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The Methodology of Anti-Zionists

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The Classical Liberal Case for Israel

Abstract

What is the methodology employed by Anti-Zionists who attack Israel? We subject their critiques to withering criticism.

The truth is that if Israel were to put down its arms there would be no more Israel. If the Arabs were to put down their arms there would be no more war Benjamin Netanyahu (August 14, 2006, quoted in Globes (2006)).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Block, Walter E., Futerman, Alan G. and Farber, Rafi. 2016. “The Legal Status of the State of Israel A Libertarian Approach”. Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 3, Issue 3, June, pp. 435–553. Most of that paper is reproduced in the present book in Chaps. 1, 2 and 6. A positive response to our article was written by Yanovskiy (2017). Available from present authors upon request.

  2. 2.

    See more on this in Chap. 3, Section 3.4.

  3. 3.

    See more on this in Chap. 3, Section 3.1.

  4. 4.

    That is the view of anarcho-capitalism also. Under limited government libertarianism, or minarchism, it would be proper for the state to own enough territory to house its army, police and courts, but no more.

  5. 5.

    There are countries that are roughly that size: Monaco, Lichtenstein for example.

  6. 6.

    Quoted in Leibler (1972, 15).

  7. 7.

    See also the tractate Baba Metzia.

  8. 8.

    And homesteading requires empirical evidence.

  9. 9.

    Except, of course, in cases where previous spceific homesteading can be traced back to a certain group, such as with Kohanim and the Temple Mount. But this cannot be done with most of the land. Also, Kohanim are not an ethnic group per se, and the argument is based on genetics as well as cultural criteria (both are relevant here, and are a case in point).

  10. 10.

    This would include commerce, such as buying, selling or bartering, but, also, anything else voluntary, such as gift-giving, inheritance, gambling.

  11. 11.

    Further, merely because someone “lives somewhere” does not grant him ownership rights. Tenants, for example, “live” in the apartments owned by landlords. They hardly achieve ownership rights by so doing. If they did, there could be no such thing as residential rentals.

  12. 12.

    Although urban land is not taken into account here, this is irrelevant given that both “Arabs and other non-Jews” and Jews had approximately the same amount of urban territory according to Table 7.1.

  13. 13.

    This is a very important point. Suppose that group A owned all of Manhattan, with its vast real estate values, while group B owned an equal amount of relatively worthless acreage in the middle of Alaska. We would have to concede that if we extrapolate from these possessions, they would each own the same amount of the entire country. Land values are entirely irrelevant to homesteading. The poor man’s parched acreage counts just as much for homesteading purposes as the rich farmer’s fertile field. Why, then, do we go on and on about the fact that Jewish territory was much more valuable than Arab holdings during this epoch? We do so because we see this as evidence that although some of the territory held by the latter group was indeed cultivated, and hence legitimately owned, another portion was not, thus did not properly belong to them at all, even though it was counted in their column.

  14. 14.

    Does this not undercut our defense of Israel? No. See below.

  15. 15.

    Lest we be misunderstood, we do not favor taxes per se. We only resort to this data to indicate which people had a greater economic impact at that time. Note, we only mention data from this epoch arguendo. Our real starting point is two millennia earlier. Even if in the early twentieth century the data indicated the reverse, our contention would still be valid. It is even more so, given this set of statistics.

  16. 16.

    See about the land categories at the time in Chap. 3, Section 3.1.

  17. 17.

    67.8% and 14.52% do not add up to 100%, as the last line in Table 7.10 indicates. The figure 100% corresponds to the column “Total”. The other columns correspond to Jewish and Arab shares respectively. The remaining % to get to 100% correspond to the category “others” (A Survey of Palestine, 1946, 572–573).

  18. 18.

    See also Chap. 3, Section 3.1, with respect to Map 3.2.

  19. 19.

    In fact, our critic is wrong, it is on page 238. See Palestine Royal Commission Report. Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. July, 1937, p. 238.

  20. 20.

    For how long must a person settle on land before he owns it? How intensively must he mix his labor with it so as to legitimately own it? This is a continuum problem which admits of no specific answer, such as 3.2 years, and one corn plant every square 14 inches. On this continuum issue see Block and Barnett (2008). For libertarian literature on the homesteading issue, see Block (1990, 2002a, 2002b), Block and Edelstein (2012), Block and Yeatts (1999–2000), Block and Epstein (2005), Bylund (2005, 2012), Grotius (1625), Hoppe (1993, 2011), Kinsella (2003, 2006, 2009a, b), Locke (1948, pp. 17–19; 1955, chapter 5), Paul (1987), Pufendorf (1673), Rothbard (1973b, 32), Rozeff (2005), Watner (1982).

