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Why Lost Cultural Relics Matter in China

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The Case for Repatriating China’s Cultural Objects
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Abstract

I have described interconnections between cultural objects and cultural identity in Chap. 5. In this chapter, I seek to figure out Chinese perceptions of their loss of cultural relics in modern Chinese history. ‘Chinese culture’, dealt with in this chapter, refers to culture in ‘China proper’ (or ‘Inner China’, ‘agrarian China’), which is termed the ‘Chinese cultural sphere’, the ‘Sinic world’, or the ‘Sinosphere’.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This statement was made by China’s permanent deputy representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Liu Zhenmin, at the meeting of the Sixty-fourth General Assembly of the United Nations. See GA/10888, ‘General Assembly Considers Drat Text on Return, Restitution of Cultural Property’, November 16, 2009, viewed April 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10888.doc.htm.

  2. 2.

    See E.O. Reischauer, ‘The Sinic World in Perspective’, Foreign Affairs, (1974), Vol. 54, no. 2, at 341; Thorp and Vinograd (2006), at 18. Within the Sinosphere, each major region is distinguished from others by its own dialect, landscape, native crops, cuisine history, famous persons, heritage sites, regional customs and characteristics. David Yen-ho Wu suggests that any expert on ethnic studies today will notice that the difference between two Han groups can, in some cases, be more pronounced than that between a Han and a minority nationality group. For instance, the regionally defined groups of Han-Cantonese, Shanghaiese, and Taiwanese, including those living overseas have obvious ethnic differences in speech, dress, customs, religious beliefs, and so on. See Wu (1991), no. 2, at 167.

  3. 3.

    Some scholars are critical about the distinctiveness of ‘Chinese identity’ or the so called ‘Chinese-ness’. Some even argue that the ‘Chinese’ as a singular thing does not exist. For a critical perspective, see the collection of essays in Sinophone Studies (S. Shih, R. Chow, I. Ang and A. Chung (eds.), Sinophone Studies, New York: Columbia University Press 2013).

  4. 4.

    This approach is qualified by Yu Ying-shih in 1991; another approach is the positivist approach. See ‘Clio’s New Cultural Turn and the Rediscovery of Tradition in Asia’, keynote address by Yu Ying-shih at the Twelfth Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, University of Hong Kong, June 24–28, 1991. Quoted from Nathan (1993), no. 4, at 924–925.

  5. 5.

    For detailed introduction of Qian Mu’s view on history, cultures, and nation, see Wong, W. National Self-Survival: Qian Mu’s View on History and Culture, (dissertation), Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2004.

  6. 6.

    Kissinger (2011), at 2–3.

  7. 7.

    Seton-Watson notes the temptation to pay more attention to the continuity than to the breaches in it is almost irresistible. The Chinese is the only one of the great empires which imposed a single culture on the vast majority of its subjects and maintained, with only a few short intervals of confusion, its sovereignty over the same territory for 3000 years up the present time. See Seton-Watson, supra note 608, at 275, 286.

  8. 8.

    The most recent version of this work was published in 2011, see Xu, W. (2011).

  9. 9.

    Ibid.; Li Ben, ‘Witness to History by Cultural Relics’, (in Chinese), April 21, 2004, viewed August 8, 2013, gmw.cn/03pindao/shuping/2004-04/21/content_15944.htm.

  10. 10.

    Li Xiaodong, An Introduction to the Science of Cultural Relics in China (in Chinese), Hebei Renmin Chuban She 1990, at 17.

  11. 11.

    The research methods of jinshi-xue included description and evidential research. Jinshi-xue developed into a systematic discipline in the Song dynasty and reached a peak in Qing dynasty under the influence of Jiaqian school, the most remarkable academic school in textology at that time. Statistics show that 906 kinds of literature of Jinshi-xue were recorded in the 200 years in Qianlong period (1711–1799). Some characteristics made jinshi-xue of the Qing period outstanding: delicate authentication, detailed evidential research, extensive range of research subjects (including coins, seals, jades). See ibid., at 17–21.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., at 17–21.

  13. 13.

