Abstract
The core sea power issue that confronts China is this: how to ensure the country’s maritime security within the modern environment, and how to keep a balance between maintaining effective military deterrence and the maximization of benefits gained from the seas. While doing so, China also needs to develop an identification with, and passion for, the seas among its people. That is to say, how can China ensure security in its surrounding seas and embrace leapfrog development brought on by the maritime economy in an environment where the supply of the relevant public goods from the government is inadequate and where the nation’s maritime development and exploitation capabilities are still lacking? This situation is similar to the challenges that had confronted the people of the Western Han Dynasty over 2000 years ago on terra firma.
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Notes
- 1.
Qian, Mu (2005). A History of the Qin and Han Dynasties. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, p. 47.
- 2.
That the population was sparse during the founding of the Western Han Dynasty is illustrated by an experience of the founding emperor Liu Bang. According to the Records of the Grand Historian: The Family Records of Prime Minister Chen: “Emperor Gaozu, passing by Quni (in what is the southeastern part of Wanxian County in Hebei today) on his way southwards, ascended its city walls and saw that it had houses of significant size. He exclaimed, ‘The wonders of this county! I have traveled widely, and the only other place I know that matches this in magnificence is the city of Luoyang.’ He then asked the local censor: ‘How many households are there in Quni?’ The censor responded, ‘Over 30,000 households were here during the early Qin. Repeated unrests since then have caused many to die or flee. Today, we have 5000 households left.’ Liu Bang, despite his travels all over his empire, was impressed by a city comprising merely 5000 households.”
- 3.
The empire slid into severe economic depression and financial difficulty. As recorded in Book of Han: Treatise on Food and Money (Part 1), “Han rose and inherited the depression of Qin. Men served in military and the old and weak transported military provisions. There was heavy conscript labor but a lack of financial resources. Even the emperor could not find four horses of the same color to draw his carriage. Some generals and ministers traveled in ox-drawn carts. Common people had neither shelter nor clothing. Therefore…law and decrees were simplified. Lawless people pursuing benefits hoarded and profiteered. Prices soared to such an extent that one dan of rice was sold for 10,000 coins and one horse for 100 jin (ingots).” “People lost their livelihood and suffered from severe famine. The price of rice soared to 5000 coins per dan. People fed on each other and the population dropped by over a half.”
- 4.
According to research done by Han Maoli, the nomadic peoples moved frequently for reasons of pastoral conservation, seasonal change and depending on the breeds of animals they were rearing at various times. See Han, Maoli (2003). A Preliminary Exploration of the Nomadic Lifestyle of the Grassland Peoples in History. Researchesin Chinese Economic History, no. 4 (2003). However, Han had neglected another key factor, that of war. For instance, Xiongnu migration northwards during Qin times and subsequent westwards migration, as well as the westwards migration of the Yuezhi, were all fundamentally the result of defeat in wars.
- 5.
Tang, Xiaofeng (2006). The Significance of Mountainous Terrain to the Xiongnu. In Hou, Renzhi (ed.) (2006). Studies in Environmental Changes in the Arid and Semi-Arid Regions of Northern China. Beijing: The Commercial Press, pp. 281–293. This paper by Tang is significant as it looks at an oft-neglected subject: although the mountains may not have been as important to the nomadic peoples as the grasslands, they were still very important. The majority of Asian scholars have only paid attention to the importance of the grasslands to nomadic peoples. In my opinion, this article is an innovative and insightful contribution to the relevant fields.
- 6.
According to the Records of the Grand Historian: The Xiongnu: “(Among the Xiongnu), the children are able to ride goats and shoot birds and rats using a bow and arrow, while their adolescents shoot foxes and rabbits for food. Their warriors are able to draw a bow and arrow and ride with ease. In terms of their lifestyles, in good times they follow the beasts and hunt for sustenance. In straitened times, they make war and invade the territory of others. Such is their nature.”
- 7.
The conquering of the Xiongnu by other nomadic tribes and the Chinese, as well as their conquering of these tribes and breaching of China’s borders also imply Xiongnu’s involvement in repeated rounds of military conflict.
