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The Restricted Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court

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Making Aggression a Crime Under Domestic Law

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS))

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Abstract

In a book on domestic implementation, exploring the jurisdictional regime of the International Criminal Court matters due to the principle of complementarity. If cases do not fall within the complementary jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, States lack a sovereignty-driven interest to enact legislation to avoid future judicial interventions. Restrictions on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court can thus affect domestic implementation. This chapter explores the restrictions imposed on the regime of the International Criminal Court regarding the crime of aggression. It chronologically assesses the decisions which were adopted at the Rome Conference in 1998, the Kampala Review Conference in 2010 and the Assembly of States Parties in New York City in 2017. The jurisdictional regime following a State referral or proprio motu investigations can be described as being more consensual regarding the crime of aggression. It excludes the territory and nationals of non-States Parties, acts of aggression by States Parties that have opted out, and (arguably) the territory and nationals of States Parties which have not ratified the Kampala Amendments. This leaves little of the strengths of territorial jurisdiction, the most basic principle of criminal jurisdiction. It installs a regime for the crime of aggression, which appeared unacceptable to the overwhelming majority at the Rome Conference. The restrictions increase the dependency from the often-paralyzed UN Security Council which is why domestic implementations can reduce the risk of impunity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3.2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (ICC Statute), Article 17. For the principle of complementarity, see also preambular para 10, Articles 1, 18, 19 and 20(3).

  2. 2.

    See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3.3.1.

  3. 3.

    See, in detail, Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3.3.1.

  4. 4.

    For the Rome Conference, see Kaul 2002, pp. 595 et seq. For the Kampala Conference, see Barriga 2012, p. 43. For the Assembly of States Parties in New York City, see Kreß 2018, p. 8.

  5. 5.

    See Kaul and Kreß 1999, pp. 145 et seq.

  6. 6.

    See on the case-by-case proposal, Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 11; Zimmermann 1998, p. 206. For an overview of the spectrum of consent for international tribunals in general, see Amerasinghe 2009, pp. 77 et seq.

  7. 7.

    See Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute and former Article 124 of the ICC Statute for the ability to opt out. For the requirement to opt in, see ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017c, para 2 and the opt-in proposal at the Rome Conference as explained in Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 11.

  8. 8.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.2 below.

  9. 9.

    See Sect. 5.2.6.3 below.

  10. 10.

    See Sect. 5.3.6.2 below.

  11. 11.

    Thirlway 1998, p. 4.

  12. 12.

    Sovereignty derives from the Latin words “suprema potentas”, meaning supreme power.

  13. 13.

    Akande 2010, pp. 12 et seq.; Amerasinghe 2009, p. 70; Lee 1999, p. 28.

  14. 14.

    See Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 933 (entered into force 24 October 1945) (ICJ Statute), Article 36.

  15. 15.

    See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 January 1980 (VCLT), Article 34. See also Akande 2010, p. 10.

  16. 16.

    Akande 2010, p. 12; Shany 2014, p. 782; Thirlway 1998, p. 4.

  17. 17.

    Amerasinghe 2009, p. 70; Tomuschat 2012, para 19. For the question of whether the consent principle in form of the Monetary Gold principle extends to advisory opinions and even to the International Criminal Court, see Akande 2010, pp. 22 et seq.; d’Argent 2019, para 28. For a rejection of the Monetary Gold principle in proceedings before the International Criminal Court, see ICC (PTC), Situation in Palestine, Decision, 5 February 2021, paras 58 et seq.: “The Chamber considers that the Monetary Gold principle does not apply to the ICC.”

  18. 18.

    See, in detail, Chap. 7, Sect. 7.3.

  19. 19.

    See, in detail, Jeßberger 2011, pp. 225 et seq.

  20. 20.

    See Scharf 2001, p. 75 who argues that the assumption of the exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its nationals “reflects a colonialist concept that was prevalent in earlier centuries but has little relevance to modern practice”.

  21. 21.

    Cormier 2020, p. 21.

  22. 22.

    Jeßberger 2011, p. 245.

  23. 23.

    For a thorough discussion, see Akande 2010.

  24. 24.

    See ICC Statute, Article 25(1): “The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”; ICC Statute, Article 25(4): “No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law”.

  25. 25.

    International Military Tribunal 1950, p. 444.

  26. 26.

    Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021b, para 1. Except for the postponement of the entry into force and the jurisdiction ratione temporis as regulated in Article 15ter(2)–(3) of the ICC Statute.

  27. 27.

    Kaul 2002, p. 614. Similarly, Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 35.

  28. 28.

    See ICC Statute, Article 1. On the Rome Conference, see Schabas 2016, pp. 22 et seq.

  29. 29.

    The inclusion of the crime of aggression was a particular concern of the Non-Aligned Movement, see Schabas 2016, p. 23; Schabas 2004, p. 134.

  30. 30.

    On the discussions about the crime of aggression at the Rome Conference, see Clark 2017; McDougall 2021, pp. 9 et seq.; Schabas 2004, pp. 131 et seq.

  31. 31.

    See Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 654.

  32. 32.

    See ICC Statute, Article 13(a) and Article 14.

  33. 33.

    See ICC Statute, Article 13(c) and Article 15.

  34. 34.

    For the use of the term when discussing the Kampala compromise, see Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 664.

  35. 35.

    See ICC Statute, Article 12(2)(a). Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, paras 15 et seq.

  36. 36.

    See ICC Statute, Article 12(2)(b). See Cryer et al. 2019, p. 148; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, paras 24 et seq.; Werle and Jeßberger 2020, para 270.

  37. 37.

    On how to become a party to the ICC Statute, see ICC Statute, Article 125. Acceptance and approval are alternative terms to ratification used depending on the domestic preference, see Clark and Meisenberg 2021a, para 8. The term “ratification” will be used in the following to capture the other terminological alternatives. The term “acceptance” seems broader and is also used in Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute.

  38. 38.

    On the various, and even more extreme proposals, see Cryer et al. 2019, p. 149; Kaul 2002, pp. 596 et seq.; Kaul and Kreß 1999, pp. 152 et seq.; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, paras 5 et seq.; Wilmshurst 1999, p. 132.

  39. 39.