    Scholars after Wang Guowei further the dual evidence method into a tri-evidence method. Jao Tsung-I, Ye Xianshu, Huang Xianfan, and Shen Congwen all have proposed their own ‘tri-evidence method’. But taking historical documents and cultural relics as historical research material is the common element they all share.

  14. 14.

    Fei, X. (1988), at 175.

  15. 15.

    It is submitted that the Shang rulers kept these inscriptions sacred because they were records of confirmed decisions or judgments and because they provided important precedents to the Shang rulers for future deliberations. There is practically no mention of the oracle bones in the abundant accounts of antiquity recorded from the Zhou dynasty to the Han dynasty. The absolute secrecy of the whereabouts of oracle bones until its being discovered is astounding. See ibid., at 178; Cui, B., ‘On the Philological Value of Jiaguwen’ (in Chinese), Tushu yu Qingbao 2007, no. 4, at 127.

  16. 16.

    Liao Jing, ‘A Historical Perspective: The Root Cause for the Underdevelopment of User Services in Chinese Academic Libraries’, The Journal of Academic Librarianship 30 (2004), no. 2, at 109–110.

  17. 17.

    Cui, B., supra note 15, at 127–128.

  18. 18.

    About six thousand different characters have been recorded from the inscriptions, of which some two thousand can be identified with modern versions. See ibid.

  19. 19.

    Rong, X. (2013), 341.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., at 6.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., at 6–7.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., at 4.

  23. 23.

    Zhang Zhaoguang notes that the students’primers, text-books, and notebooks present the average intellectual level of the public; the examination papers contain information on the ideology and its influence on thinking. See Yu Xin, Mapping the Extraordinary: Knowledge, Faith and Manuscript Culture in Medieval China (in Chinese), Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chuban She 2011, at 70–73.

  24. 24.

    See Harrison (1969), pp. 2–15; Townsend (1992).

  25. 25.

    Harrison, ibid., pp. 3–14.

  26. 26.

    See Lu and Dellios (1998), no. 1, at 20.

  27. 27.

    G. Wang, ‘On Tianxia’, Lecture delivered in September 2012 at the Australian Centre on China in the World, viewed August 4, 2014, http://www.thechinastory.org/2013/08/wang-gungwu-%E7%8E%8B%E5%BA%9A%E6%AD%A6-on-tianxia-%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B/.

  28. 28.

    In the view of Wang Gungwu, traditional Chinese way of looking at ‘culture’ is rather more holistic, which covers religion, philosophy, politics, music, art, and all other branches of knowledge. See G. Wang, ‘China’s Quest: A New Cultural Identity’, Lectures delivered in DU’s 2009-10 Bridges to the Future Series on April 28, 2010, viewed August 3, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4R9HITn7HBw.

  29. 29.

    See Liang, S. (2006), at 31; Alitto (1986), at 82–83; 612. Liang summarized some characteristics of traditional Chinese culture: vast territory with a large population; multi-national integration; long history; an unnamed power for the preservation of culture; immobile social status and culture; almost no religious life; emphasis on clan system; no scientific-orientation in academia; no democracy; priority of morality in the social structure; precocity; indifference to military; emphasis on filial piety; and the existence of hermits. See Liang, S. (2005), pp. 10–24.

  30. 30.

    Thorp and Vinograd, (2006).

  31. 31.

    Fong (1992), at 3.

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    The appreciation of painting and calligraphy has a long history in China. In the South-Qi dynasty, the great art critic, Xie He, had put forward the ‘six principles of Chinese painting’: spirit resonance, the way of using the brush, proper representation of objects, application of color, good composition, and transmission of the old masters by copying them. The six principles marked the theoretical framework of Chinese painting. In the Song dynasty, calligraphy and painting were adored in imperial court. Emperor Huizong was a great painter, poet, and calligrapher; he endeavored to search for great art. He managed to collect an unprecedented amount of masterpieces. Emperor Huizong also organized the compilation of Xuanhe Painting Catalogue and Xuanhe Calligraphy Catalogue. The painting catalogue recorded 6390 paintings by over 230 painters, and the calligraphy catalogue recorded 1198 pieces of calligraphic works by over 190 calligraphers of different styles. See Li, X., supra note 10, at 21–24.

  34. 34.