  21. 21.

    On the charge of displacement of Arabs, see Chap. 3, Section 3.1.

  22. 22.

    But are there no statutes of limitation, that would override the long deferred claim of the Hebrews? Not at least according to libertarian law. See on this Block (Unpublished).

  23. 23.

    See Chap. 4.

  24. 24.

    With the purpose of not making the “International Community” angry. See Chap. 4.

  25. 25.

    See Chap. 4.

  26. 26.

    See Chap. 4.

  27. 27.

    See Chap. 4.

  28. 28.

    We hold no particular brief for “international law”, philosophically. However, this does not stop us from attempting to refute Hammond’s claim in this regard.

  29. 29.

    They would undoubtedly be decreased even more so, were these invasive occurences to cease altogether.

  30. 30.

    On the influence of Israel on the economy of Palestinian Arabs in Judea and Samaria see Zaken (2019).

  31. 31.

    See DellaPergola (2001, 3).

  32. 32.

    Contrary to popular word usage, there are no “ghettos” in the U.S. A “ghetto” is actually an area to which an ethnic group is forcibly removed, and not allowed by law to leave.

  33. 33.

    Phillips (2009) explains: “Julius Stone referred to the absurdity of considering the establishment of Israeli settlements as violating Article 49(6): ‘We would have to say that the effect of Article 49(6) is to impose an obligation on the State of Israel to ensure (by force if necessary) that these areas, despite their millennial association with Jewish life, shall be forever judenrein. Irony would thus be pushed to the absurdity of claiming that Article 49(6), designed to prevent repetition of Nazi-type genocidal policies of rendering Nazi metropolitan territories judenrein, has now come to mean that?.?.?.? (sic) the West Bank?.?.?.? (sic) must be made judenrein and must be so maintained, if necessary by the use of force by the government of Israel against its own inhabitants. Common sense as well as correct historical and functional context exclude so tyrannical a reading of Article 49(6).’

    “Stone’s pointed critique of what has since become ‘accepted’ wisdom invites a hypothetical: Suppose a group of Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel requested permission to establish a community on the West Bank. Further, assume that Israel facilitated the community’s establishment, without the loss of their citizenship, on land purchased from other Palestinian Arabs (not citizens of Israel) or on state territory. Would establishment of this settlement violate Article 49(6)? If not, how can one distinguish the hypothetical Arab settlements from Jewish settlements?

    “Concluding that Israeli settlements violate Article 49(6) also overlooks the Jewish communities that existed before the creation of the state in areas occupied by today’s Israeli settlements, for example, in Hebron and the Etzion bloc outside Jerusalem. These Jewish communities were destroyed by Arab armies, militias, and rioters, and, as in the case of Hebron, the community’s population was slaughtered. Is it sensible to interpret Article 49 to bar the reconstitution of Jewish communities that were destroyed through aggression and slaughter? If so, the international law of occupation runs the risk of freezing one occupier’s conduct in place, no matter how unlawful” (emphasis added).

  34. 34.

    The fact that we feel compelled to explicitly deny this outrageous charge demonstrates the effectiveness of anti Israel propaganda.

  35. 35.

    Were the Nazis “ethnically cleansed” when Germans were removed from France, Poland, Russia in the aftermath of World War II? Of course not. However, Hammond’s use of this phrase would imply that they were.

  36. 36.

    Apart from the obvious growth of Arab Israeli population, the data that can be seen in Table 6.4 regarding the growth of the total Muslim population west of Jordan river since 1947 makes the “ethnic cleansing” “theory” look ridiculous. In contrast, if we see the situation of Arab Jews, it would be exactly the opposite, since the reduction was almost complete. The reason for the latter? (Real) ethnic cleansing.

  37. 37.

    See Chap. 3, Section 3.4.

  38. 38.

    See Chap. 3, particularly Sections 3.4 and 3.6.

  39. 39.

    See Chap. 6, Sect. 6.6, among others.

  40. 40.

    See Chap. 5.

  41. 41.