    Germany 1998, p. 2. This proposal was already made at the Preparatory Committee. For a more detailed analysis, see Kaul 2002, pp. 597 et seq.; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, paras 6 et seq. The German proposal, however, discussed universal jurisdiction only with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

  40. 40.

    Germany 1998, p. 3.

  41. 41.

    See, in particular, the widely supported Korean proposal which required only one of the mentioned States to have accepted the jurisdiction, see Lattanzi 1999, p. 57. See also Kaul 2002, pp. 599 et seq.; Kaul and Kreß 1999, p. 153; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 8.

  42. 42.

    See also the even more extreme French proposal submitted prior to the Rome Conference to the Preparatory Committee which “took the principle of statal consent almost to its logical extreme” by requiring for every individual case the specific consent of all States directly concerned (i.e., the territorial State, the States of nationality of the suspect, the victim State and, if applicable, the custodial State), see Article 34 of France 1996. On this proposal, Kaul and Kreß 1999, pp. 153 et seq.

  43. 43.

    See United States of America, Proposal Regarding Article 7, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L.70, p. 247: “Where a situation has been referred to the Court by a State Party [or where the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation,] the Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 provided that the following States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime in question in accordance with article 7 bis or ter: (a) The State on the territory of which the act or omission in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; and (b) The State of nationality of the accused/suspect with respect to the crime.” See also Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 10.

  44. 44.

    Or “conjunctive approach”, see Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 12

  45. 45.

    Or “disjunctive approach”, see ibid.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., para 10.

  47. 47.

    Similarly, Werle and Jeßberger 2020, para 274 whereby the German proposal was mainly rejected for political and not for legal reasons. See Scharf 2001, p. 77, whereby no one at the Rome Conference disputed that core crimes were crimes of universal jurisdiction and the consent regime was adopted as a “politically expedient concession to the sovereignty of states in order to garner broad support for the statute”.

  48. 48.

    See Cassese et al. 2013, p. 271; Cryer et al. 2019, p. 149; Kaul 2002, p. 607.

  49. 49.

    See, in detail, ICC (PTC), Situation Bangladesh/Myanmar, Decision, 6 September 2018, paras 54 et seq.

  50. 50.

    See Scheffer 1999b, p. 18; Scheffer 2013, pp. 233 et seq. See also Morris 2001, pp. 26 et seq.; Morris 2000.

  51. 51.

    On the main contentions against the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties and the difference between the pacta tertiis rule of Article 34 of the VCLT, and the consent principle in general, see Cormier 2020, pp. 12 et seq.

  52. 52.

    See US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes D. Scheffer, Statement of the 42nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, in United Nations 1998b, p. 361, para 21; see also in his scholarly work after the Rome Conference, Scheffer 2013, pp. 233 et seq.; Scheffer 1999a, pp. 70 et seq.

  53. 53.

    The situation in Afghanistan potentially includes crimes committed by US nationals. For the US criticism, see the statement by Sekulow 2019, p. 10. On the Afghanistan situation, see also Trump 2018; Bolton 2018.

  54. 54.

    His criticism particularly concerns the argument based on the VCLT. The rest of the statement is rather ambiguous. Scheffer appeared as an amicus curiae in the oral hearing of the International Criminal Court in the situation in Afghanistan, see Scheffer 2019, p. 30. See also Scheffer 2020. Regarding the argument grounded in the VCLT, he states: “Today it holds very little credibility because of the character of the crimes at issue, the evolution of international criminal law, and the longstanding principle of criminal jurisdiction over one’s own territory.”

  55. 55.

    For a detailed discussion and rejection of the US reasoning, see Akande 2003, pp. 620 et seq.; Cormier 2020, pp. 14 et seq.; Kaul 2002, pp. 608 et seq.; Mégret 2001, pp. 251 et seq.; Scharf 2001, pp. 98 et seq.

  56. 56.

    Namely the pacta tertiis rule of Article 34 of the VCLT. See Cormier 2020, p. 16; Lee 1999, p. 29; Mégret 2001, p. 249; Scharf 2001, p. 98.

  57. 57.

    For a discussion of the principle of consent and its possible violation by the jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties, see Akande 2003, pp. 635 et seq.; Cormier 2020, pp. 18 et seq.

  58. 58.

    See Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 16. See also Cryer 2005, p. 985.

  59. 59.

    In detail, see Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, paras 30 et seq. See also Kaul 2002, pp. 610 et seq.

  60. 60.

    See ICC Statute, Article 12(2)(a) and (3)

  61. 61.

    See ICC Statute, Article 12(2)(b) and (3).

  62. 62.

    See https://web.dev.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-i-have-decided-proceed-opening. Accessed 15 September 2022.

  63. 63.

    See Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute, which does not refer to Article 13(b) which deals with Security Council referrals. Bekou and Cryer 2007, p. 50.

  64. 64.

    See ICC Statute, Article 13(b). See, in detail, Schabas and Pecorella 2021b, paras 17 et seq.

  65. 65.

    Kaul 2002, p. 612; Kaul and Kreß 1999, p. 157.

  66. 66.

    Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 35.

  67. 67.

    Kaul 2002, p. 612.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.; Kaul and Kreß 1999, p. 172.

  69. 69.

    See ICC Statute, Article 13(b) and Article 15ter in comparison to Article 12 and Article 15bis of the ICC Statute.

  70. 70.

    Kaul and Kreß 1999, p. 172.

  71. 71.

    Kaul 2002, p. 612. See also Schabas 2016, p. 368.

  72. 72.

    Similar concerns were raised by States prior to the Rome Conference, see Schabas 2016, p. 368.

  73. 73.

    Krisch 2012, para 4.

  74. 74.

    On a case study on the actual and threatened use of veto related to the situation in Syria, see Trahan 2020, pp. 260 et seq.

  75. 75.

    Kaul 2002, p. 614. Similarly, Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 35.

  76. 76.

    By ratification of the ICC Statute or by an ad hoc declaration. For this point of criticism, see Kaul 2002, p. 612; Lattanzi 1999, p. 58; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 7; Simpson 2004, pp. 57 et seq.

  77. 77.

    Kaul 2002, p. 612; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 7; Simpson 2004, pp. 57 et seq.

  78. 78.