    The fifth century scholar Yen Yen-chih believed that there were three kinds of signs: the magical hexagram of the Yijing (The Book of Changes), which represented nature’s principles; the written ideographs, which represented concepts; the pictorial representation, which depicted nature’s form. See Fong (1996), at 28.

  35. 35.

    See Fong (2003), no. 2, pp. 258–280; Shi Shouqian, Style in Transformation: Studies on the History of Chinese Painting (in Chinese), Beijing: Peking University Press 2008.

  36. 36.

    Hay (2005), at 117.

  37. 37.

    See H. Wu, ‘The Admonitions Scroll Revisited: Iconology, Narratology, Style, Dating’, in: S. McCausland (ed.), Gu Kaizhi and the Admonitions Scroll, London: The British Museum Press 2003, at 89–91.

  38. 38.

    F.W. Mote, ‘A Millennium of Chinese Urban History: Form, Time, and Space Concepts in Soochow’, in R.A. Kapp (ed.), Four Views of China (Rice University Studies 59, no. 4), Houston: Rice, at 51.

  39. 39.

    See Fong (1992), at 3.

  40. 40.

    Fong (1996), at 28.

  41. 41.

    See Zhu, C. (2007), no. 3, pp. 81–85; Mei, H. et al. (2009); etc.

  42. 42.

    Tu,W. (2005), no. 4, at 147.

  43. 43.

    S. Pearce, ‘Form and matter: Archaizing reform in sixth-century China, in: S. Pearce, A. Spiro and P. Ebrey (eds.), Culture and Power in the Reconstitution of the Chinese Realm 200600, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, at 151.

  44. 44.

    E. Wang, Inventing China Through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography, Albany: SUNY Press 2001, at 28.

  45. 45.

    Jianxiong (2008), no.9, pp. 11–13. Because of the important role that history plays in China, history is often sources of conflict and debate. As Callahan writes, ‘history’ is often seen as a security issue in East Asia international relations, and history is also an important security issue in Chinese texts. See Callahan (2006), no.2, at 183–185.

  46. 46.

    No systematic mythology developed in ancient China; the heroes that made great contributions to their tribes and the emperors (later the representatives of Heaven) were adored as Gods. The characters of ‘Di’ (emperor) and ‘God’ in oracle bones refer to ‘the ancestors of the primitive tribes’. Historians in ancient times not only recorded historical events around the emperors, but also acted as the bridges between Heaven and the people by recording the Will of Heaven and the astronomical phenomena faithfully. These historical records provide the only source for understanding the Will of Heaven to the posterity. In this sense historians in ancient China in effect were like priests or sorcerers in other religions. Ge, J., ibid., at 11–12.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., at 13.

  48. 48.

    Y. Yu, ‘Address of yu Yingshih on the Occasion of Receiving the John W. Kluge Prize at the Library of the Congress’, Library of Congress, December 5, 2006, viewed December 5, 2013, http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2006/06-A07.html.

  49. 49.

    Ibid. The major schools in the ‘hundred schools of thought’ included Yin-Yang school (originated in the official astronomers), Confucianist school (originated in Ministry of Education), Mohist school (originated in the Guardians of the Temple), School of Names (originated in the Ministry of Ceremonies), Legalist school (originated in the Ministry of Justice), and Taoist school (originated in the official historians). See Fung, Y. (1948), at 30–35.

  50. 50.

    Fung, Y., ibid., at 197. According to Liang Shuming, Confucianism is focused on earthly life. Before the adoption of Confucianism, Chinese people also had their own ‘religious’ lives by worshiping totem, objects and gods. Gradually the ancient religions were replaced by Confucianism, and this process has been called the ‘moralization of social relations by Confucianism. Only the tradition of worship for gods (heaven) and ancestor dating back to antiquity have been inherited until today. In Chinese culture, the emphasis on earthly life overrides ‘religious’ life. Liang, S., (2005), at 85–102.

  51. 51.

    The influence of Buddhism in China reached its peak during the Tang dynasty and Buddhist arts flourished in that period. Chan Buddhism (commonly known as Zen) is a combination of the most subtle and delicate aspects of both the Buddhist and Taoist philosophies, which exercised a great influence later on in Chinese philosophy, poetry, and painting. Chan Buddhism became the dominant Buddhist school of China during the Tang and Song dynasties. Fung, Y. (1948), at 212.