- 8.
Li, Dingyi (1997). A Brief History of China. Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 105.
- 9.
Zhou, Xishan (2004). The Four-Thousand-Year War between the Han and the Xiongnu. Shanghai: Shanghai Pictorial Publishing House, pp. 26–27.
- 10.
Currently the most northerly Xiongnu site found by archaeologists is located in Transbaikalia in Russia, while the most northwesterly site found thus far is located in Ulaangom in Mongolia. The eastern spread of the Xiongnu reached the Shilka, Argun, Kherlen, Yalu and Liao Rivers, while their Western spread has been detected as far as Ili River in Xinjiang, and the Semirechye region. In the south, the Xiongnu presence has reached Qinghai, Ningxia, northern Shaanxi, Ordos in Inner Mongolia and Shuozhou in Shanxi. Although these may not be indicative of the peak of the Xiongnu empire, they give us a good idea of the strength and influence of the Xiongnu. See Ma, Liqing (2005). The Original Xiongnu and the Xiongnu: Archaeological Explorations in History and Culture. Hohhot: Inner Mongolia University Press, p. 43.
- 11.
In 174 BCE, the Xiongnu sent a letter to Emperor Xiaowen of the Northern Wei which read: “The Kroraina, Wusun, Hujie and 26 other surrounding peoples have become slaves of the Xiongnu. The people of the bow have been united under one family, and the contours of the northern lands have been settled.”
- 12.
For instance, King Xin of Han and Zhonghang Yue were of great help in the crafting of battle and diplomatic strategy. The relevant information can be found in the Book of Han: Traditions of the Xiongnu (no. 50), the Book of Han: Traditions of the Xiongnu (no. 64 part 1), Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of Gaozu and Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Gaozu (no. 1 part 2).
- 13.
In 177 BCE, a letter from the Emperor Wen to Modu Chanyu of the Xiongnu read: “The Han became sworn brothers with the Xiongnu in the hope that you would not violate the border. To this end we have lavished on you an abundance of gifts.” The gifts given at one time were recorded in the following list: lined coat with embroideries, a long jacket and a brocade robe, a bishu (comb-shaped headdress), an ornamental belt with gold decorations, a gold belt hook, ten bolts of embroidered silk fabric, twenty bolts of brocade, forty bolts of red thick silk fabric and forty bolts of green silk fabric. See the Book of Han: Traditions of the Xiongnu (no. 64 part 1).
- 14.
In 200 BCE, the Emperor Gaozu was surrounded by the Xiongnu at Pingcheng, and was left without food for days. Eventually, he managed to emerge from the crisis by bribing the wife of Modu Chanyu to put in a good word for him. Hence there was a folk song that went: “It was truly difficult in Pingcheng, and the defenders were unable to draw their bows and arrows after seven days of no food.” See the Book of Han: Traditions of the Xiongnu (no. 64 part 1).
- 15.
In 133 BCE, the Emperor Wudi—acting on the advice of a local man in Mayi named Nie Yi—attempted to lure the Xiongnu Chanyu into a trap. However, the plot was discovered by the Chanyu. See the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Wudi (no. 6).
- 16.