    Where the International Criminal Court has not yet commenced investigations at the time of writing due to the lack of jurisdiction over the most responsible according to Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute and the failure of the UN Security Council to refer the situation. See, in detail, Trahan 2020, pp. 278 et seq. On the decision against the initiation of investigations, see Office of the Prosecutor 2015.

  79. 79.

    On the German proposal, see Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 7. For the same comment on the Korean proposal, see Kaul 2002, p. 613.

  80. 80.

    See the Korean Proposal in Kaul 2002, pp. 599 et seq.; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 8.

  81. 81.

    Kaul describes the omission of custodial State jurisdiction as “the most serious deficit of Article 12”, see Kaul 2002, p. 613; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 8. For the reactions from civil society, see Glasius 2005, p. 73.

  82. 82.

    Cassese et al. 2013, p. 271.

  83. 83.

    See Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 16. See also Kaul 2002, p. 607. Especially common law countries have based their jurisdiction mainly on the principle of territoriality, see Jeßberger 2011, p. 241.

  84. 84.

    See Cormier 2020, p. 21, whereby the national State of the accused “may intervene diplomatically and the accused is entitled to consular assistance but consent of the State of nationality is not necessary for the foreign domestic prosecution to go ahead”; Kaul 2002, p. 607; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 16.

  85. 85.

    Lee 1999, p. 28. See, e.g., Article 36 of the ICJ Statute.

  86. 86.

    Similarly, Kaul and Kreß 1999, p. 150.

  87. 87.

    Similarly, Kaul 2002, pp. 608 et seq.

  88. 88.

    See Scharf 2001, p. 75, who argues that the assumption of the exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its nationals “reflects a colonialist concept that was prevalent in earlier centuries but has little relevance to modern practice”.

  89. 89.

    Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 16.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., para 35. They assume that it could have helped to reach the “ambitious target” of 60 ratifications for the ICC Statute to enter into force (see Article 126 of the ICC Statute) already four years after the Rome Conference. Many observers thought that this early fulfillment of the minimum number of ratifications was impressive, see Clark and Meisenberg 2021b, para 2.

  91. 91.

    Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 35

  92. 92.

    For this view but with a critical addition, see Mégret 2006, p. 30; Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 35.

  93. 93.

    See ICC Statute, Article 5(2): “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”

  94. 94.

    See ICC Statute, Article 8bis.

  95. 95.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis and Article 15ter.

  96. 96.

    See Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b.

  97. 97.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010. See also Blokker and Kreß 2010, p. 892; Wenaweser 2010.

  98. 98.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis.

  99. 99.

    See, in detail, Barriga and Blokker 2017a; Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021a.

  100. 100.

    Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 662.

  101. 101.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(4).

  102. 102.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(5).

  103. 103.

    See Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1212. Similarly, Reisinger Coracini 2010, p. 749.

  104. 104.

    For a detailed discussion whether the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is based on a single-ratification regime after Kampala: Barriga and Blokker 2017a, pp. 664 et seq.

  105. 105.

    Emphasis added. See Ambos 2010, p. 505; Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 655; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213; Reisinger Coracini 2010, pp. 773 et seq.; McDougall 2021, pp. 303 et seq.; Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2019, para 329.

  106. 106.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1214.

  107. 107.

    See Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, para 1 where “the amendments to the Statute contained in annex I of the present resolution, which are subject to ratification or acceptance and shall enter into force in accordance with Article 121, para 5…” See ICC Statute, Article 121(5): “Any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance.”

  108. 108.

    This was explained by the Chair of the Review Conference when introducing the draft on the opt-out regime. See Barriga and Kreß 2011f. See also Clark 2020, para 40; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1213 et seq.; McDougall 2021, pp. 303 et seq.

  109. 109.

    See, e.g., Akande 2010, p. 11; Koh and Buchwald 2015, p. 283; Murphy 2015, pp. 543 et seq.; Zimmermann 2016, p. 244.

  110. 110.

    See ICC Statute, Article 121(5) second sentence: “In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.”

  111. 111.

    In detail, see Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 657.

  112. 112.

    See also Barriga 2012, p. 52 fn. 260.

  113. 113.

    Similarly, Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2019, para 339, whereby Article15bis(4) “presupposes the consent of States parties to the Court’s exercise of its treaty-based, aggression-related jurisdiction”. On the explanations of the President of the Review Conference, see Barriga 2012, p. 52.

  114. 114.

    See Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213.

  115. 115.

    See the so-called “ABS proposal” by Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland, in Barriga and Kreß 2011g.

  116. 116.

    For this description, see Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213. See the proposal by Canada, in Barriga and Kreß 2011h.

  117. 117.

    Barriga and Blokker 2017a, pp. 653, 671; Kreß and Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1203. For a summary of the negotiation history of the Kampala compromise, see also Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 20, paras 2 et seq.

  118. 118.

    Kreß and Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1195. See also Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2019, para 339 who state that the establishment of the opt-out regime aimed mainly at convincing France and Great Britain to stop insisting on the monopoly of the UN Security Council.

  119. 119.

    Which are later described as the “camp protection”. See, in detail, Barriga and Blokker 2017b, p. 622, fn. 3.

  120. 120.

    Combined with a Pre-Trial Chamber “filter” if the UN Security Council does not act. This proposal was made by Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland, Barriga and Kreß 2011g. On this proposal, see also Kreß and Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1292 et seq.; Trahan 2011, pp. 69 et seq. Roughly half of the delegations preferred the unmodified jurisdictional regime of Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute, see Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 653.

  121. 121.

    See Clark 2010, p. 705. See also Barriga and Kreß 2011a, pp. 629 et seq., paras 28 et seq.; Barriga and Kreß 2011c, paras 38–39.

  122. 122.

    The amendment procedure of Article 121(4) of the ICC Statute requires, however, ratification or acceptance by seven-eighths of the States Parties.

  123. 123.

    See ICC Statute, Article 121(5) second sentence: “In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.”

  124. 124.

    Which is also known as the “menu approach” and later as the approach of the “camp consent”, Reisinger Coracini 2010, p. 758; see alsoKreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1203; Trahan 2011, p. 70; Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, pp. 20, paras 2 et seq.

  125. 125.

