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Blindfolded in the Dark. The Intelligence Position of Dutchbat in the Srebrenica Safe Area

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Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali

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Abstract

The attack on and the full conquest of the Safe Area of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 caught everyone by surprise. This did not only go for Dutchbat, but for all intelligence services concerned. This cannot merely be explained by the fact that it was just shortly before the attack on the enclave that the Bosnian Serbs took the decision to conquer it completely, but it also has to do with the extremely weak intelligence position of the UN and with the absence of sufficient capacity and the right means to gather and analyse intelligence. Because of this, the fall of Srebrenica can be attributed to the failure of military intelligence. The Netherlands can be blamed as well. In the Dutch cabinet, in the Dutch Army and in Parliament an anti-intelligence attitude prevailed. Among them the idea had taken root that a peacekeeping operation did not require intelligence. Dutchbat command made serious mistakes and did not seize all available opportunities improve the intelligence position inside the enclave.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002a.

  2. 2.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b.

  3. 3.

    Wiebes 2002; for the English-language version, see Wiebes 2003.

  4. 4.

    Doctrinecommissie van de Koninklijke Landmacht 1996, pp. 128–130; see also: Nederlandse Defensiestaf 2012, pp. 12–13.

  5. 5.

    House 1993, p. 2.

  6. 6.

    House 1993, p. 3.

  7. 7.

    House 1993, p. 3.

  8. 8.

    House 1993, p. 3; Nederlandse Defensiestaf 2012, pp. 38–39.

  9. 9.

    See: The Interagency OPSEC Support Staff 1996, p. 2-1.

  10. 10.

    House 1993, p. 3; The Interagency OPSEC Support Staff 1996, p. 2-1; see also: Nederlandse Defensiestaf 2012, p. 40.

  11. 11.

    House 1993, p. 4; see also: Nederlandse Defensiestaf 2012, p. 40.

  12. 12.

    House 1993, p. 4; see also: Herman 1996, pp. 121–124.

  13. 13.

    House 1993, pp. 5–6.

  14. 14.

    Nederlandse Defensiestaf 2012, pp. 44–45; see also: House 1993, pp. 4–9.

  15. 15.

    House 1993, p. 9.

  16. 16.

    House 1993, p. 10.

  17. 17.

    House 1993, pp. 9–10.

  18. 18.

    House 1993, p. 10.

  19. 19.

    Ibidem.

  20. 20.

    House 1993, p. 10; for a theoretical approach of the intelligence cycle see for instance: De Graaff 2010, pp. 349–358.

  21. 21.

    Van Kappen 2003, pp. 3–4; see also Carment et al. 2006, pp. 1–2.

  22. 22.

    Martyn 2006, p. 23.

  23. 23.

    Doctrinecommissie van de Koninklijke Landmacht 1996, p. 130; see also: Cammaert 2003, pp. 14–15.

  24. 24.

    Doctrinecommissie van de Koninklijke Landmacht 1999, p. 118.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Defensiestaf 2005; Nederlandse Defensiestaf 2012; Ministerie van Defensie 2013.

  27. 27.

    Theunens 2001, p. 598.

  28. 28.

    Carment et al. 2006, p. 2.

  29. 29.

    Van Reijn 2010, p. 87.

  30. 30.

    See for instance Leurdijk 2006.

  31. 31.

    Carment et al. 2006, p. 2; see also Leurdijk 2006.

  32. 32.

    Hereinafter, the term “Bosnia” will be used to denote the entire area of Bosnia–Herzegovina.

  33. 33.

    Van Woensel 2004, pp. 261–263; Klep and Van Gils 2005, pp. 298–301.

  34. 34.

    For this, see for instance: Ten Cate and Van Woensel 2008, pp. 256–272; Ten Cate 2014, pp. 232–235.

  35. 35.

    Van Woensel 2004, pp. 263–264; Klep and Van Gils 2005, pp. 309–311; Ten Cate and Van der Vorm 2016, pp. 70–71.

  36. 36.

    Ten Cate and Van der Vorm 2016, pp. 71–72.

  37. 37.

    Van Woensel 2004, pp. 266–268; Ten Cate and Van der Vorm 2016, pp. 73–75; see also Ten Cate 2014, pp. 236–241.

  38. 38.

    Van Woensel 2004, pp. 268–269; Ten Cate and Van der Vorm 2016, p. 75.

  39. 39.

    Van Woensel 2004, p. 271; Klep and Van Gils 2005, pp. 315–317; Ten Cate and Van der Vorm 2016, pp. 76–77.

  40. 40.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 157–158.

  41. 41.

    Andreas Zumach 1995. See also: Nederlands Dagblad, 13 October 1995 and De Gelderlander, 13 October 1995.

  42. 42.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 158.

  43. 43.

    While patrolling the no-fly zone over Bosnia, the aircraft was hit by an SA-6 Gainful SAM. The aircraft came down near the town of Banja Luka, Bosnia. Captain Scott O’Grady was able to safely eject. However, O’Grady spent six days on the ground in enemy territory before being rescued by a Marine Corps CH-53 and support aircraft. Scott was picked up near the town of Mrkonjić Grad. Scott O’Grady’s story made headlines around the world, becoming a celebrity. He is one of the better-known F-16 pilots.

  44. 44.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 158–159.

  45. 45.

    The authors have some doubts as to whether the UAVs’ range was great enough to cover Eastern Bosnia.

  46. 46.

    Veteraneninstituut (Vi), Interviewcollectie Nederlandse Veteranen (ICNV), interviewnummer ID: 516, C.H. Nicolai, 13 oktober 2008, [2:23–2:25].

  47. 47.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 159.