For this period, more than ten significant conflicts or battles with the Xiongnu can be found in records in the Book of Han and the Records of the Grand Historian on the reigns of the Emperors Gaozu, Hui, Wen, Jing, Wu and of the Empress LüZhi: In the ninth lunar month in 200 BCE, “King Xin of Han, was besieged by the Xiongnu at Mayi and surrendered to them.” In the 12th lunar month in 181 BCE, “The Xiongnu invaded Didao and captured over 2000 people.” In the fifth lunar month of 177 BCE, “The Xiongnu invaded Beidi and Henan for banditry.” In the winter of 166 BCE, “The Xiongnu plundered border regions and killed Commander Mao of Beidi.” From 166–154 BCE, “The Xiongnu … crossed the border each year to kill and capture large numbers of people, especially in Yunzhong and Liaodong, with over 10,000 people killed in either of them.” In the winter of 158 BCE, “Thirty thousand Xiongnu cavalrymen invaded Shang Commandery and another thirty thousand invaded Yunzhong.” In the second lunar month in 148 BCE, “The Xiongnu invaded Yan.” In the spring of 144 BCE, “The Xiongnu entered Yanmen all the way to Wuquan, entered Shang Commandery and pillaged the horses, killing two thousand soldiers in battle.” In the spring of 141 BCE, “The Xiongnu invaded Yanmen and Prefect Feng Jing died in a battle of resistance.” See: Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of Gaozu (no. 8), Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of Empress Dowager Lü (no. 9), Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of the Xiaowen Emperor (no. 10), Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of the Xiaojing Emperor (no. 11), Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of the Xiaowu Emperor (no. 12), and the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Gaozu (no. 1), the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Hui (no. 2), the Book of Han: Annals of Empress Lü Zhi (no. 3), the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Wen (no. 4), the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Jing (no. 5) and the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Wu (no. 6).
- 17.
In the Book of Han: Traditions of the Xiongnu (no. 64 part 1), it is written: “In the 14th year in the reign of Emperor Xiaowen, the Xiongnu Chanyu led 140,000 cavalrymen into Zhunuo and Xiaoguan. They killed Commander Mao of Beidi and captured a large number of people and livestock. They advanced to Pengyang and had their cavalrymen break into the palace at Huizhong and burn it. The mounted scouts advanced to Ganquan Palace in Yong. Thereupon Emperor Wen appointed Zhou She, Capital Garrison Commander, and Zhang Wu, Chamberlain for Attendants to command an army of 1000 chariots and 10,000 horsemen stationed by Chang’an. The emperor also made Marquis of Chang (Lu Qing) General of Shang Commandery, Marquis of Ning (Wei Xiu) General of Beidi, Marquis of Longlü (Zhou Zao) General of Longxi, Marquis of Dongyang (Zhang Xiangru) a grand general, and Marquis of Cheng (Dong Chi) a general. These generals led a mighty army with a great number of chariots and cavalrymen into a fight with the Xiongnu. By then the chief of the Xiongnu had stayed within the Great Wall for more than a month. As soon as they chased the enemy beyond the Great Wall, the Han troops returned without inflicting any casualties. As a result, the Xiongnu grew even more arrogant and presumptuous. They crossed the border each year to kill and capture large numbers of people, especially in Yunzhong and Liaodong, with over 10,000 people killed in either of them. Deeply concerned about the situation, the Han Empire sent a letter to the Xiongnu through an envoy, and the chief of the Xiongnu sent his representative to return the compliment. The issue of heqin (peace through marriage ties) was brought up again between the two sides.” A similar account can be found in Records of the Grand Historian: The Xiongnu (no. 50).
- 18.
“Now the Xiongnu migrate from place to place, grazing and hunting crossing the border, either in Yan and Dai, or in Shang Commandery, Beidi and Longxi. If soldiers garrisoning a fortress are short in number, they will cross the border. Sire, if you do not send a force to their rescue, people in the border areas will despair and consider surrender an option; if you send a small rescue force, the strength remains short; if you mobilize and send a larger one from faraway counties, before it arrives, the Xiongnu will have fled. If you do not disband the force, the expenses will be great; if you do, the Xiongnu will invade again.” See the Book of Han: Yuan Ang and Chao Cuo (no. 19).
- 19.
Book of Han: Chao Cuo.
- 20.
Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Wudi (no. 6).
- 21.
Book of Han: Treatise on Food and Money.
- 22.
In the sixth month of 133 BCE, it was summer. “Censor-in-Chief Han Anguo was made Army-Protecting Commandant; Palace Garrison Chamberlain Li Guang, Commandant of Courageous Cavalry; Chamberlain for the Palace Stables Gongsun He, Commandant of Light Chariots;Minister of Ethnic Affairs Wang Hui, Commander of Garrison Troops; and Superior Grand Master of the Palace Li Xi, Commandant of Reserve Troops. Together, they commanded an army of over 300,000 stationed in Mayi Valley, lured the Chanyu and attempted to ambush him. He crossed the border but sensed their scheme. Thus he fled away.”