    See the proposal by Canada, in Barriga and Kreß 2011h, whereby “[all state(s) concerned with the alleged crime of aggression][the state on whose territory the alleged offence occurred and the state(s) of nationality of the persons accused of the crime] have declared their acceptance of this para.” Barriga and Blokker 2017a, pp. 653, 671; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1203.

  126. 126.

    Barriga 2012, p. 50.

  127. 127.

    Reisinger Coracini 2010, p. 759.

  128. 128.

    See ICJ Statute, Article 36.

  129. 129.

    See Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1203 whereby the Canadian proposal translated Article 121(5) of the ICC Statute into an “opt-in” mechanism.

  130. 130.

    See United States of America, Proposal Regarding Article 7, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L.70, p. 247.

  131. 131.

    The opt-out system stems from the joint proposal of Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland as well as Canada, which were the countries making the competing proposals before, Barriga and Kreß 2011d. The idea of an opt-out had been explored before by the Chair of the negotiations, though at that time without much response, see Barriga and Kreß 2011b, p. 704 as well as Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 671.

  132. 132.

    See Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 20, paras 2 et seq.

  133. 133.

    See, in detail, Sect. 5.3.2.2. See, in particular, Galbraith 2013. See also van Aaken 2014, pp. 464 et seq.; Teichman and Zamir 2019, pp. 1269 et seq.; Zamir and Teichman 2018, p. 427.

  134. 134.

    See, e.g., on the position of France and the United Kingdom, Belliard 2017; Whomersley 2017.

  135. 135.

    See Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1195; Wenaweser 2010, p. 884; Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2019, para 339.

  136. 136.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1204.

  137. 137.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(6) and (8). It thus recognizes the primary but not the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

  138. 138.

    Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021a, para 45.

  139. 139.

    McDougall 2021, p. 258.

  140. 140.

    Galbraith 2013.

  141. 141.

    Van Schaack 2011a, p. 585.

  142. 142.

    See for a classical definition of rationality whose assumption have been transferred to collective actors such as States, van Aaken 2014, p. 425 whereby all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets. See for a rational choice theory explanation of the high participation rate in case of opt-out clauses, Galbraith 2013, p. 346.

  143. 143.

    Kaul 2010, p. 665; Politi 2012, pp. 277 et seq.; Schabas 2016, p. 422; Trahan 2011, p. 91. See also van Schaack 2011a, p. 585 whereby the opt-out system offers “a toehold” from which civil society can “mount a political shame campaign to encourage states to decline the opt-out option”.

  144. 144.

    McDougall 2021, p. 36.

  145. 145.

    Ibid.

  146. 146.

    Kaul 2010, p. 665.

  147. 147.

    Galbraith 2013, p. 347.

  148. 148.

    Ibid.

  149. 149.

    McDougall 2021, p. 36.

  150. 150.

    Galbraith 2013, p. 314; van Aaken 2014, p. 427.

  151. 151.

    Galbraith 2013, p. 347.

  152. 152.

    See ibid., p. 335. In her assessment of over 300 multilateral treaties, she notices that treaties with opt-in clauses to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice have a State acceptance on average of five percent of these clauses, while treaties with an opt-out option to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice have a State acceptance of 80 percent.

  153. 153.

    Galbraith 2013, pp. 346 et seq.

  154. 154.

    Ibid.

  155. 155.

    Ibid.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., p. 314.

  157. 157.

    Donation rates are twice as high in countries with opt-out systems where people are presumed to have consented to organ donation unless declared otherwise, see Johnson and Goldstein 2004, pp. 1714 et seq. See also Galbraith 2013, p. 352; Thaler and Sunstein 2009, pp. 175 et seq.; van Aaken 2014, pp. 429 et seq.

  158. 158.

    Galbraith 2013, p. 349. See also Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, p. 8; Sunstein 2014, p. 721 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, pp. 34 et seq.

  159. 159.

    In favor: van Aaken 2014; Teichman and Zamir 2019, pp. 1264 et seq.; Zamir and Teichman 2018, pp. 423 et seq.

  160. 160.

    See Galbraith 2013, p. 347.

  161. 161.

    The benefit of this default effect might have also been seen in the negotiations leading to Kampala, where an opt-out system was briefly discussed as one which would “strongly reduce the number of States who were beyond the Court’s jurisdictional reach” as it reverses the “default situation”, see Barriga and Kreß 2011b, p. 704, para 41.

  162. 162.

    Barriga and Kreß 2011b, p. 704, para 41; Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2019, para 339.

  163. 163.

    Only two States have lodged a declaration under Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute, namely Guatemala (2018) and Kenya (2015). See https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library#. Accessed 15 September 2022.

  164. 164.

    For an appraisal of the adopted opt-out system, see, e.g., Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1216.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., p. 1215.

  166. 166.

    Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 658. Similarly, Statement by Japan in Barriga and Kreß 2011e.

  167. 167.

    Van Schaack 2011a, p. 578 whereby the ability to opt out and the non-State Party exclusion are premised on the principle of State consent.

  168. 168.

    See Clark 2010, p. 705. See also Barriga and Kreß 2011a, pp. 629 et seq., paras 28 et seq.; Barriga and Kreß 2011c, paras 38–39.

  169. 169.

    Or even by the national State of the accused.

  170. 170.

    Barriga 2012, p. 50.

  171. 171.

    Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 659.

  172. 172.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1212.

  173. 173.

    For an overview of the matters that remained unclear after Kampala, see Stahn 2010, pp. 880 et seq.

  174. 174.

    Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021a, para 31. This is at least what Rule 44(2) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence aims to clarify when it states that such a declaration has as a consequence the acceptance of jurisdiction “with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5 of relevance to the situation.” Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 31.

  175. 175.

    Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021a, para 31.

  176. 176.

    Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, pp. 954 et seq.; Kreß et al. 2012, p. 88; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213 fn. 113; McDougall 2021, p. 336.

  177. 177.

    For a comparable “sitting duck” scenario in case a State accepts the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as compulsory in relation to any other State which does the same, see Alexandrov 2006, pp. 34 et seq.; d’Amato 1985, pp. 387 et seq.; Galbraith 2013, p. 348. However, a reasoning of “symmetric liability” may not be central in international criminal law which is concerned with the prosecution of individuals for the “most serious crimes of international concern” and less bothered with the interests of States that stand behind these nationals. See also Kaul and Kreß 1999, pp. 174 et seq.