  52. 52.

    Neo-Confucianism, the synthesis of Taoist cosmology and Buddhist spirituality around the core of Confucianism, predominated in the intellectual and spiritual life of China, Korea, and Japan to the modern period. In Taoism, Chan Buddhism and Confucianism, the object of spiritual practice is to ‘to become one with Tao’ or to harmonize one’s will with Nature. See Huang (1999), at 5.

  53. 53.

    Alitto (1986), at 82.

  54. 54.

    Hummel (1930), at 55; Tonglin Lu, ‘Destruction, Revolution and Cultural Nihilism’, in: R. Bogue and M. Cornis-Pope (eds.), Violence and Mediation in Contemporary Culture, Albany: State University of New York Press 1996, at 144.

  55. 55.

    Mao was an avid reader of the New Journal of the New Cultural Movement. In Mao’s later political life, he emphasized the function of ideology and believed in its ability to change the social reality. This was believed to have originated from the radical thoughts of the New Cultural Movement. Mao was insistent on opposing traditional Chinese culture; it was the unchanging theme of his thoughts. See Lu, T., ibid.

  56. 56.

    The Xueheng Journal, begun in 1922, aimed to conserve the quintessence of native Chinese culture and blend it with Western knowledge. In effect, the Xueheng Journal was the literary headquarter of modern Chinese conservatism, attracting old-types scholars of all ages and from all fields of study together around Xueheng. The Xueheng scholars had close association with Babbitt. Babbit was profiled as a modern saint by Mei Guandi and he supervised Wu Mi at Harvard University. Wu Mi and his colleagues endeavored to introduce Babbitt’s thought in the journal of Xueheng, especially the ideas of new humanism. Babbitt told his Chinese students that ‘China needs to absorb the positive elements from the Western civilization and science. But it is more important to maintain the core values of humanism of the Chinese tradition. China should not abandon its tradition for pursuing progress. See X. Kuang, ‘Xuehang Pai and the New Humanism’ (in Chinese), Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 1994, pp. 90–99.

  57. 57.

    A great deal has been written on this subject during the past four decades. It is generally agreed that the Cultural Revolution had its root in Mao’s attempt to find an alternative path to socialism other than the Soviet one; and that it resulted in the total destruction of the common belief and value system of several generations of Chinese communists and intellectuals. After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government opened a door for total denigration of Cultural Revolution. It has been telling the Chinese people and the people over the world that the Cultural Revolution was 10 years of calamities, and that China’s economy was brought to the brink of collapse during that period.

  58. 58.

    The River Elegy shown on China’s central television took a sharply critical stance on traditional Chinese culture. It asserted that China’s land-based civilization was defeated by the maritime civilizations backed by modern science. The revival of China must come from the flowing blue seas which represent the explorative, open cultures of the West and Japan.

  59. 59.

    The CPC announced to inherit and promote the refined traditional Chinese culture at its fourteenth Congress in 1992. After that, to promote traditional Chinese culture has been highlighted in its subsequent congresses. See Ai (2009), no. 61, pp. 689–701; Bell (2007), no. 2, pp. 20–28.

  60. 60.

    It is held that New Confucianism has gone through three generations. The first generation, from 1920 to 1949, labored to make Confucianism relevant in a time of national crisis. Important representatives are Liang Shuming, Feng Youlan, Xiong Shili and Helin. The second generation, from 1949 to 1970, includes philosophers such as Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan. These four philosophers jointly published ‘A Manifesto on Chinese Culture to the World’ in 1958, announcing that Chinese culture, including Confucianism was not dead and that a reformed Confucian contribution to world civilization was not only possible but was to be applauded. See U. Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement, Taipei: Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies 2001; Yao Xinzhong, An Introduction to Confucianism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, at 6–7.

  61. 61.

    See Wang Ruichang, ‘The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China’, in: R. Fan (ed.), The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, Dordrecht: Springer 2011, at 33. There are several observations of the coming back of Chinese traditions. Some argue that the promotion of Chinese tradition serves the CPC’s governing of China, because the attempt to replace family ties with ties with to the state during the Cultural Revolution proved to be a failure. Confucianism values still inform ways of life, especially regarding family ethics. By contrast, some attribute the revival of Chinese tradition to its ‘intellectual cross-fertilization and rivalry’. See Bell (2007), at 23; Makeham (2008), at 331.

  62. 62.

    Zhu, C. (2007), no. 3, pp. 81–85.

  63. 63.

    Yan Haiming, ‘Cultural Heritage and Cultural Identity’ (in Chinese), Chinese Cultural Relics Information, October 18, 2013, viewed November 14, 2013, ccrnews.com.cn/plus/view.php?aid = 48361.

  64. 64.

    See Shen Congwen, Material Cultural History, (in Chinese), Taiyuan: Beiyue Wenyi Chubanshe 2002, at 5–10; Zhang Guotian, ‘The Semiotic Feature of Cultural Relics’ (in Chinese), Beifang Wenwu 29 (1992), pp. 97–101.

  65. 65.

    The media report of this trip has triggered a lot of reactions. For more information of the public reactions, see Chiarch, ‘Reactions to the Chinese Mission to Inspect Chinese Antiquities in Foreign Museum Collections’, in A Big Job: Protecting China’s Archaeological Heritage, December 18, 2009, viewed July 2, 2014, chiarch.wordpress.com/tag/cultural-relics/.

  66. 66.

    It has been reported that when the auctions of the bronze heads from the Old Summer Palace proceeded in 2009, the Sino-French relationship dropped to the bottom.

  67. 67.

    Zang (2010); Ye Tingfang and Wang Rongzu, ‘A Paradise Lost: Memorial of the Destruction of the Old Summer Palace’, (in Chinese) Zhonghua Dushu Bao, September 22, 2010, viewed July 23, 2014, http://epaper.gmw.cn/zhdsb/html/2010-09/22/nw.D110000zhdsb_20100922_1-17.htm.

  68. 68.

    See Zhang Zicheng, A Memorandum of A Century’s Loss of Cultural Relics in China (in Chinese), Beijing: Zhongguo Lvyou Chubanshe 2001; Wu Shu, Who is Collecting China (in Chinese), Taiyuan: Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe 2008; Lu Jiansong, A Memorandum of Tragedies of Cultural Relics (in Chinese), Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe 2002; etc.

  69. 69.

    Chen Yinke’s statement is in Chinese “敦煌者,吾国学术之伤心史也”. Today inside the Mogao Grottoes there is a museum that displays photos of the loss of Dunhuang manuscripts. In the dooryard of the museum, there is a big stone statue engraved with ‘敦煌者吾国学术之伤心史也’. People will see the engraved stone statue when they enter the museum.

  70. 70.

    Quoted from Tan Chung, ‘Introduction’, in: Tan Chung (ed.), Dunhuang Art: Through the Eyes of Duan Wenjie, New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts 1994, at 34.

  71. 71.

    Rong, X. (2005), no. 4, pp. 173–175.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., at 175.

  73. 73.

    Ibid.

  74. 74.

    See Chiarch, supra note 65.

  75. 75.

    According to newspaper report, Fan Jinshi arrived at Dunhuang in 1963 as a graduate student from Peking University when her parents were living in Shanghai and they were reluctant to allow their daughter to work so far away. At that time getting to Dunhuang was an ordeal. No planes, and few trains went there. The academy’s headquarters had neither electricity nor running water. It is said despite the harsh conditions, Fan fell in love with Dunhuang and was determined to preserve its beauty. At the age of 76, she is still working as hard as ever. See H. Cotter, ‘Buddha’s Caves’, The New York Times, July 6, 2008, viewed July 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/arts/design/06cott.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; ‘Researcher Fan Jinshi Honored for Preserving the Dunhuang Grottoes’, womenofchina.cn, 1 March 2014, viewed September 14, 2014.

  76. 76.

    ‘Fan Jinshi: A Watcher of Dunhuang’ (in Chinese), September 14, 2010, viewed September 14, 2014, http://fashion.ifeng.com/art/interview/detail_2010_09/14/2510278_0.shtml. When I was at Dunhuang in September 2014, I happened to meet Fan Jinshi, while she was taking a walk after lunch; and she was greeted with high respect by the crowds. After she left, according to her colleagues, Fan Jinshi once said that her greatest wish is to recover the Dunhuang cultural relics lost abroad. She would organize to build one of the best museums at Dunhuang to house the Dunhuang manuscripts if they could come home.

  77. 77.

    Kaufman (2010), no. 1, at 2.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., at 1.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., at 3. Notably, some scholars have strongly criticized the consumption of national humiliation in China, e.g. Wang, Z. (2012).

  80. 80.

    Liang Qichao was believed to be the first person to introduce the term minzu (nation) to China in 1899. The term nation was adopted from the writings of Meiji Japan and associated with nationalistic writings warning the Chinese people of the danger of annihilation under Western invasion at the turn of the twentieth century. See Fei, X. (1988), Zhao (2000), Levenson (1968), Hsü (1960).

  81. 81.

    In Fei Xiaotong’s view, as a general rule, the name of an ethnic group is first applied by outsiders and then gradually becomes accepted by the group itself. People living in the same social community would not develop the consciousness of their ethnic entity without contacts with people outside their community. For example, the people known as Qins and Hans called themselves by these names only after they were referred to in this way by ethnic groups outside the Central Plain. A people acquires its specific name long after it has begun its existence as an entity, instead of becoming an ethnic entity because it is called by that name’. See Fei, X. (1988), at 167–217.

  82. 82.

    See Zhao (2004), at 12.

  83. 83.

    Deep culture here refers to the unconscious framework of meaning, values, norms, and hidden assumptions that we use to interpret our experience. See Wang, Z. (2012), at 11–12.

  84. 84.

    See C. Wang, ‘The Qing Imperial Collection, circa 1905-25: National Humiliation, Heritage Preservation, and Exhibition Culture’, in: H. Wu (ed.), Reinventing the Past: Archaism and Antiquarianism in Chinese Art and Visual Culture, Chicago: The Center for the Art of East Asia, University of Chicago 2010, at 236.

  85. 85.

    Kraus (2009), at 837.

  86. 86.

    Ibid., at 842.

  87. 87.

    Feng, J., ‘For the Sake of Dignity of Civilization: Regarding Return of Dunhuang Cultural Relics’, Zhongguo Wenhua, (2001), no. 17–18, pp. 63–65.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Lin (2010).

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.

  93. 93.

    Binod Singh, ‘History of the Old Summer Palace Will Teach Us a Lesson’, China Daily, October 19, 2010, viewed June 13, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/19/content_11431079.htm.

  94. 94.

    Quoted from Jin Yongbing, ‘Cultural Confidence and Value of National culture’ (in Chinese), Wenyibao, December, 9, 2011, viewed May 4, 2014, http://www.cflac.org.cn/wywzt/2012/liangsicheng/201202/t20120215_128705.html. Tu Wei-ming shares a similar view. On one hand, Chinese intellectuals have inseparable contacts with Chinese tradition, but on the other hand, they have to admit that Western culture has some advantages over traditional Chinese culture. However, they are repelled by the Western imperialism and colonization in history. Chinese nationalism and patriotism were stimulated to salvage China from subjugation, and at the same time Confucianism was marginalized. The marginalization of Chinese tradition has caused cultural identity crisis for many Chinese intellectuals. See Tu Wei-ming, ‘Literates traditionally represented Heaven, but now they are experiencing crises of cultural identity’ (in Chinese), June 7, 2013, viewed September 4, 2013, cul.qq.com/a/20130607/021501.htm.

  95. 95.

    Jin, Y. ibid.; Li Lin ‘A Review of the Call for the Young Generation’s Cultural Confidence’, (in Chinese), Renmin Ribao, May 27, 2014, viewed Junne 12, 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2014/05-27/6214253.shtml.

  96. 96.

    de Botton and Armstrong (2013), Kramer (2000).

  97. 97.

    Ibid.; A. de Botton, ‘Alain de Botton’s guide to art as therapy’, The Guardian, January 2, 2014, viewed June 12, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/jan/02/alain-de-botton-guide-art-therapy.

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Liu, Z. (2016). Why Lost Cultural Relics Matter in China. In: The Case for Repatriating China’s Cultural Objects. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0597-8_6

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