In 129 BCE, Wei Qing led the first-ever Western Han military victory over the Xiongnu, pursuing them “all the way to Longcheng and killing some 700 Xiongnu.”
In 128 BCE, “General Wei Qing was sent out of Yanmen Pass, while General Li Xi was dispatched out of Dai Commandery. A few thousand Xiongnu were killed.”
In 127 BCE, “Generals Wei Qing and Li Xi were dispatched from Yunzhong to Gaoque. The troops then moved on to Fuli, where they killed several thousand Xiongnu.”
In 124 BCE, “Great General Wei Qing led six generals and over 100,000 troops to Shuofang and Gaoque, killing five thousand enemies.”
In 123 BCE, “in the second month of spring, Great General Wei Qing rode out to Dingxiang with six generals and over 100,000 troops, killing over three thousand of the enemy.” A month later, Wei Qing led the same troops to a “massive victory” during which “19 thousand Xiongnu were killed”.
In the spring of 121 BCE, “(Emperor Wudi) sent Huo Qubing, Commandant of Courageous Cavalry, to lead a force out of Longxi. In Gaolan, it harvested more than 8000 enemy heads.” In the summer, “Huo Qubing and Gongsun Ao led a force more than 2000 li north. They went beyond Juyan and brought back over 30,000 enemy heads.” In the autumn, “King Kunye of the Xiongnu killed King Xiutu and surrendered with his followers, totaling over 40,000. (Emperor Wudi) relocated them in five vassal states located in the Prefectures of Wuwei and Jiuquan.”
In the winter of 119 BCE, “General-in-Chief Wei Qing, assisted by four generals, went out by way of Dingxiang. General Huo Qubing marched out by way of Dai. Each commanded a force of 50,000 horsemen. They were followed by hundreds of thousands of footmen. Wei Qing surrounded the Chanyu in Mubei and harvested 19,000 enemy heads. He did not return until his force reached the Tianyan Mountains. Huo Qubing engaged the Left Virtuous Kingand cut off and brought back over 70,000 enemy heads. He returned after he offered sacrifices to Heaven in the Langjuxu Mountains. The two forces suffered tens of thousands of deaths.”
In 111 BCE, “(Emperor Wudi) sent an army of 100,000 combining horsemen from Longxi, Tianshui and Anding and footmen from Zhongwei, Henan and Henei commanded by General Li Xi and Chamberlain for Attendants Xu Ziwei to launch an expedition against Western Qiang and conquered it.”
In 110 BCE, “(Emperor Wudi) sent Yang Pu, Commandant of Storied Ships, and Xun Zhi, Left Commandant, to command a force of recruited offenders to attack Korea. Then he sent General Guo Chang and Commandant of Court Gentlemen Wei Guang on an expedition against Ba and Shu. They subdued those disobedient in the wild Southwest. Then he established Yizhou Prefecture.”
In 104 BCE, “(Emperor Wudi) sent General Li Guangli to command a force of guilty men to conquer Dawan in the west.”
In 100 BCE, in spring “Li Guangli, General of Er Shi, cut off the King of Dawan’s head and brought back “blood-sweating” horses as spoils.”
In 99 BCE, “In the 5th month, it was summer. The General of Er Shi led a force of 30,000 horsemen to march out by way of Jiuquan and engaged the Right Virtuous King in the Tianshan Mountains. He harvested over 10,000 enemy heads. Then the emperor sent the General of Yinyu to go beyond Xihe and Commandant of Cavalry Li Ling to go north of Juyan with a force of 5000 under his command. They engaged the Chanyu and inflicted over 10,000 deaths on the enemy.”