    Here, we come perilously close to criticizing a scholar not for what he writes, but for what he omits. This appears at first sight as an intellectual failure on our part. However, context is all. There is not one people in the dock on these matters, but two. Yes, there were some Israeli leaders who mis-spoke. But when compared to the gargantuan sins of commission on the other side, the former pale almost into insignificance. Moreover, the Arabs did indeed launch a series of genocidal wars against Israel, not just talked about it.

  42. 42.

    Israel’s Law of Return for Diaspora Jews is often characterized by anti-Zionists as a “racist” policy that contrasts with Israel’s opposition to the Palestinian Arabs’ “right of return”. Since we have already treated the latter in length throughout this book (for instance, see Chap. 6, Section 6.4), consider the following on the former: The right to citizenship for descendants of former nationals is not new. It occurs in Germany, Italy, Hungary, and other countries. Yet, it seems somehow that only Israel’s right of return laws are a form of “racism”. Since Israel is the Jewish state, it has laws of return with respect to Jews. It is a wild-eyed stretch to assume that by not giving these rights to others it is “racist”, in very much the same way that it would be absurd to think of Italy as “racist” if it does not extend citizenship rights for the Chinese along with descendants of former national Italians.

  43. 43.

    See UNRWA, http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (last visited April 26, 2020).

  44. 44.

    See more on this subject in Chap. 6, Section 6.4.

  45. 45.

    On Israel’s economy and economic freedom see Chap. 8.

  46. 46.

    See Chap. 4.

  47. 47.

    See Chap. 4.

  48. 48.

    See “Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt” (Mar 26, 1979).

  49. 49.

    See Chap. 4.

  50. 50.

    See for example Rothbard (1962, ch. 10; 2009).

  51. 51.

    “Since last year, Syria has been under the control of the most militantly anti-imperialist government that the Middle East has seen in years”, Rothbard (1967, 27).

  52. 52.

    It could be interesting to know whether our critic only disapproves of property held by Israeli Jews, or if Israeli Arabs are also to be regarded as illegitimate owners. We presume that this author would only condemn the former, although both groups are Israeli, since the latter are Arab, and as such, ipso facto the “rightful owners”.

  53. 53.

    See Chap. 5.

  54. 54.

    We owe this general observation of the anti-Zionist obsession against Israel, and its relation with the Jews, to Dr. Gustavo Perednik. See Perednik (2014).

  55. 55.

    Since the Messaiah had not appeared by 1948.

  56. 56.

    See Chap. 1 supra.

  57. 57.

    For example, most of the Old City of Jerusalem and Masada.

  58. 58.

    For a libertarian analysis of the privatization process, see Anderson and Hill (1996), Block (2002c, 2009a), Butler (1988), Carnis (2003), Ebeling (2013), Hanke (1987a, b), Hannesson (2004, 2006), Hoppe (2011), Karpoff (2001), Megginson (2001), Moore (1987), Moore and Butler (1987), Motichek et al. (2008), Ohashi (1980), Ohashi et al. (1980), Pirie (1986), Savas (1987), Walker (1988), White (1978).

  59. 59.

    Along with a little “body English,” that is. In effect, we are assuming, in the absence of any contrary claim or evidence, that parents always bequeath their wealth to their (typically younger) relatives. But there is enough precedence in natural law for us not to have to apologize for any such assumption.

  60. 60.

    Buchanan (1983) favors a 100% inheritance tax, thus entirely obviating this institution. Were he correct, this would spell the death knell for our thesis. But his proposal has been roundly and correctly refuted. For other critics of inheritance, see Batchelder (2009–2010), Matthews (2014), Prabhakar (2008), White (2008); for supporters, Block (2011b, 2012), Rothbard (1973a, b), Tabarrok (2005), Tullock (1971). States Rothbard (1973a, b, 49–50) on this matter: “Many people are willing to concede the justice and propriety of property rights and the free-market economy, to concede that the farmer should be able to charge whatever his wheat will bring from consumers or the worker to reap whatever others are willing to pay for his services. But they balk at one point: inheritance. If Willie Stargell is ten times as good and ‘productive’ a ball player as Joe Jack, they are willing to concede the justice of Stargell’s earning ten times the amount; but what, they ask, is the justification for someone whose only merit is being born a Rockefeller inheriting far more wealth than someone born a Rothbard? The libertarian answer is to concentrate not on the recipient, the child Rockefeller or the child Rothbard, but to concentrate on the giver, the man who bestows the inheritance. For if Smith and Jones and Stargell have the right to their labor and property and to exchange the titles to this property for the similar property of others, they also have the right to give their property to whomever they wish. And of course most such gifts consist of the gifts of the property owners to their children—in short, inheritance. If Willie Stargell owns his labor and the money he earns from it, then he has the right to give that money to the baby Stargell.”

