Abstract
A major criticism of Chinese state enterprises is their poor performance with the solution being privatization and/or liquidation. This view assumes first the superiority of private sector performance and second a clear distinction between public and private enterprise. This chapter argues that these assumptions are incorrect. Instead the state has a vital role to play in the economy, and in any case the distinction between private and private enterprises are not at all sharp. The recounting of state enterprise reforms ends with typologies of state enterprises today. Evidence also shows that reforms have strengthened governance and performance, while divestiture and consolidation has produced fewer but larger and stronger state enterprises. While the enterprise-economic growth link is not easily established, the enterprise-income distribution has been perverse as state enterprises cease providing social protection.
Keywords
- State Enterprise Reform
- State-owned Assets Supervision And Administration Commission (SASAC)
- China China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
- State State Administration Of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
- privatizationPrivatization
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Zi Gong asked about government. The Master said, “Enough food, enough weapons and the confidence of the people.”
子贡问政。子曰:“足食,足兵,民信之矣。”
(Confucian Analects, 12: 7).
The duke Jing of Qi asked the Master about government. The Master replied, “Let the king rule, the minister govern, the father parent, the son obey.”
齐景公问政于孔子。孔子对曰:“君君,臣臣,父父,子子”。
(Confucian Analects, 12: 11).
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Notes
- 1.
Other attacks on the Chinese system may be even less grounded. Two examples from credible sources suffice to prove the claim. John Micklethwait opined that “the country’s rulers are acutely aware that their government does not serve ordinary Chinese well”. This judgment was based on a single person’s view, and the article was not even entirely about China (The Economist, 2011). Arthur Kroebar (2012), in explaining China’s continued resilience to the global finance crisis, ended his article with the account of China’s “second-rate society” being built upon inequality, and this is ironic considering the revelations about what unfettered capitalism had produced in twenty-first-century US (Kroeber, 2012).
- 2.
- 3.
Since the Institute was launched in 2004, there are currently (as of 2017) nearly 500 such institutes globally (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 2017).
- 4.
“Yu zhi qi guo zhe, xian qi qi jia” (欲治其国者,先齐其家) (To rightly govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate one’s own family) (Dawson, 2005).
- 5.
James C. Hsiung (2012) noted that “the state, as the certifying agent of social mobility, in what became a ‘one-career society’, invariably became larger than society itself.”
- 6.
“Legal person” is a concept relative to a natural person, which refers to legal organizations including state, corporations, institutions, and so on to execute rights and obligations in law.
- 7.
A Party Committee is an organization (similar to Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors) established in China’s state enterprises. It functions to ensure that the Communist Party of China’s policies and strategies are executed. It participates in decision-making, supervision, day-to-day operations, employment of key persons, coordination of internal relations, and other corporate governance details. It is compulsory for state enterprises to set them up but not for private enterprises.
- 8.
Corporate system reform refers to the type of enterprise transforms from enterprise owned by the whole people to wholly state-owned companies with only one single-large stockholder that is the state. For example, in December 2017, China Mobile Communications Group Corporation reformed into China Mobile Communications Group Co. Ltd. (Stcn.com, 2017).
- 9.
Joint -stock system reform refers to ownership structure is diversified to not just one single-large stockholder. For example, in October 2017, a case of cross holdings among “Yangqi ” was that Ansteel Group transferred 650 million A-shares to China National Petroleum Corporation (Xinhuanet, 2017)
- 10.
Mixed ownership reform refers to welcoming non-state stockholders’ participation. For example, in August 2017, China Unicom launched the mixed ownership reform to let Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and other companies invest in China Unicom to become stockholders (Stcn.com, 2017).
- 11.
The census enumerated 154,000 state enterprises that are wholly or majority-owned by the government, representing only 3.1% of the total number of enterprises in the industrial and service sector (Gao, 2010). The appearance of China’s state enterprises in the Fortune 500 list of companies is another indicator of the enterprise size. In 2011, China had 61 companies in this list, compared to 19 in 2005. The Sinopec Group is ranked fifth (23rd in 2005), China National Petroleum sixth (39th), and State Grid seventh (32nd) (Fortune Online, 2011).
- 12.
This state-private dichotomy is encapsulated in catchwords such as “China state enterprises advance, private sector retreats” (Chovanec, 2010).
- 13.
Marshall Meyer argued this was the case with Haier (Knowledge@Wharton, 2001).
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
“Enterprise performance” in this context refers to performance at the (microeconomic) enterprise level.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Even the sale of telecommunications equipment by Huawei, an employee-owned enterprise, to America’s AT&T in 2009 was scuttled by the American fear of the Chinese use of such equipment to spy on the US (Pomfret, 2010).
- 20.
By the mid-1990s, Mai and Perkins (1997) made this conclusion that “most SOEs are now able to operate, to a greater or lesser extent, in a market environment. Economic reform has enabled them to make their own production plans, set prices, purchase inputs and sell outputs within a market structure (Mai & Perkins, 1997)”.
- 21.
As the boundary between public sector and private sector becomes indistinct for many enterprises, the key to government support appears to hinge upon whether the leadership of the enterprise has close ties with the government, regardless of whether it is classified as public, private, or in-between.
- 22.
In as early as 1997 , Li and Putterman (2008) estimated that small state enterprises accounted for no more than 16% of total state enterprise output (Li & Putterman, 2008). This share in output would have fallen further with the government strategy of “retaining the large and releasing the small”, since the bulk of state enterprise closures are likely to be small enterprises owned by local and provincial jurisdictions.
- 23.
The large Chinese state conglomerates have been compared with their Japanese and Korean counterparts (The Economist, 1997).
- 24.
The number of central enterprises had to be reduced to fewer than 100 by 2010, but progress was slower than expected (Yang, 2011).
- 25.
From May 1998, those who were retrenched were able to receive assistance through a re-employment service. The International Labour Organization (ILO) reported that by the end of 1998, about 85% of those made redundant had registered (International Labour Organization, 2002). Dong and Putterman (2003) estimated that the ratio of state enterprise loss to before-tax profits rose from 5% in 1980 to 22% in 1995, reflecting a widening gap (Dong & Putterman, 2003).
- 26.
The World Bank did undertake a program that aimed to reduce the social consequences of its enterprise reform program. However, the fund allocated was modest, and the activities, which were later assessed to be partially successful, were limited to management and retraining of laid-off workers (Carlier, 2001).
- 27.
The strategy involved privatization, liquidation, and/or closure of numerous state enterprises at county and local levels, laying off about four million state enterprise employees, and restructuring of large enterprises through corporatization, mergers and listing on international stock exchanges.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
In the collection of papers that served as inputs to the FYP, 2 out of 9 chapters and 5 out of 20 background papers were devoted to social security issues and an additional paper co-authored by Edwin Lim and Michael Spence on housing.
- 31.
As reflected from the data in the China Statistical Yearbook, the average residential housing prices increased two and a half times from RMB 1790 per square meter in 1997 to RMB 4459 per square meter in 2009.
- 32.
Corporate social responsibility was first introduced into China by multinationals to meet the demand of Western consumers, but its adoption was accelerated by labor protests within China.
- 33.
Listed subsidiaries of these holding companies are required to and do pay dividends to the holding companies, but these profits are retained at the holding company level.
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Li, R., Cheong, K.C. (2019). State Enterprises, Economic Growth, and Distribution. In: China’s State Enterprises. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0176-6_3
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