Japan’s Post-War Reconstruction, the Car Industry, and Nissan/Datsun

Suzuki, Hitoshi

doi:10.1007/978-981-15-9058-0_2

Hitoshi Suzuki⁵

Part of the book series: New Directions in East Asian History ((NDEAH))

173 Accesses

Abstract

The outbreak of the Korean War resulted in American (and British) occupation powers to lift Allied restrictions on Japanese industry. The Japanese car industry revived under MITI’s guide and its market protection. Although ranking second next to Toyota in domestic shares, Nissan superseded in exports and overseas assembling. Nissan’s leadership was essential in both launching JAMA and internationalising Japanese trade unions. Facing competition from the aggressively rising Honda, Nissan gave full gas to its plant projects in the US and Europe. The queen’s visit to Japan in May 1975 marked a turning point for improving Anglo-Japanese relations, encouraging the Japanese to invest in Britain. Britain was targeted as one of the most suitable location in Europe, but not without rivals.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 39.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 54.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 54.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
Mountfield, 2007a, pp. 111, 114; Cortazzi, 2002.
2.
HughCortazzi, Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere; A Memoir, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 1998, pp. 34–47.
3.
Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford University Press, 1982, pp. 132–133. Nobusuke Kishi—later the Japanese prime minister—was in charge of this policy before accepting a post in Manchuria. Kishi and Nissan’s founder, Yoshisuke Ayukawa, worked closely together.
4.
Ibid., p. 200.
5.
Ibid., pp. 9, 237, 258.
6.
Johnson, Werner, and Noguchi pointed out Japanese continuity from the pre-war to the post-war economy. Johnson and Noguchi emphasised the role of MITI and bureaucrats in the economy, while Werner emphasised the Bank of Japan. Noguchi downplayed the role of Japanese dependence on exports for post-war growth; Yukio Noguchi, Post-War Economic History; Where Have We Failed (Sengo keizai-shi; watashitachi wa dokode machigaetanoka), Tokyo: Nikkei, 2019; Richard Werner, Princes of the Yen; Japan’s Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy (2nd ed.), Carnforth: Quantum Publishers, 2018.
7.
Masaaki Sato, Nissan; Glory and Disgrace (Nissan, eikou to kutsujyoku), Tokyo: Bungei-shunjyu, 2012, p. 22; Jiro Uesugi, Nissan’s Fall and Come-back; Why Japanese Failed to Revive (Nissan-jidousha no shippai to saisei), Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 2001, pp. 46, 134, 157. Former Nihon-keizai-shinbun (Nikkei) journalist Sato wrote three Japanese books on Toyota, Honda and Nissan, among which the last one—and the most contested—has not been translated into English. Masaaki Sato, The Toyota Leaders; An Executive Guide, Vertical, 2008; Masaaki Sato, The Honda Myth; The Genius and His Wake, Vertical, 2006.
8.
Nissan’s headquarters moved to its hometown, Yokohama, in August 2009 to celebrate the harbour’s centennial.
9.
Based on the Japanese abbreviation “Kogin” of Nihon Kogyou Ginkou, Nissan was also nicknamed Kogin-motors; Uesugi, 2001, p. 149.
10.
Ishihara was more than ambitious to become president and intended to talk down Kawamata. Former Nikkei journalist Sato described Ishihara’s attitude as visiting Kawamata’s house without appointment and, lounging on a sofa with his feet on the table, telling Kawamata to leave Nissan and join a subsidiary; this was the “president’s decision, confirmed by the main bank Kogin.” It was a plot, but Ishihara’s coup d’état failed. The unions, Nissan-rouso, stopped the assembly lines in protest and directly lobbied Kogin to express the unions’ support of Kawamata’s presidency; Sato, 2012, pp. 39–41; Shioji, 2012, pp. 76–78.
11.
See Sect. 4 of this chapter on Shioji. Kawamata owed him for driving the leftist unions out of the plants and thereafter relied on Shioji’s leadership; Hisao Inoue, Nissan vs. Ghosn; Two Decades of Dictatorship and Turmoil (Shihai to antou no nijyu-nen), Tokyo: Bungei-shunjyu, 2009, pp. 71–73.
12.
Koichi Shimokawa, The Japanese Automobile Industry; A Business History, London: Athlone Press, 1994, p. 110; Mountfield, 2007a, p. 117.
13.
Nissan, 1983, pp. 98–99.
14.
Ibid.
15.
Kawamata as president named the car. He admitted this later on and told PM Margaret Thatcher that the Bluebird’s success owed heavily to the British. See Sect. 14 in Chapter 4.
16.
Nissan, 1975, p. 155.
17.
Ibid., p. 154.
18.
Ibid., p. 155. The reversion of Okinawa from the US to Japan took place on 15 May 1972; thereafter, drivers drove on the left side of the road, as on the mainland.
19.
Ibid., p. 154.
20.
Ibid., p. 181.
21.
