject, and it may vary according to the comprehension that one has of the principle of the lawful judge, which varies in comparative law depending on the characteristics of each judicary system. In some countries for example, there is no court specialisation: all judges are generalists and are part of the same judicial body, being capable of adjudicating in various branches. It is not surprising that, in those systems, the notion of a lawful judge is totally different from that existent in Brazil. Fabri and Langbroek (2007, pp. 300–301).

  187. 187.

    Of course that, although specialisation is an important element to provide functionality and efficiency to the system, specialisation itself is not enough to reach a correct decision and an efficient result. Technical knowledge is not the only relevant predicate to the task of judging: abilities such as analysing information, evaluating evidence, inquiring witnesses, conducting hearings, writing understandable decisions, these are all important features as well. In this sense, Posner (1983, p. 778).

  188. 188.

    Uzelac (2014, p. 149). Commenting the South African experience, Van Loggerenberg says that we must not only think of the variety of services (in the multidoor or multiaccess logic), but also of the variety of tasks attributed to judges and the variety of their capabilities and expertises (multitasked and multi-skilled). Van Loggerenberg (2014, pp. 187–188).

  189. 189.

    Vincent and Guinchard (2003, pp. 330ff). In Belgium, this competence is even larger, involving disputes about neighborhood rights, alimony, rights and duties of spouses, consumer relationships etc. About the subject, Voet (2014, pp. 131, 134).

  190. 190.

    Gramckow and Walsh (2013, p. 4).

  191. 191.

    Mak (2008, p. 6).

  192. 192.

    This makes room for state law, at the initiative of the State Courts of Appeals, to regulate other functions for the justice of the peace, but the majority of States of the Federation have not, to date, drafted rules about the justice of the peace.

  193. 193.

    Reporting some good experiences from the German Federal Constitutional Court, which the author understands that could also be applied to the United States federal courts, Damle (2005, pp. 1291ff). See also Gramckow and Walsh (2013, pp. 10, 21ff).

  194. 194.

    Fabri and Langbroek (2007).

  195. 195.

    In most legal systems from the countries we had the opportunity to study, this possibility is not usually admitted. Expressly bringing the subject to the debate, Kerošius et al. (2014, p. 212).

  196. 196.

    Bohn (2011, pp. 136–137).

  197. 197.

    Langbroek and Fabri (2007, p. 21).

  198. 198.

    Fabri and Langbroek (2007, pp. 301, 312).

  199. 199.

    Barber (2013, pp. 567–568): ‘Identifying democracy and competency as two of the necessary, though not sufficient ingredients for a successful state gives us just enough to begin to explain the classic demands of the separation of powers. It explains why we need different types of institutions, wielding different types of power, staffed by people with different talents and qualities. (…) There is a good explanation, grounded in the point of the state, as to why the state needs an array of institutional forms, why these institutions should exercise the powers they possess, and why different types of qualification should be required of the officers who act in those bodies. The usual demands of the separation of powers can be couched in terms of suitability. Institutions and powers should be created that are suitable to the achievement of the state’s characteristic purpose. Powers should be allocated to those institutions that are most suitable for their exercise. The type of person chosen to act in these institutions should be suitable for the type of power the institution exercises.’

  200. 200.

    This is the conclusion in some other countries. Kerošius et al. (2014, p. 211).

  201. 201.

    Therefore, one cannot agree with Mendes (2006, pp. 276–277), that suggests only specialisation of courts.

  202. 202.

    An automated electronic case assignment does not consider judges’ technical specialisation, as observed by Romboli (1993, pp. 68–69). About false assumptions regarding specialisation, Oldfather (2012, pp. 851ff).

  203. 203.

    Baum (2009, p. 1676).

  204. 204.

    This measure is suggested to avoid ultra-specialisation and a sort of ‘saturation’ of the magistrate’s expertise due to an overspecificity of the subject-matter. Some authors criticise long-term stability of specialised judges, what happens in every system where judges are entitled to lifetime tenure and can only be removed or appointed elsewhere if they ask or agree to it. Zimmer (2009, pp. 5–6).

  205. 205.

    Regarding litigation agreements, I should envisage the possibility of parties agreeing not only the assignment among the judges of the specialised list, but also agreeing to assign a specific magistrate from the list. Parties would define not only the organ (such as in forum selection clauses), but the person of the judge herself. Would that be possible? I am inclined to answer the question affirmatively. In this case, the conventional norm would derogate the need of objective and impersonal criteria to case assignment to one of the judges among those on the list (letter ‘f’ in the text). The only downside of this choice would be a possible practice of judge shopping. However, in the countries with more flexibility when it comes to case assignment, this problem has not been observed, although the theoretical issue deserves close attention. See Langbroek and Fabri (2007, p. 16, 307).

  206. 206.

    Other authors suggest compensations and awards to be offered to judges whose productivity is based on specialisation, perhaps giving them some days off or cash bonuses. Mäurer (2000, p. 69), Weth (1997, pp. 971ff).

  207. 207.

    This characteristic has been seen as fundamental to assure efficiency in court management. Langbroek and Fabri (2007, p. 17).

  208. 208.

    Fabri and Langbroek (2007, p. 296). In France, legislation has historically provided some rules like those. See Foignet (1932, pp. 37–38).

  209. 209.

    Mak (2008, p. 3).

  210. 210.

    Art. 34, paragraph 2°, (1), Lithuanian CPC. About the subject, Kerošius et al. (2014, p. 212, note 13 and p. 213 note 15, highlighting), however, that competence transfers are exceptional in practice.

  211. 211.

    Damle (2005, p. 1271).

  212. 212.

    By the risk of capture, some authors defend that the solution for some issues should be in charge of a generalist judiciary, not of specialised regulatory agencies. About the discussion, see Eskridge (2013, pp. 428ff).

  213. 213.

    Defending specialisation formats that do not withdraw judge’s general vision, Zimmer (2009, p. 5), Mak (2008, p. 7).

  214. 214.

    Or adopting alternatives, such as itinerant judges. Against the euphoria over specialisation, see Uzelac (2014, pp. 156–157).

  215. 215.

    Mak reaches a partially similar conclusion: Mak (2008, p. 5).

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Cabral, A. (2023). New Trends and Perspectives on Case Management: Proposals on Procedural Agreements and Case Assignment Management. In: Cadiet, L., Fu, Y. (eds) On Judicial Management from Comparative Perspective. Contemporary Chinese Civil and Commercial Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8673-4_3

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