Restrictions of Rights

Sadurski, Wojciech

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-8935-6_10

Wojciech Sadurski^2,3

1042 Accesses

Abstract

How constitutional rights can properly be restricted is both a matter of constitutional design of the permissible grounds for such restrictions, and also of the interpretation by constitutional courts of these grounds and additional requirements, which together constitute a pattern of scrutiny of the limitations of rights. Both the constitutional design and the courts’ interpretation thereof are discussed in this Chapter. While all CEE constitutions have adopted a typically European approach, where grounds for restrictions are specifically listed on the constitutional charters of rights, specific designs of these restrictions differ from country to country, and some main models of that design are discussed. Case law of constitutional courts scrutinizing legislative restrictions on constitutional rights is then analysed, with special attention paid to the use of proportionality analysis, which has become by far the most important tool (also some other tools such as non-infringement of the essence of a right, or non-discriminatory character of restrictions are discussed). At the end, a postscript of “constitutional duties” is added: discussing how the inclusion of citizens’ duties in CEE constitutions (as in some other constitutions around the world) may be seen as either meaningless or harmful.

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Notes

1.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Lithuania and Montenegro.
2.
Compare, e.g., Basic Law of F.R.G. article 5 (freedom of expression can be subject to limitations by statutes “for the protection of youth” and for the protection of “personal honour”) with article 10 (privacy of letters, posts and telecommunications may be restricted by statutes in order “to protect the free democratic order or the existence or security of the Federation”) and with article 11 (freedom of movement may be restricted by statutes when necessary to protect the free democratic order, to combat the danger of epidemics, to deal with natural disasters or grave accidents, to protect young people or to prevent crime).
3.
Art. 24 (1).
4.
Art. 24 (4).
5.
As examples of such rights provisions in the first category of constitutions, consider the right to strike in the Constitution of Lithuania (Art. 51: “(1) Employees shall have the right to strike in order to protect their economic and social interests. (2) The restrictions of this right, and the conditions and procedures for the implementation thereof shall be established by law”); consider also the right to vote in Lithuania (art. 20) and Georgia (art. 28).
6.
Serbia and Montenegro Charter (art. 5), Macedonia (art. 54), Slovenia (art. 15), the Ukraine (art. 64) and Serbia (art. 11) [note that, hereinafter, a name of a country followed by a number of an article refers to the provision of the constitution of that country]. The same construction was envisaged by the abortive project of the charter of rights in Poland in 1992 which explicitly stated: “The rights and liberties guaranteed by this Charter may be restricted only by statute and only when such a restriction is envisaged by this Charter”, id. art. 5.2.
7.
Art. 55 (3).
8.
Art. 56 (3).
9.
These include the right to life (art. 20), to dignity and against torture (art. 21), to privacy (art. 23 (1)), etc.
10.
Decision of 27 March 1996, summarised at http://ks.rfnet.ru/english/codicese.htm, and in the Bull. Constit. Case Law 1996 (2): 253–55.
11.
Belarus, art. 23 (1). Other general clauses of this type are: Albania (art. 17); Belarus (art. 23); Croatia (art. 16), Czech Charter (Art. 4 (2, 3, 4)); Estonia (art. 11); Latvia (art. 116), Moldova (art. 54), Poland (art. 31), Romania (art. 49); Slovakia (art. 13).
12.
For instance, the Estonian constitution mentions only “necessity in a democratic society” and the requirement that the limits must not “distort the nature of rights and liberties”, Art. 11.
13.
For instance, the Albanian constitution provides, inter alia, that the rights limitations may not exceed the limitations provided for in the ECHR, Art. 17 (2).
14.
Moldova Art. 54 (2); Romania art. 49 (2).
15.
E.g., Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision K.23/98 of 25 February 1999.
16.
Consider these two examples. Article 29 of the Moldovan constitution allows for the following grounds for restricting the right to the inviolability of the domicile: execution of an arrest warrant; preventing the threat to life, physical integrity or the property of a person, and preventing the spread of a disease. Art. 26 of the Albanian Constitution envisages the following grounds for limiting the right against forced labour: execution of a judicial decision, the performance of military service, or of service resulting from a state of war, a state of emergency, or a natural disaster. This is the way in which the Constitution fleshes out the vague general clause (art. 17) to specific fact situations in which the limits on a particular right may be relevant.