Ibid., p. 395.
22.
Ibid., p. 160.
23.
Ibid., p. 397.
24.
TNA (The National Archives, Kew), FV22/133, Gardiner to Boonham, 21 August 1978.
25.
Mountfield, 2007a, p. 109.
26.
Zoltán Südy, “Memoires on Japanese Investments to Hungary (Nihon kigyou no tai-Hungary toushi no denkiteki-kousatsu),” in Shuichi Ikemoto and Hiroshi Tanaka (eds.), Japanese Multinationals’ Entry into the New Developing Markets in Europe; Perspectives from Central Europe and Russia (Oushu shinkou-shijyou-koku eno Nikkei-kigyou no shinshutsu), Tokyo: Bunshin-dou, 2014, pp. 232–233.
27.
Ibid.
28.
The launch of the Subaru 1000 also occurred in 1966.
29.
Sato, 2012, p. 11.
30.
In consultation with its owner, Shojiro Ishibashi, also the founder of Bridgestone, Yoshio Sakurauchi as MITI’s minister mediated the merger; Inoue, 2019, pp. 74–77.
31.
After its first challenge in the Manx Tourist Trophy in 1959, Honda won the TT in 1961 and then launched its motorcycle plant in Belgium in September 1962. Assembly started in May 1963.
32.
Takumi Anzai, Keidanren; The Fall of Japanese Business’s Headquarters (rakujitsu no zaikai-souhonzan), Shicho-sha, 2014, p. 105. Again in 1968 a high-ranked MITI official stated that Japanese car assemblers should merge under two groups, Toyota and Nissan; Masaaki Sato, Automobile Industry; The Making and Breakup of Alliances (Jidousha gasshou-renkou no sekai), Tokyo: Bungei-shunjyu, 2000, pp. 22–23.
33.
Anzai, 2014, p. 104.
34.
Sato, 2000, p. 23.
35.
Sato, 2012, p. 11.
36.
Ibid.
37.
Suzuki, 2015a, pp. 28–34; Sato, 2012, pp. 10–12.
38.
Sato, 2012, p. 11.
39.
Ichiro Shioji, The Rise and Fall of Nissan; Testimony by the President of the Jidousha-rouren (Nissan-jidousha no seisui), Tokyo: Ryokufu Publishing, 2012, pp. 13–14.
40.
Nissan-rouren http://www.ngu.or.jp/soshiki/history/. Accessed on 23 October 2019.
41.
Nissan, 1983, pp. 245–246; Nissan-rouren http://www.ngu.or.jp/soshiki/history/. Accessed on 23 October 2019.
42.
Shioji, 2012, pp. 79–90.
43.
Ibid., pp. 80–82; Sato, 2000, p. 106.
44.
Shioji, 2012, pp. 82–87.
45.
Ryo Takasugi, Labour Aristocrant (roudou-kizoku), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986. Shioji was known to own a yacht, drove a Nissan Z, and rarely hesitated to hide his private wealth, questioning why it was wrong for a union leader to sail on a yacht and enjoy (expensive) drinks in Ginza.
46.
A majority of Japanese analysts, biased on the management side, have criticised Shioji’s dominant leadership as an abuse of power. Noriaki Kawakatsu, Nissan’s 2300 Secret Files; Seven years’ war of a manager against the “absolute power” (Nissan-jidosha gokuhi file 2300) Tokyo: President, 2018; Uesugi, 2001, pp. 52–56, 137–142.
47.
Philip Garrahan and Paul Stewart, The Nissan Enigma: Flexibility at Work in a Local Economy, London: Mansell Publishing, 1992, pp. 1–5.
48.
Suzuki, 2015a, pp. 29–34.
49.
JAW http://www.jaw.or.jp/intro/intro8.html. Accessed on 23 October 2019.
50.
Ibid.
51.
Nissan, 1975, pp. 156–157.
52.
The name Nissan Motor originated in June 1934. Ayukawa was the owner of a metal casting firm in Tobata, Fukuoka of Kyushu, which later became Hitachi Metals. During the late 1930s, Ayukawa became one of the three influential Japanese officials (the others were Nobusuke Kishi—prime minister after the war—and Yosuke Mastuoka) ruling Manchuria.
53.
Sato, 2012, p. 40.
54.
See Sect. 6 of the next chapter.
55.
Shioji, 2012, p. 214. PM Thatcher recalled her visit to Japan in September 1982 and pointed out that one clue to Japan’s industrial success was its industrialists having had earlier careers in engineering. In contrast, she characterised British management as being limited to administration and accountancy; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: HarperCollins, 1993, p. 496. Ironically, her ‘favourite’ counterpart, Ishihara, had the latter background.
56.
Sato, 2012, pp. 50–52.
57.
Ibid.
58.
Ibid.; Sato, 2000, p. 107.
59.
Shioji, 2012, p. 207.
60.
Sato, 2012, p. 52.
61.
Sato, 2000, p. 107.
62.
See Sect. 3 of this chapter.
63.
Sato, 2012, p. 52.
64.
Sato, 2000, p. 94.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo, Japan
Hitoshi Suzuki

Authors

Hitoshi Suzuki
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hitoshi Suzuki .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Suzuki, H. (2020). Japan’s Post-War Reconstruction, the Car Industry, and Nissan/Datsun. In: Japanese Investment and British Trade Unionism. New Directions in East Asian History. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9058-0_2

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9058-0_2
Published: 24 November 2020
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-15-9057-3
Online ISBN: 978-981-15-9058-0
eBook Packages: HistoryHistory (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics