Challenges to the EU’s Normativity in Multileveled Coercive Action

Abstract

This chapter shifts the focus to the EU’s ability to act normatively, even when acting unilaterally, by analysing the coercion aspect of the use of instruments element. In particular, the discussion examines the EU’s use of economic coercion by leveraging its fisheries market. This type of economic coercion in the area of fisheries has a considerable impact on third States due to the size and characteristics of the EU fisheries market, which can be a strong leverage for the EU. This chapter examines the EU’s normativity in using coercive measures by exploring three types of coercive instruments ordered according to the level of unilateralism involved—implementing multilaterally agreed measures, enforcing conditionality under bilateral agreements and adopting purely autonomous measures. These instruments form part of the EU’s action against illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing or complement it through fighting legal yet unsustainable fishing. The discussion also analyses the EU’s normativity under the legitimacy element with respect to each level of coercive action. These instruments also present a mixture of uses of the exclusive Common Fisheries Policy and the Common Commercial Policy competences. As such, the analysis looks at instruments where the EU has strong powers giving it large freedom to act normatively. Nevertheless, challenges to normativity are still identified relating to the ways in which the EU has put in place some of its coercion frameworks as well as the coherence and consistency in their implementation.