In the spring of 97 BCE, (Emperor Wudi) accepted the tributes from the feudatory princes in Ganquan Palace. “(He) sent Li Guangli, General of Er Shi, to lead a force of 60,000 horsemen and 70,000 footmen out of Shuofang; Gongsun Ao, General of Yinyu, to lead a force of 10,000 horsemen and 30,000 footmen out of Yanmen; Han Yue, General of Mobile Corps, to lead a force of 30,000 footmen out of Wuyuan; and Lu Bode, Commandant of Strong Archers, to lead a force of over 10,000 footmen to join forces with the General of Er Shi.”
In the 3rd month of 90 BCE, it was spring. “(Emperor Wudi) sent Li Guangli, General of Er Shi, to command a force of 70,000 out of Wuyuan; Shang Qiucheng, Censor-in-Chief, to command a force of 20,000 out of Xihe; and Ma Tong, Marquis of Chonghe, to command a force of 40,000 horsemen out of Jiuquan. Shang Qiucheng engaged the enemy in the Junji Mountains and killed a lot of enemies.”
See the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Wudi (no. 6).
- 23.
After 133 BCE all the way to 127 BCE, although the Han army under the leadership of famed commander Wei Qing had tried to make the transition from a wholly defensive position to a defense strategy that is centered on offense, from the numbers of Xiongnu killed or captured (hundreds to thousands) we can see that this was a preliminary stage in the Western Han state’s efforts. We can surmise that the Western Han troops were not of a significant size and were yet unable to truly put on a deadly offense against the Xiongnu. See the Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Wudi (no. 6).
- 24.
Records of the Grand Historian: Pinghuai (no. 8).
- 25.
Book of Han: Annals of Emperor Jingdi (no. 5).
- 26.
Chen, Xiaoming (2003). A Comparison of Defence at the Northern Borderduring the Eastern and Western Han Periods. China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies, no. 3; Huang, Jinyan and Chen, Xiaoming (1997). The Scale of Border Troop Deployment and Maintenance Costs during the Han Dynasty. Researchesin Chinese Economic History, no. 1; Lin, Chaomin (2005). Han Migrants and the Unification of Yunnan. Journal of Yunnan Minzu University, no. 3 (2005); Ma, Dazheng (2005). A Few Issues in the Study of the History of Xinjiang. Shi Yuan, no. 4 (2005); Qian, Mu (2005). A History of the Qin and Han Dynasties. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, pp. 152–161.
- 27.
During the early Western Han period, the troops deployed against the Xiongnu were regular soldiers whose originating garrisons were typically located deep within the empire.
- 28.
The typical border defense posting during the early Han was for a period of one year.
- 29.
In the Western Dynasty when “the road to the wild Southwest was opened up”, “tens of thousands were conscripted to carry rations across hundreds of miles. Generally speaking, only 1 dan out of over 10 zhong (64 dan) could reach the destination.” See Records of the Grand Historian: Pinghuai (no. 8).
- 30.
Huang Jinyan and Chen Xiaoming (1997) may have jumped to conclusions with their statement that Zhufu Yan had been exaggerated. Though Jia Yi’s description supports Sima Qian’s and Zhufu Yan’s, this does not proves that the latter two exaggerate the difficulty of grain transport, because when Jia says that “it is hard to transport goods by sea even with money ten times of their worth spent”, he is talking about sea transportation. It is common knowledge that the cost of sea transportation was lower than that of land transportation. Thus Huang and Chen’s assertion that ten percent of the grains could reach the designated destination is questionable. Moreover, the “hire money” they mentioned was merely the spending on human labor. The wear and tear of vehicles and the consumption of cattle and horses have not been factored. Therefore, they have obviously underestimated the costs of transportation. In addition, in their estimates of border troop numbers during the Western Han period, Huang and Chen had omitted the southwestern and southeastern commanderies in their calculations. See Xin, Deyong (2005). Research on the Mass Migration to Kuaiji in the Reign of Emperor Wudi of Han. Historical Research, no. 1; Chen, Xiaoming (2002). Commentary of Economic Development in Border Commanderies in China’s North and Southwest during the Han Period. Jiangxi Social Sciences, no. 11. Refer to Lei Haizong’s study of the period of Emperor Wudi’s reign in: Lei, Haizong (2001). The Culture and Soldiers of China. Beijing: The Commercial Press, pp. 28–32.
