Abstract
Vietnam has had to cope with a changed strategic and economic environment forged by China’s rise and growing competition between China and Japan. Although Vietnam’s relationship with China is its most important, Vietnamese leaders have sought to hedge against becoming too dependent on and vulnerable to China by boosting relations with other powers, particularly the United States, Japan, and India. Notably, over the past several years, Vietnam and Japan have expanded their relationship beyond the economic sphere that previously had dominated. Pushed together by the two countries’ heightened sense of threat from China, Hanoi and Tokyo have accelerated their strategic cooperation.
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Notes
- 1.
Adapted from Marvin Ott, “The Future of US-Vietnam Relations” (Paper presented at the future of relations between Vietnam and the United States, SAIS, Washington, DC, October 2–3, 2003).
- 2.
Carlyle Thayer, “Strategic Posture Review: Vietnam,” World Politics Review, no. 15 (January, 2013).
- 3.
Ibid.
- 4.
Thuy T. Do, “Is Vietnam’s Bamboo Diplomacy Threatened by Pandas?” East Asia Forum, April 3, 2014.
- 5.
The Eighth Plenum’s reinterpretation is summarized as follows: “With the objects of struggle, we can find areas for cooperation; with the partners, there exist interests that are contradictory and different from those of ours. We should be aware of these, thus overcoming the two tendencies, namely lacking vigilance and showing rigidity in our perception, design, and implementation of specific policies.” Carlyle Thayer, “Upholding State Sovereignty through Global Integration” (Paper presented to Workshop on “Vietnam, East Asia & Beyond,” Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, December 11–12, 2008).
- 6.
Thuy T. Do, “Is Vietnam’s Bamboo Diplomacy Threatened by Pandas?”
- 7.
In 2013, Vietnam ran a deficit of about 23 billion dollars with China, a 50 percent increase since 2010. Since 2009, Chinese imports have represented around a quarter of Vietnam’s total imports by value, compared to less than 10 percent a decade earlier.
- 8.
Thuy T. Do, “The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Working Paper No. 173 (March 5, 2009): 4.
- 9.
Vietnam, Ministry of Defense, White Paper, 2009, 38.
- 10.
U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Remarks at Press Availability,” National Convention Center, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010.
- 11.
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Conference Room, Tokyo, July 27, 2010.
- 12.
John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” The Washington Post, July 30, 2010.
- 13.
Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam Mulling New Strategies to Deter China: What is Vietnam’s Strategy for Resisting Chinese Coercion?” The Diplomat, May 28, 2014.
- 14.
In Manila in May, Vietnam’s prime minister wrote to Reuters that his government was “considering various defense options, including legal actions in accordance with international law.” Rosemarie Francisco and Manuel Mogato, “Vietnam PM says considering legal action against China over disputed waters,” Reuters, May 22, 2014.
- 15.
Hai Minh, “Extensive Activities to Protect National Sovereignty,” Vietnamese Government Web Portal, June 2, 2014.
- 16.
Vietnam Foreign Ministry, “Vietnam, China Agree to Restore, Develop Ties,” August 28, 2014.
- 17.
Shortly before Le Hong Anh’s trip to Beijing, Vietnam promised to compensate the Chinese workers and managers who were victims of the riots.
- 18.
Zachary Abuza, “Vietnam buckles under Chinese pressure,” Asia Times, July 29, 2014.
- 19.
For three perspectives on internal debates over how to deal with the oil rig crisis, see Zachary Abuza, “Vietnam buckles under Chinese pressure,” Asia Times, July 29, 2014; Alexander Vuving, “Did China Blink in the South China Sea?” The National Interest, July 27, 2014; and Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam, China and the Oil Rig Crisis: Who Blinked?” The Diplomat, August 04, 2014.
- 20.
“ISEAS Monitor—Vietnam,” Issue 2014, no. 5 (September 1, 2014).
- 21.
Patrick Boehler, “Just 14 factories targeted in Vietnam’s anti-China protests belonged to mainland Chinese,” South China Morning Post, updated May 20, 2014; Joshua Kurlantzick, “Vietnam Protests: More Than Just Anti-China Sentiment,” Asia Unbound blog, May 15, 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia; Eva Dou and Richard C. Paddock, “Behind Vietnam’s Anti-China Riots: A Tinderbox of Wider Grievances.” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2014.
- 22.
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-Vietnam Relations (Basic Data),” July 2012.
- 23.
Author’s interviews in 2002, 2005, and 2012.
- 24.
In 2001, Vietnam and the United States extended normal trade relations status, also known as most-favored nation status, to one another, significantly lowering tariffs on most products from the other country.
- 25.
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, 264.
- 26.
Martin Fackler, “Japan is Flexing Its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China,” New York Times, November 26, 2012.
- 27.
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-Vietnam Joint Statement on the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia,” October 31, 2010.
- 28.
Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Vietnam, Japan Lift Bilateral Relations to New Height,” paragraphs 6–9, March 19, 2014.
- 29.
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida’s Visit to Vietnam,” August 2, 2014.
- 30.
Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam’s East Sea Strategy and China-Vietnam Relations” (Paper delivered to the 2nd International Conference on China’s Maritime Strategy, Institute of Global and Public Affairs and the Shanghai Maritime Strategy Research Center, University of Macau, September 19–20, 2014).
- 31.
As Abe said in a speech that was intended for delivery in Jakarta in January 2013, “Japan’s national interest lies eternally in keeping Asia’s seas unequivocally open, free, and peaceful—in maintaining them as the commons for all the people in the world, where the rule of law is fully realized…In light of our geographic circumstances, the two objectives are natural and fundamental imperatives for Japan, a nation surrounded by ocean and deriving sustenance from those oceans—a nation that views the safety of the seas as its own safety.” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Bounty of the Open Sea: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy,” January 18, 2013. A year later, he and President Sang issued a joint statement saying, “Mindful of air and maritime linkages between Vietnam and Japan in the region, Prime Minster Shinzo Abe stressed that any unilateral and coercive action to challenge peace and stability should not be overlooked. The two sides affirmed that peace and stability at sea were in the common interest of both countries as well as of the international community. They also shared the position that all relevant parties should comply with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They concurred on the importance of maintaining maritime security and safety, upholding the freedom of the high seas including the freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded commerce, and ensuring self-restraint and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law including UNCLOS. They also shared the view that Code of Conduct (COC) in South China Sea should be concluded at an early date.” Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, “Vietnam, Japan Lift Bilateral Relations to New Height,” March 19, 2014.
- 32.
Celine Pajon, “Japan and the South China Sea,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales Center for Asia Studies, January 2013.
- 33.
Celine Pajon, “Japan’s ‘Smart’ Strategic Engagement in Southeast Asia,” The Asan Forum, December 06, 2013.
- 34.
VOVWorld, “World Community Continues to Support Vietnam in the East Sea Issue,” July 3, 2014. Zachary Abuza writes that during internal party debates over responding to the HS981 deployment, some Vietnamese leaders pushed for a more explicit backing of Abe’s collective self-defense move. Zachary Abuza, “Vietnam buckles under Chinese pressure,” Asia Times, July 29, 2014.
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Manyin, M. (2018). Vietnam among the Powers: Struggle and Cooperation. In: Rozman, G., Liow, J. (eds) International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier. Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3171-7_14
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