Abstract
This chapter takes into consideration the nature of meaning keeping in view that both language and mind embody meaning. The concept b of meaning is central to philosophy of language and mind because meaning is the way language and mind function. The problem arises when we try to decipher the way meaning arises. The holists and atomists differ as to how meaning arises in language and mind.
Quine and Davidson have been the champions of meaning holism because both hold that meaning cannot be atomic because language functions as a system. With reference to language, Quine is of the view that language as a theory is not verifiable in experience piecemeal because sentences do not get verified in isolation. Therefore language as a whole has to get its meaning by an encounter with the world.
Davidson explains the language-world encounter through the concept of interpretation of our utterances regarding the world. For him, interpretation is a basic mechanism by which we understand language as such. Therefore we have to keep in mind the truth conditions of the sentences we make regarding the world. Meaning accrues to language holistically within a broad truth schema that can ensure meaning for the entire language by appealing to the truth conditions.
Meaning holism is defended in this chapter because of its efficacy in explaining meaning without going back to the atomistic verificationism and reductionism of the logical positivists. However, it is further argued the naturalist semantics is not enough to explain meaning and normativity of language.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (2001). Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (2005). Truth, language and history. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
De Rosa, R., & Lepore, E. (2004). Quine’s meaning holism. In R. F. Gibson (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dummett, M. (1975). What is a theory of meaning? In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J., & Lepore, E. (1992). Holism: A shopper’s guide. Oxford: Blackwell.
Quine, W. V. (1953). From a logical point of view. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York/London: Columbia University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1981). Theories and things. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Russell, B. (1919). Introduction to mathematical philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin.
Tarski, A. (1956). Logic, semantics and metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Tractatus logico-philosophicus (D. F. Pears, & B. F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pradhan, R.C. (2019). Meaning Holism. In: Mind, Meaning and World. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7228-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7228-5_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-7227-8
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-7228-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)