- 31.
During the reign of the Emperor Yuandi of Han, both population numbers and land development area numbers had vastly outstripped those of earlier periods.
- 32.
Book of Han: Zhao Chongguo and Xin Qingji (no. 39).
- 33.
Although the military was compensated by the state for rations generated through its tuntian efforts, the policy of tuntian had contributed significantly to the savings in tax collection by reducing the cost of shipping rations and other supplies to border regions.
- 34.
Book of Han: Treatise on Food and Money (no. 4 part 1).
- 35.
Wang, Yong (2005). The Promotion of Winter Wheat in the Guanzhong Plain during the Mid to Late Western Han Dynasty. Journal of Chinese Historical Geography, no. 3.
- 36.
Zhang, Zexian (1998). Description of Agricultural Production in the Hexi Corridor in the Han and Tang Dynasties. Journal of Chinese Historical Studies, no. 1.
- 37.
Qi, Qingshun and Tian, Weijiang (2006). Xinjiang in History. Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publishing House.
- 38.
Book of Han: Traditions of the Xiongnu.
- 39.
Lattimore, Owen (2006). The Inner Asian Frontiers of China. (Tang, Xiaofeng. trans.) Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing, pp. 37–68.
- 40.
Zhu, Shaohou (2004). A Discussion of the Mingtian System and the Damage Caused by the System during the Han Dynasty. Journal of Henan University, no. 1.
- 41.
If a particular region did well agriculturally under the control of the Western Han government, then during the cost-benefit “trial” process the Western Han Empire would have gained another reason to establish more institutions or implement more management measures in this region, as well as another reason to go to war for this region. The converse is also true. For the nomadic peoples, the logic for the cost-benefit analysis for territorial control was the inverse: for them, from the perspective of production utility the value of a piece of land lay in whether it was suitable for grazing.
Of course, in the cost-benefit analysis conducted by both parties, as to which mode of production is more advantageous in the border region in question was not the be-all and end-all of the issue. Both parties also had to consider other factors like the cost of implementing political control and the cost of going to war, whether the territory in question was geographically strategic, whether they had access to sufficient monetary and military resources to sustain political control, etc. As relative strength between the two changed repeatedly over the long term, so did the specifics of any cost-benefit analysis either party would conduct with regard to political control from one time to another.
- 42.
Huang, Jingyu (2006). The State Equine Breeding System during the Western Han Dynasty as Understood from Bamboo Slip Records. Nandu Xuetan (Journal of the Nanyang Normal University Faculty of Humanities and Social Studies), no. 3; An, Zhongyi (2006). Horse Breeding during the Han Dynasty and the Improvement of Equine Breeds. Agricultural Archaeology, no. 4; Zhang, Liren (2006). Historical Exchanges and Cultural Consolidation between the Peoples of the Hexi Corridor. Journal of Chinese Historical Geography, no. 3; Zhang, Zexian (1998). Description of Agricultural Production in the Hexi Corridor in the Han and Tang Dynasties. Journal of Chinese Historical Studies, no. 1.
- 43.
Xinshu: The Xiongnu.
- 44.
Kong, Zhiguo (2008). Property Rights on Paper. Cenfortuna, no. 12.
- 45.
Yu, Ying-shih (2005). Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations. (Wu, Wenling, trans.) Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, pp. 39–178.
- 46.
This point is also corroborated by our cost-benefit analysis of China’s maritime rights and interests.
- 47.
Zhu, Heping (2004). On Civilian Tuntian during Han Dynasty. Agricultural Archaeology, no. 1.
- 48.
Yu, Ying-shih (2005). Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations. (Wu, Wenling, trans.) Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, pp. 118–124.
- 49.
Yu, Ying-shih (2005). Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations. (Wu, Wenling, trans.) Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, pp. 114–115.
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Kong, Z. (2017). Learning from Tuntian of Western Han. In: The Making of a Maritime Power. Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1786-5_5
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