  178. 178.

    Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 656; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213; Manson 2010, p. 441; McDougall 2021, p. 336.

  179. 179.

    See, in detail, Blokker and Barriga 2017; Schabas 2016, pp. 427 et seq.; Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021b.

  180. 180.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1211; Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021b, para 2.

  181. 181.

    Kaul 2010, p. 664.

  182. 182.

    Blokker and Barriga 2017, p. 651 Except for the different provisions for entry into force and for the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction in Article 15ter(2) and (3) of the ICC Statute.

  183. 183.

    Kaul 2002, p. 612. See also Kaul and Kreß 1999, p. 157.

  184. 184.

    The irrelevance of any form of consent is confirmed by Understanding 2 to the Kampala Amendments, see Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, Annex III, Understanding 2. See also Blokker and Barriga 2017, p. 649; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1211.

  185. 185.

    For other voices that deplore the Kampala regime as a restricted one, see Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 662; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 40.

  186. 186.

    But see ICC Statute, Article 15bis(4).

  187. 187.

    But see ICC Statute, Article 15bis(5).

  188. 188.

    On the purposes of punishment, see Jeßberger and Geneuss 2020.

  189. 189.

    See also for a more general critique on any form of consent Barriga and Kreß 2011b, p. 702, para 36: “A system that required the consent of the future aggressor State would not have any deterrent effect”.

  190. 190.

    See ICC Statute, Article 8bis(1).

  191. 191.

    The deterrent effect of criminal law is said to be mainly dependent upon the certainty of punishment, see Beccaria 1963, p. 58.

  192. 192.

    ICC Statute, Article 15bis(5).

  193. 193.

    Van Schaack 2011a, p. 591.

  194. 194.

    Brown 2014, p. 650.

  195. 195.

    The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data of the Correlates of War Project are among the most widely used and analyzed datasets in the study of international conflict and international relations. By definition, “Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war”, see Jones et al. 1996, p. 163. For an analysis of the dataset from 1946 to 2001 with respect to the crime of aggression, see Brown 2014. For the table of the first users of force in Militarized Interstate Disputes (1946–2001), see Brown 2014, p. 663.

  196. 196.

    See Brown 2014, p. 662. Brown considered those uses of force as potentially relevant acts of aggression that had a highest action in dispute [HiAct] of 12 or higher, meaning these disputes involved: border violation, blockade, occupation of territory, seizure, attack, clash, declaration of war, use of CBR weapons, begin of interstate war or joining of an interstate war. See MID 5.0 Codebook, p. 3.

  197. 197.

    Mégret 2006, p. 13.

  198. 198.

    Non-States Parties are excluded, see ICC Statute, Article 15bis(5).

  199. 199.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(4).

  200. 200.

    Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 933 (entered into force 24 October 1945) (UN Charter), Article 24(1).

  201. 201.

    See Table 1 “First users of force in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1946-2001” in Brown 2014, p. 663. Brown found 1738 potential cases of acts of aggression. 22 % of them (385 in total) were committed by the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States). For a similar finding, see Grover 2019, p. 166.

  202. 202.

    See in detail, Strapatsas 2017. For the political reasons why the Security Council might have declined to make an aggression determination, see van Schaack 2011a, p. 567.

  203. 203.

    There were only two referrals at the time of writing, namely Darfur and Libya.

  204. 204.

    See the statement by France after the adoption of the Kampala Amendment: “In article 15 bis, para 8, the text restricts the role of the United Nations Security Council and contravenes the Charter of the United Nations under the terms of which the Security Council alone shall determine the existence of an act of aggression.”

  205. 205.

    See Article 23(2) of International Law Commission 1994: “A complaint of or directly related to an act of aggression may not be brought under this Statute unless the Security Council has first determined that a State has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint.”

  206. 206.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1216.

  207. 207.

    See UN Charter, Article 24. See also ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para 26; Blokker 2007, pp. 878 et seq.; Kreß 2015, p. 566; Webb 2016, p. 128.

  208. 208.

    See also Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1216; McDougall 2021, p. 352.

  209. 209.

    See for the rejection of the US proposal which would have required, like the strict consent-based regime, the active consent of the national state of the accused, Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 10.

  210. 210.

    See for a contribution on this issue one year after the Kampala Conference van Schaack 2011b, p. 156. See also Kreß 2018, p. 8 who assumes that this legal controversy had surrounded the consent-based jurisdictional regime “ever since the adoption of the Kampala amendments”; McDougall 2021, p. 258 who considers this as a “constructive ambiguity” which became “increasingly clear in the lead-up to the 2017 activation decision of the ASP”. See also Trahan 2018, pp. 202 et seq.

  211. 211.

    Clark 2009.

  212. 212.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1196.

  213. 213.

    See ICC Statute, Articles 15bis(3) and 15ter(3).

  214. 214.

    McDougall 2021, p. 258.

  215. 215.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(3) and ter(3). The other condition of Article 15bis(2) and ter(2) of the ICC Statute, the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by 30 States Parties, was met in 2016. For the list of ratifications of Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, see https://treaties.un.org/. Accessed 15 September 2022.

  216. 216.

    At the 15th Session of the Assembly of States Parties in 2016, it was decided “to establish a facilitation, based in New York, open only to States Parties, to discuss activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression”. See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, para 4.

  217. 217.

    Kreß 2019, p. 52. See also Grover 2019, p. 161.

  218. 218.

    See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, para 13.

  219. 219.

    The term “ratification” will be used in the following to capture other terminological alternatives.

  220. 220.

    Kreß 2018, p. 8; Trahan 2018, p. 203.

  221. 221.

    McDougall 2021, p. 303.

  222. 222.

    Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, para 1.

  223. 223.

    Manson 2010, p. 426.

  224. 224.

    ICC Statute, Article 121(5) second sentence states that “[i]n respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.”

  225. 225.

    In Kampala, this discussion was framed under the heading of the “positive understanding” and the “negative understanding” of Article 121 of the ICC Statute. See Barriga 2012, p. 41.

  226. 226.

    The activation took effect on 17 July 2018. See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017c, operative para 1.

  227. 227.

    See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017c, operative paras 2 and 3. In the same vein, Trahan 2018, p. 219.

  228. 228.

    See the language of Article 121(5) and Article 15bis(5) of the ICC Statute.

  229. 229.

    See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017c, operative para 3: “Reaffirms paragraph 1 of article 40 and paragraph 1 of article 119 of the Rome Statute in relation to the judicial independence of the judges of the Court”.

  230. 230.

    See Clark 2020, para 45. See also McDougall 2021, p. 327 whereby Article 19 of the ICC Statute confirms that determinations as to whether or not the Court has jurisdiction in any case is a “judicial function”. This mandate of the Court under Article 119(1) stands in contrast to Article 119(2) of the ICC Statute which assigns to the Assembly of States Parties “any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Statute”.

  231. 231.

    Clark 2020, para 45. See also McDougall 2018, p. 514.

  232. 232.

    Similarly, Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 942. The last-minute attempts by some States to move the paragraph on the reaffirmation of judicial independence from the operative part to the preamble of the Resolution suggest that its language was “not necessarily so innocuous”, see Trahan 2018, p. 216.

  233. 233.

    Kreß 2019, p. 58.

  234. 234.

    Zimmermann 2018, p. 24.

  235. 235.

    In the same vein, Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 942.

  236. 236.

    Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom (March 2017) in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 15.

  237. 237.

    See United States of America, Proposal Regarding Article 7, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L.70, p. 247.

  238. 238.

    See Barriga and Kreß 2011h.

  239. 239.

    Or the “principle of relative effect of treaties”, see Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom (March 2017) in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 16, paras 5, 6, 13. See also van Schaack 2011b, p. 156. On the principle, see Chinkin 1993, pp. 25 et seq.

  240. 240.

    For a detailed discussion and rejection of the US reasoning, see Akande 2003, pp. 620 et seq.; Cormier 2020, pp. 14 et seq.; Kaul 2002, pp. 608 et seq.; Mégret 2001, pp. 251 et seq.; Scharf 2001, pp. 98 et seq.

  241. 241.

    See Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, para 1. See Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom (March 2017) in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 16, para 12(a).

  242. 242.

    Manson 2010, p. 426.

  243. 243.

    See Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom (March 2017) in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 16, para 7. Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 952; Murphy 2015, p. 541. For a skeptical view, see McDougall 2021, p. 30.

  244. 244.

    Ibid.

  245. 245.

    Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 953; Manson 2010, pp. 425 et seq.; Schabas 2016, p. 356.

  246. 246.

    Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom (March 2017) in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, pp. 16 et seq., para 12. See already Zimmermann 2016, p. 244. See also Murphy 2015, pp. 543 et seq.

  247. 247.

    Liechtenstein is one of the States which strongly supported the Aggression Amendments from the beginning. See, in detail, Alavi and Barnes 2020, pp. 8 et seq.

  248. 248.

    See Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, pp. 20 et seq.; see also the concurring Paper submitted by Argentina, Botswana, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland (August 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, pp. 24 et seq. On this reading see also Kreß 2019, p. 53 who describes it as the “more permissive position”; Trahan 2018, pp. 207 et seq. who describes it as “the Liechtenstein/Swiss/Majority Reading”.

  249. 249.

    See Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 22, para 17.

  250. 250.

    Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 20, paras 2 et seq.; Paper submitted by Argentina, Botswana, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland (August 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 26. See also Clark 2020, para 40; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213; McDougall 2021, pp. 313 et seq.; Trahan 2018, pp. 208 et seq.

  251. 251.

    Paper submitted by Argentina, Botswana, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland (August 2017), p. 27, para 15 and Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), p. 20 para 4 and p 21 para 8, in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b. See also Barriga and Blokker 2017a, pp. 667 et seq., 673; Clark 2010, p. 704 fn. 55; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1215; Wenaweser 2010, pp. 885 et seq. For a contrary view, see Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, pp. 950 et seq. who argue that such a sui generis regime would be neither in accordance with the text of the ICC Statute nor with basic principles of international law.

  252. 252.

    Kreß and Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213.

  253. 253.

    Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 20, para 3.

  254. 254.

    Ibid., p. 20, paras 2 et seq. See also Barriga and Blokker 2017a, pp. 653, 671; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1213.

  255. 255.

    Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 22, para 15; paper submitted by Argentina, Botswana, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland (August 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 26. See also Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 657; Trahan 2018, p. 209.

  256. 256.

    Ibid.

  257. 257.

    For an explanation of the negative understanding, see Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1196.

  258. 258.

    Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 20; Clark 2020, para 41; McDougall 2021, pp. 311 et seq.; Reisinger Coracini 2010, p. 768, fn. 126; Wenaweser 2010, pp. 885 et seq. as well as fn. 10.

  259. 259.

    Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 20.

  260. 260.

    Paper submitted by Argentina, Botswana, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland (August 2017), p. 27, para 15 and Paper submitted by Liechtenstein (April 2017), p. 20 para 4 and p 21 para 8, in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b. See also Barriga and Blokker 2017a, pp. 667 et seq., 673; Clark 2010, p. 704 fn. 55; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1215; McDougall 2021, pp. 313 et seq.; Wenaweser 2010, pp. 885 et seq.

  261. 261.

    See the explicit language of Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010a, preambular para 2: “Noting article 121, paragraph 5, of the Statute which states that any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment … and that in respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding the crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory…”. For the same systematic interpretation, see also Schabas 2016, p. 356. See also Clark 2010, p. 709 fn. 70.

  262. 262.

    States decided that the amendments “shall enter into force in accordance with Article 121, paragraph 5” of the ICC Statute. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, para 1. See also Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1214.

  263. 263.

    See also Zimmermann 2018, p. 24 who describes it as an “opting-out light” approach. See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017a. It would have allowed States Parties to exempt themselves in an “as painless form imaginable” instead of lodging a formal opt-out declaration with the Registrar as required by Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute.

  264. 264.

    See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 2, para 4, p. 3, para 11.

  265. 265.

    Also called the “no deal option” or BATNA, which is the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement and a common term in negotiation theory. See Fisher et al. 2012, pp. 99 et seq.

  266. 266.

    Article 15bis(9) indeed ensures that the International Criminal Court is not dependent upon the Security Council to prosecute the crime of aggression in case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation. See Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2021a, para 53.

  267. 267.