  61. 61.

    There is of course such a thing as a natural statute of limitations: time. For, the further back one goes into history, the more difficult it is to prove any familial relationship. But, if it can be proven, even if it occurred millennia ago, that should suffice. For a libertarian analysis of this issue, see Alston and Block (2007), Block (1993, 2001, 2002b), Block and Yeatts (1999–2000).

  62. 62.

    Based on an example by Israeli Journalist Marcelo Kisilevski.

  63. 63.

    They are also a rights violation, per se. If A owes B money, then A owes B money, period. Just because A refuses to pay B what rightfully belongs to the latter for a large number of years in no way cancels A’s debt to B, or the latter’s heirs. Yet, a statute of limitations is predicated upon the proposition that if sufficient time passes, then otherwise rightfully owned debts are cancelled. If that is not a violation of justice, then nothing is.

  64. 64.

    See Chap. 1.

  65. 65.

    Of course, there are exceptions in the case of Jews today, we allow. If farming took place twenty centuries ago, there may not be any physical evidence of such in the modern day. However, there is numerous evidence, provided allthroughout this book, that the Jews homesteaded part of the territory in contention two millennia ago. Not only in historical sources, but also in the form of buildings, structures, roads, temples, that endure to the present.

  66. 66.

    See Chap. 3, Section 3.1.

  67. 67.

    We do not at all oppose absentee landlordship, provided that it is based on initial homesteading, and then, subsequently, on what Nozick (1974) calls “legitimate title transfer.” That is, anything voluntary, such as gift, trade, sale, gambling.

  68. 68.

    States Malcolm (1958, pp. 31–32): “On one walk he ‘gave’ to me each tree that we passed, with the reservation that I was not to cut it down or do anything to it, or prevent the previous owners from doing anything to it: with those reservations it was henceforth mine.” The point is, if you cannot sell something, then you do not fully own it.

  69. 69.

    If the critic would say, on the contrary, that the titles were illegitimate, but that the Arab peasants working the land were the real homesteaders, then he would have to prove that such widespread dispossession took place. As we showed in Chap. 3, Section 3.1, for the most part it did not. Moreover, as shown above, where oh where is the evidence of such widespread homesteading by these Arab peasants? The data simply does not reflect it.

  70. 70.

    Twain (1869, 349), quoted in Peters (1984).

  71. 71.

    Twain (1869, 366; 375), quoted in Peters (1984).

  72. 72.

    Twain (1869, 441; 442), quoted in Peters (1984).

  73. 73.

    We have no quarrel with collectivism (narrowly understood), provided it takes place on a voluntary basis. The following can all be said to fit this bill and thus none is per se a violation of rights: nunnery, convent, kibbutz, commune, collective, syndicate, cooperatives, monastery, abbey, priory, friary, religious community, family. The same goes for all sports teams, orchestras, choruses, dance troups, clubs, etc.

  74. 74.

    Well, as licit as any other country.

  75. 75.