  48. 48.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 159–160.

  49. 49.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 161.

  50. 50.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 161.

  51. 51.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 160–161; see also: Wiebes 2002, pp. 299–300, and Brouwers and Kranenberg 2002, ‘Inlichtingen rond Srebrenica faalden’.

  52. 52.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 159.

  53. 53.

    Cited in: Wiebes 2003, p. 366.

  54. 54.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 161–162.

  55. 55.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 162–163; see also Wiebes 2003, p. 367.

  56. 56.

    Cited in: Wiebes 2003, p. 363.

  57. 57.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 163.

  58. 58.

    Ibidem.

  59. 59.

    The ‘order of battle’ shows the hierarchical organisation, command structure, strength, disposition of personnel, and equipment of units and formations of the armed force.

  60. 60.

    Information repetition or the ‘Cry Wolf’ syndrome occurs when certain intelligence is presented again and again, does not appear to be true again, thus causing warning fatigue: because similar intelligence was false the last few times it must be false again. De Graaff 2010, p. 559; see also: Metselaar 1997, p. 32 ff.

  61. 61.

    Cited as such in: De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 164; CIA 1999, p. 15.

  62. 62.

    Cited in De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 164.

  63. 63.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 164.

  64. 64.

    Metselaar 1997, p. 36.

  65. 65.

    Westerman and Rijs 1997.

  66. 66.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 164.

  67. 67.

    Cognitive dissonance is a psychological term for the uneasy tension that arises when learning facts or opinions contrary to one’s own conviction or opinion, or behaviour that does not match one’s own conviction, values and norms. According to this theory people feel a strong urge to reduce that dissonance by adapting or rationalising their opinion or behaviour.

  68. 68.

    Metselaar 1997, p. 43.

  69. 69.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, pp. 164–165.

  70. 70.

    Citeds as such in: Wiebes 2002, p. 387.

  71. 71.

    Ofri 1983, pp. 822–827.

  72. 72.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 165.

  73. 73.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b, II, p. 1388.

  74. 74.

    Van Woensel 2004 p. 264; Ten Cate and Van de Vorm 2016, pp. 72–73; see also De Weger 2011, p. 61.

  75. 75.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b, II, pp. 1389–1390.

  76. 76.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b, II, p. 1390.

  77. 77.

    Martyn 2006, p. 23; see also Svensson 2003, pp. 41–46.

  78. 78.

    Veteraneninstituut (Vi), Interviewcollectie Nederlandse Veteranen (ICNV) [interview collection Dutch veterans], interviewnummer ID: 1411, F. Heuberger, 3 May 2011, [1:17–1:23].

  79. 79.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b, II, pp. 1390–1391.

  80. 80.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b, II, p. 1391; Van Woensel 2004, pp. 269–270.

  81. 81.

    Ramirez 2004, no page.

  82. 82.

    Cleveland 2001, p. 5.

  83. 83.

    Rose dispatched a JOC team to Goražde to check on rumours about Serbian cruelties against the muslim population. They set up an observation post in the town centre from where they started patrols in the vicinity of the town. In April 1994 one of the JOCs was killed when his Land Rover was fired on by the Serbs. In the same month the JOC team called in air support against an attack by Serb artillery and tanks. During the air attacks a British Fleet Air Arm (Royal Navy) Sea Harrier was downed by the Bosnian Serbs. The pilot was able to eject safely and managed to join the JOC team in town. Meanwhile the team was beleaguered by the local muslim population because they felt underprotected. JOC team decided to exfiltrate from Goražde under the cover of darkness. On foot the SAS soldiers, with a number of wounded colleagues and the pilot, succeeded in reaching a safe spot, where they were picked up by a helicopter. See Mackenzie 2011, pp. 227–228 and De Weger 2011, pp. 63–64. For a detailed account: Spence 1998.

  84. 84.

    Cleveland 2001, p. 5; Ramirez 2004; Mackenzie 2011, pp. 227–228; see also Wiebes 2002, pp. 219–211, and De Weger 2011, pp. 63–64.

  85. 85.

    Ten Cate and Van der Vorm 2016, pp. 65–67; see also: Wiebes 2002, p. 221.

  86. 86.

    Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) 2002b, II, p. 1391; Wiebes 2002, pp. 220–221.

  87. 87.

    De Graaff 2010, p. 554.

  88. 88.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 166.

  89. 89.

    Wiebes 2002, pp. 113–114, 161–162.

  90. 90.

    Van Reijn 2010, p. 87.

  91. 91.

    See also: De Graaff 2010, pp. 558–559.

  92. 92.

    De Graaff 2010, p. 560.

  93. 93.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 166.

  94. 94.

    Quoted as such in De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 166 [United Nations 1999, § 487].

  95. 95.

    De Graaff and Wiebes 2014, p. 166.

  96. 96.

    Dimitriu and Tjepkema 2010, p. 229.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA), University of Leiden, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Cees Wiebes

  2. Centre of Research and Expertise, Veterans Institute, Doorn, The Netherlands

    Jeoffrey van Woensel

  3. Enschede, The Netherlands

    Aad Wever

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  1. Cees Wiebes
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty of Military Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands

    Floribert Baudet

  2. Department of History and Art History, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Eleni Braat

  3. Veteraneninstituut , Doorn, The Netherlands

    Jeoffrey van Woensel

  4. Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Independent scholar, retired Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Aad Wever

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Wiebes, C., van Woensel, J., Wever, A. (2017). Blindfolded in the Dark. The Intelligence Position of Dutchbat in the Srebrenica Safe Area. In: Baudet, F., Braat, E., van Woensel, J., Wever, A. (eds) Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8_7

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