    See their statements made right after the adoption of the Kampala Amendments, Statement by France, in Barriga and Kreß 2011e, p. 811; Statement by the United Kingdom in Barriga and Kreß 2011e, p. 813.

  268. 268.

    See also Trahan 2018, p. 242 whereby one suspects that the French and UK delegation might also have been fine with jurisdiction not activating.

  269. 269.

    See the account by the Swiss delegate Stürchler 2018, p. 3; Trahan 2018, p. 213.

  270. 270.

    See also Trahan 2018, p. 215. On the benefits and shortcomings of consensual decisions, see Sabel 2006, Chapter 16.

  271. 271.

    Paper submitted by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom (March 2017), in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017b, p. 15. See Stürchler 2018, p. 3 whereby France and the UK on the last day of the conference circulated their own draft resolution reintroducing their initial position practically unchanged. In the same vein, Kreß 2018, p. 11.

  272. 272.

    See ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017c, operative para 2.

  273. 273.

    Clark 2020, para 46 (“The 2017 resolution renders the opt-out something of a dead letter”); Stürchler 2018, p. 5 (“imply a revision of the plain reading of article 15bis”); Zimmermann 2018, p. 23(“completely set aside any effect Article 15bis(4) might still have had”; “diametrically undercut”); Zimmermann and Freiburg-Braun 2019, paras 359 et seq. (“effectively revered the opt-out option”; “de facto amendment of the Kampala amendment”).

  274. 274.

    For a discussion, see Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, pp. 943 et seq.; McDougall 2021, pp. 328 et seq.

  275. 275.

    For a definition of “subsequent agreement”, see Draft Conclusion 4 in International Law Commission 2018. See also Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, Article 31 mn. 72 et seq.

  276. 276.

    For the same objection, see Trahan 2018, pp. 232 et seq. The dividing line between interpretation, on the one hand, and amendment or modification, on the other, is “difficult, if not impossible to fix”, see Commentary to Draft Conclusion 7, in International Law Commission 2018, para 27 with further references; Fitzmaurice and Merkouris 2020, p. 216. There is a tension between the recognition of States Parties as the “best interpreters of their own agreement”, and the respect for amendment procedures specifically established where States Parties are no longer satisfied by the status quo of the treaty, instead of generously allowing subsequent agreements that “inevitably destroy the balance of benefits laid down in the original treaty”. See also Klabbers 1994, p. 337; Murphy 2013, p. 89.

  277. 277.

    On the risk to circumvent formal amendment procedures, see Commentary to Draft Conclusion 7, in International Law Commission 2018, para 37.

  278. 278.

    This is possible under the assumption that States Parties were never able to adopt Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute, while leaving Article 121(5) second sentence of the ICC Statute unapplied.

  279. 279.

    See Arato 2013, p. 308; Gardiner 2020, p. 481; Villiger 2009, Article 31 mn. 16.

  280. 280.

    For a similarly critical view, see Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 946; Stürchler 2018, p. 3; McDougall 2021, pp. 329 et seq. See for the requirement of an agreement between all parties Villiger 2009, Article 31, para 15.

  281. 281.

    See Commentary to Draft Conclusion 11, in International Law Commission 2018, para 30. See also Boyle and Chinkin 2007, p. 157.

  282. 282.

    See Commentary to Draft Conclusion 11, in International Law Commission 2018, para 28; Wolfrum and Pichon 2010, para 18.

  283. 283.

    See Commentary to Draft Conclusion 11, in International Law Commission 2018, para 30; Wolfrum and Pichon 2010, para 4.

  284. 284.

    Boyle and Chinkin 2007, pp. 157 et seq.

  285. 285.

    See, e.g., the Statement by Switzerland: “Switzerland does not share the legal view expressed in this resolution regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In our view, the Court does have jurisdiction over a crime of aggression committed by nationals or on the territory of non-ratifying States Parties.” See also Argentina, Belgium, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Finland, Liechtenstein and Cyprus, Mexico, Slovenia, Spain, Palestine. See their statements in ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017d, Annex VII. See also Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 946; McDougall 2021, p. 327.

  286. 286.

    For an equally skeptical view, see McDougall 2021, pp. 325 et seq.

  287. 287.

    See, in contrast, the resolution which deletes Article 124, ICC Assembly of States Parties 2015, Annex.

  288. 288.

    They stipulate essentially the same thing. In case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation, the International Criminal Court shall not exercise jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a national or on the territory of a non-ratifying State Party (operative para 2) or a non-State Party (Article 15bis(5) of the ICC Statute).

  289. 289.

    Similarly, McDougall 2021, pp. 332 et seq.

  290. 290.

    Ibid., p. 333.

  291. 291.

    Even if it is a subsequent agreement, it does not necessarily mean that it is the prevailing view on interpreting Article 15bis of the ICC Statute, but it would only be one of several factors to be taken into account when interpreting Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute. See VCLT, Article 31(3) whereby it “shall be taken into account, together with the context”. See also Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 948; McDougall 2021, p. 334 ; Trahan 2018, pp. 231 et seq.

  292. 292.

    Similarly, Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 948; McDougall 2021, p. 333.

  293. 293.

    See Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 949 whereby it adds “considerable weight” to the strict consent-based view.

  294. 294.

    McDougall 2021, p. 333.

  295. 295.

    See VCLT, Article 32(a) and (b).

  296. 296.

    It does not require the State Party to be a “ratifying” State Party, but is unlimited in scope. The addition of “in accordance with Article 12” is read as providing that the general rules on the exercise of jurisdiction of Article 12 apply unless otherwise provided by Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute. Also assuming that the language of Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute is rather “straightforward”, see Clark 2020, para 40; Clark and Heinze 2021, para 24; Clark 2010, p. 704. See also Barriga and Blokker 2017a, p. 657; McDougall 2021, pp. 303 et seq.

  297. 297.

    It would make little sense if the drafters resorted to a different language for non-ratifying States Parties and non-States Parties to achieve the same result, namely their exclusion. Similarly, McDougall 2021, p. 311.

  298. 298.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1. See also McDougall 2021, p. 307 et seq.

  299. 299.

    See for a summary of the discussions of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression Barriga and Blokker 2017b, pp. 622 et seq.

  300. 300.

    See McDougall 2021, p. 314.

  301. 301.