    Let us focus narrowly on our contention that Jews returned “to homestead land again”. An objection might be launched against us to the effect that either this terrain belongs to the Jews based on what happened 2000 years ago, as we both authors contend, or it does not. If so, there is no need to re-homestead any territory. On that account, our contention that those Arabs who remained in Israel in 1948 have a right to the land they occupied is wrong. This is, arguendo, erroneous since the Jews homesteaded it 2000 years ago, and thus even those good Arabs were still usurpers, trespassers. Here is our response to this possible objection to our claim in the text. We agree 100% as to the fact that Jews homesteaded the area 2000 years ago. No problem there. The thing is how do we make a case for modern day Jews to all of the territory? The land in 1948s Israel can be divided into three parts: 1- Specific places that are Jewish beyond doubt, including the Temple Mount, Jerusalem’s Old City, every archaeological site, etc. These are Jewish, and no Arab control nor ownership can be justified. Thus, Jews need not homestead again what is already theirs. 2- Most of the land had no evidence of previous (Jewish or non-Jewish) homesteading, so it cannot be considered the proper ownership of anyone. It was held by the Ottomans, then the British, and now the state of Israel. It passed from one national entity to the other. For example, the Negev Desert. Hence, although many places could have exhibited evidence of Jewish homesteading in the form of buildings, temples, roads, you name it, there is none now. So they must be homesteaded again. This is the sense in which we use this expression, “again.” 3- Many Arab villages were built from scratch, in places where no evidence of previous Jewish homesteading exists. These places, we believe, should be owned by Arabs, since they homesteaded them. And no proof of previous Jewish homesteading exists there. For instance, many of the villages now populated by Israeli Arabs. Thus, there are some pieces of terrain that can be properly owned by Arabs, and whose ownership could be legitimately granted to them on a theoretical level. We do just that, in contrast to our crticis that regard all Jewish property as illegitimate. We also reject what might be called an ultra Zionist position; that Arabs cannot own a single square inch of Israeli territory. Ours is a moderate stance.

  76. 76.

    Future Government of Palestine, G.A. Res. 181(II), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, at 131, UN Doc. A/519 (1947).

  77. 77.

    Paraphrase.

  78. 78.

    Let us engage in a bit of contrary to fact history. Suppose that in 1948, the seven Arabs nations that attacked the new state of Israel had instead welcomed it as a neighbor. And posit that Israel’s neighbors never engaged in wars against it, not in 1956, nor, 1967, nor 1973. Is there anyone rash enough to doubt that the size of this small nation would have been exactly the same as laid down by the U.N. in 1948? Although this can of course only be speculative, it would be foolish to deny the possibility of this scenario. Thus, the reason for “greater” Israel does not at all emanate from expansionistic tendencies on the part of this nation. Rather, it stems from defensive wars that this country won. “Conquest” implies initiation of violence. The very opposite is the case in this regard.

  79. 79.

    Paraphrase.

  80. 80.

    See on wage scales at the time Table 2.1, and Chapters 1, 2 and 3.

  81. 81.

    During the period 1517–1917.

  82. 82.

    In the beginning of the 1920s. See the “Trans-Jordan Memorandum” (September 16, 1922).

  83. 83.

    See Kurzman (1970 (2005)).

  84. 84.

    If there were, the Israelis were powerful enough to successfully carry it out.

  85. 85.

    See Chap. 3, Section 3.8.

  86. 86.

    Future Government of Palestine, G.A. Res. 181(II), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, at 131, UN Doc. A/519 (1947).

  87. 87.

    On Michigan Democratic Representative Rashida Tlaib’s claims on this regard, see Phillips (2019) and Rozett (2019).

  88. 88.

    In the words of Israeli politican Naftali Bennet: “Judea and Samaria has been a Jewish state for roughly 3000 years, well before the first Americans reached the new continent of America, and we’re going to stay here forever [...] We’re not occupying any land. One cannot occupy his own home. These are not settlements. We’ve got about 650,000 Israelis living in eastern Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria. Big cities. We’ve been here for thousands of years. We’re staying here. We’re going to live side by side in peace with the Arabs here, but not by forcing our hand”. Quoted in Benari (2016).

  89. 89.

    See Block (2011a) and Jankovic and Block (2016).

  90. 90.

    See Chap. 1.

  91. 91.

    As is interpreted in the Bible.

  92. 92.

    See Map 5 in Annex A.

  93. 93.

    The Balfour Declaration. November 2, 1917. See Map 10 in Annex A.

  94. 94.

    This is particularly true on the cases where Palestinian Arab propaganda features an alleged case of Israeli atrocity. See Chap. 4.

  95. 95.

    See Assouline (2013).

  96. 96.

    See Chap. 1.

  97. 97.

    The name of the entity Islamic texts say transported Muhammad from Mecca to Jerusalem and back.

  98. 98.

    See Chap. 1.

  99. 99.

    He criticized Futerman, Farber and Block (2016).

  100. 100.

    The following is based on sections of our paper Farber, Rafi; Block, Walter E. and Futerman, Alan G. 2018. “Reply to Mosquito on Israel and libertarianism”. Review of Social and Economic Issues (RSEI), Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 29–38.

  101. 101.

    Needless to say, we consider this point only arguendo.