    The insertion of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction in Article 15bis and ter did not amend Articles 5, 6, 7 or 8 either. For contributions that equally doubt the fit of Article 121(5) of the ICC Statute to the crime of aggression, see Barriga and Blokker 2017b, p. 632; Clark 2009, pp. 419 et seq.; Clark and Heinze 2021, para 24; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1197; Reisinger Coracini 2008, p. 716.

  302. 302.

    For details, see Clark and Heinze 2021, para 13; Clark 2009, p. 416.

  303. 303.

    See Clark 2009, pp. 419 et seq.; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1197; Wenaweser 2010, pp. 885 et seq.

  304. 304.

    Bertram-Nothnagel 2010, p. 7.

  305. 305.

    Clark 2009, pp. 415, 419; Clark 2020, para 37.

  306. 306.

    States decided that the amendments “shall enter into force in accordance with Article 121, paragraph 5” of the ICC Statute. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute 2010b, para 1.

  307. 307.

    The use of “adopted in according to Articles 121 and 123” and the lack of the use of “enter into force” may point to the application of Article 121(3) and against Article 121(4) or (5) of the ICC Statute, but the irrelevance of a ratification would be “an astonishing consequence, given the political importance of the matter”. See Kreß and Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1196 et seq. See also Clark and Heinze 2021, para 23.

  308. 308.

    See VCLT, Article 31(1). On the contextual interpretation, see Article 31 in Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, paras 44 et seq.

  309. 309.

    The use of “adopted in according to Articles 121 and 123” and the lack of the use of “enter into force” may point to the application of Article 121(3) and militate against the application of Article 121(4) or (5) of the ICC Statute. The irrelevance of ratification of the Aggression Amendments, however, would be “an astonishing consequence, given the political importance of the matter”. See Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1196 et seq. Moreover, Article 5(2) uses the term “provision” instead of “amendment”, which may also raise doubt as to the application of Article 121, see Clark and Heinze 2021, para 23.

  310. 310.

    On the contextual interpretation and the possibility that other provisions of the treaty have a “necessary consequence or implication”, see Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, Article 31, para 49.

  311. 311.

    Clark and Heinze 2021, para 23.

  312. 312.

    Similarly, Reisinger Coracini 2008, p. 715. Newly added crimes need to respect Article 121(5) of the ICC Statute.

  313. 313.

    See Article 31, in Dörr and Schmalenbach 2012, para 59.

  314. 314.

    VCLT, Article 32.

  315. 315.

    See Clark 2009, pp. 414 et seq.; Clark 2020, paras 27 et seq. There were four different interpretations discussed, namely the adoption model, the Article 121(5)-model with a negative understanding, the Article 121(5)-model with a positive understanding and the Article 121(4)-model. See, in detail, also Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, pp. 950 et seq.; Barriga and Blokker 2017b, pp. 622 et seq.; Clark and Heinze 2021, para 23; Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1196 et seq.; McDougall 2021, pp. 292 et seq.

  316. 316.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, pp. 1198 et seq. On the preparatory work, see Clark 2009, pp. 421 et seq.

  317. 317.

    On this last-minute compromise, see Kreß 2018, p. 2; Zimmermann 2016, para 39.

  318. 318.

    Clark 2009, p. 425.

  319. 319.

    Ibid.

  320. 320.

    For a characterization of the Activation Resolution, adopted in New York City, as a supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32, see Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2018, p. 948; McDougall 2021, p. 333.

  321. 321.

    Although they are not stricto sensu preparatory work of Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute, “anything that looks helpful” can fall into this category of “supplementary means” under Article 32 of the VCLT according to Gardiner 2015, p. 112. See also International Law Commission 2018.

  322. 322.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1 above.

  323. 323.

    Others may approach the same legal issue on the basis of an interpretation of Article 121(5) of the ICC Statute, see Clark and Heinze 2021, para 25.

  324. 324.

    Clark and Heinze 2021, para 26; McDougall 2021, p. 335; Trahan 2018, p. 232.

  325. 325.

    If Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute is read as having always precluded a different default jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression than the one enshrined in Article 121(5) of the ICC Statute.

  326. 326.

    Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 10.

  327. 327.

    Ibid., para 16.

  328. 328.

    See Sect. 5.2.2 above.

  329. 329.

    As of December 2022, 44 States Parties have ratified the Kampala Amendments. For the current state of ratifications, see https://treaties.un.org. Accessed 15 December 2022.

  330. 330.

    Kreß and von Holtzendorff 2010, p. 1216.

  331. 331.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.2 above.

  332. 332.

    As of December 2022. For the current state of ratifications, see https://treaties.un.org/. Accessed 15 December 2022.

  333. 333.

    Namely, the permanent members of the Security Council. See the statement by France after the adoption of the Kampala Amendment: “In article 15 bis, paragraph 8, the text restricts the role of the United Nations Security Council and contravenes the Charter of the United Nations under the terms of which the Security Council alone shall determine the existence of an act of aggression.”

  334. 334.

    See Article 23(2) of the 1994 Draft Statute of the International Law Commission: “A complaint of or directly related to an act of aggression may not be brought under this Statute unless the Security Council has first determined that a State has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint.”

  335. 335.

    See ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan, Statement, 28 February 2022: https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-i-have-decided-proceed-opening. Accessed 15 September 2022.

  336. 336.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(5).

  337. 337.

    See ICC Statute, Article 15bis(4).

  338. 338.

    Provided Article 15bis(4) of the ICC Statute cannot enter into force on the basis of Article 5(2) and of the first sentence of Article 121(5) without triggering the latter’s second sentence.

  339. 339.

    Schabas and Pecorella 2021a, para 10.

  340. 340.

    See, in detail, Chap. 2., Sect. 2.3.3.1.

  341. 341.

    For the question of whether States can rely on ordinary criminal offenses to prosecute other ICC Statute crimes and render cases inadmissible under Article 17 of the ICC Statute, see Stahn 2012.

  342. 342.

    See, e.g., McDougall 2022. To bolster its legitimacy, an endorsement of the UN General Assembly is debated.

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    Annegret Hartig

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Hartig, A. (2023). The Restricted Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court. In: Making Aggression a Crime Under Domestic Law. International Criminal Justice Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-591-1_5

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