  102. 102.

    Scare quotes to indicate that all five of the contending parties agree that Israeli territory (or Jewish rights) should extend at least to 7% of what it included in 1948: “The partition plan granted the Jews, who had a negligible fraction of Palestine land, almost half the land area of the country” (emphasis added) (Rothbard 1967, 24); “The Jews bought nearly 9% of the land, and homesteaded it...” (Block et al. 2016, 487); “As noted in the title, Israel is 7% legitimate” (Mosquito 2018a).

  103. 103.

    At least in terms of extent of territory.

  104. 104.

    The Canadian response to the attempt of Quebec to set up its own country is an honorable exception to this general rule. No armies sweeping in, as in the case of the Kurds, or the Americans in 1776. Democratic elections were allowed, as they were not for the Catalonians in Spain.

  105. 105.

    Before the secessions (or its attempt), have the Spaniards held pogroms against the Catalonians? No. Had the British treated the Americans in this despicable manner? Of course not. QED? Perhaps the Kurds suffer from the Syrians and Turks a hatred similar to that of the Arabs against Israel.

  106. 106.

    We are still assuming 7% of the terrain actually controlled by the Israelis in 1948. We could also say 9% or 10%, but, arguendo, we continue with the 7% figure.

  107. 107.

    Work with us here. We follow Rothbard’s (1967, 29) view that, “Israel is a European nation with a European technological standard battling a primitive and undeveloped foe […]”.

  108. 108.

    See Block et al. (2016), pages 444, 476, 503, 508 for references.

  109. 109.

    On libertarian punishment theory, see the following: Block (2006, 2009b, b), Kinsella (1996), Marjanovic (2013), Morris (1968), Nozick (1981, 363–373), Olson (1979), Rothbard (1982a [1998], 88), Whitehead and Block (2003). Again, in the view of Rothbard (1982a [1998], 91–92): “It should be evident that our theory of proportional punishment—that people may be punished by losing their rights to the extent that they have invaded the rights of others—is frankly a retributive theory of punishment, a ‘tooth (or two teeth) for a tooth’ theory. Retribution is in bad repute among philosophers, who generally dismiss the concept quickly as ‘primitive’ or ‘barbaric’ and then race on to a discussion of the two other major theories of punishment: deterrence and rehabilitation. But simply to dismiss a concept as ‘barbaric’ can hardly suffice; after all, it is possible that in this case, the ‘barbarians’ hit on a concept that was superior to the more modern creeds.” If this does not justify relieving the Arab countries of their undeserved property, and thus greatly expanding Israel, then nothing does or can.

  110. 110.

    To which this author seeks to hold us.

  111. 111.

    Also, we are attempting to convert Mosquito, a pre-eminent libertarian theorist, to our way of looking at this matter.

  112. 112.

    That is, if we follow an anarcho-capitalist viewpoint.

  113. 113.

    This is undeniable (again, from an anarcho-capitalist viewpoint), but would prohibit us from commenting on Rothbard (1967) in any relevant manner.

  114. 114.

    Paul Berman (2018), discussing Michael Walzer’s book A Foreign Policy for the Left (2018), comments at Tablet: “Sometimes a broad public on the American left gazes upon authoritarian political movements and dreadful dictators in distant corners of the universe and likes to imagine that, far from being authoritarian or dictatorial, the movements and the dictators are boldly progressive, superior perhaps even to the U.N. and the ICC—though Walzer suggests that, in their inner thoughts, a great many people do know better. But they go on proclaiming their political fantasy, anyway, which amounts to an additional twist on the ‘politics of pretending.’

    “There is the spectacular instance of left-wing delusion about the Islamist political movement—the left-wing supposition that something has got to be progressive about the Islamists, even if the Islamists appear to be medieval reactionaries; and the further supposition that Islamism’s enemies among Muslims and non-Muslims alike must surely be the actual reactionaries, even when the enemies appear to be liberals and progressives […]

    “Only, why would large numbers of idealistic-minded people on the American left want to engage in this sort of foreign-affairs make-believe? What is the appeal in it? The appeal is to avoid thinking about the world beyond the United States […] It is a provincialism that calls itself idealism.”

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Block, W.E., Futerman, A.G. (2021). The Methodology of Anti-Zionists. In: The Classical Liberal Case for Israel. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3953-1_7

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