17.
See Poland Art. 31 (3), Estonia Art. 11, Russia Art. 55 (3), Slovenia Art. 15 (2).
18.
See Albania Art. 17(1); Moldova Art. 54 (2); Romania Art. 49 (2).
19.
See Hungary art. I (3); Romania, Art. 49.
20.
The Slovenian Constitution has a “necessity” but not a “proportionality” requirement, Art. 15 (2).
21.
Decision U-I-25/95, of 27 November 1997, at http://www.us-rs.si/en/casefr.html, para. 47.
22.
More precisely, the requirement of necessity is present in: Articles 8–11 of the Convention rights to respect for privacy, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of expression, and to freedom of association and assembly, respectively; Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (liberty of movement within a state); and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 7 (right of an alien not to be expelled before certain conditions are met).
23.
See e.g. Goodwin v. United Kingdom 22 E.C.H.R. 123, 143–4 (1996); for discussion see Alastair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention of Human Rights (Butterworths, London 2001) at 411–2, 448.
24.
Marc-Andre Eissen, quoted by Mowbray, id. at 413.
25.
See P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1998) at 81.
26.
The three tiers are the principles of suitability (relevance), necessity, and proportionality sensu stricto.
27.
Robert Alexy, “Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality”, Ratio Juris 16 (2003): 131–40 at 135.
28.
Id. at 135, emphasis added.
29.
Id. at 135, emphasis in original.
30.
Gerald Gunther, “The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection”, Harvard Law Review 86 (1972): 1–49 at 8. These words applied to the so-called “strict scrutiny” of “suspect classifications” under the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution.
31.
Art. 31 (3) of Constitution. Before the Constitution of 1997, under the so called “Little Constitution”, which provided no textual basis for “necessity” or “proportionality” tests, the Constitutional Tribunal read the requirement of proportionality into the general principle of the rule of law, see Jerzy Oniszczuk, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w orzecznictwie Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego (Zakamycze: Kraków, 2000), p. 252.
32.
Decision no. P.2/98 of 12 January 1999.
33.
The word used in the original is “samowola budowlana”, which means building without permission, but in addition has a strong negative connotation in Polish.
34.
Decision no. P.2/98 of 12 January 1999, Orzecznictwo Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego w 1999 r. – czesc I (Wydawnictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego: Warszawa 2000): 13–29 at 15.
35.
This article lists the grounds upon which the constitutional rights can be legitimately restricted by statutes.
36.
Decision no. P.2/98, at 26.
37.
Id. at 20.
38.
Id. at 23.
39.
See Dieter Grimm, “Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany”, in David M. Beatty, ed., Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1994): 267–96.
40.
The judgment of 12 December 2005, No. K 32/04, OTK ZU No. 11/A/2005, 13.
41.
The judgment of 19 May 2012, No. K 20/09, OTK ZU No. 4/A/2011, poz. 35.
42.
Decision of 28 April 2000, no. 3-4-1-6-2000, at http://www.nc.ee/english/const/2000/3-4-1-6-00i.html
43.
Id., section 13 of the Decision.
44.
Id, section 16.
45.
Id. section 17.
46.
Decision no. 26/1999 of 8 September 1999, summarised in Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1999 (3): 392, HUN-1999-3-008.
47.
Decision no. 793/B/1997 of 24 February 1998, summarised in Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1998 (1): 57–58, HUN-1998-1-002.
48.
Decision No 139 of 14 December 1994, http://www.cecl.gr/RigasNetwork/databank/Jurisprudence/jurisprudence_main.htm
49.
Decision No 71 of 1993.
50.
Decision No 139 of 1994.
51.
Interview with Mr Horatiu Dumitru in Bucharest, 10 March 2001. Mr Dumitru, a private lawyer at the time of the interview, had worked as lawyer for the Government at the time of the Constitutional Court’s decision discussed in the main text.
52.
This is reinforced by a contrast with section (2), which is worded in characteristically right-oriented terms: “Citizens have the right to pensions, paid maternity leave…”, etc.
53.
Namely, the defence of national security, public order, health or morals, the prevention of a natural calamity or extremely grave disaster.
54.
Decision of 17 May 1996, no. 21/1996, reprinted in László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2000): 333–45.
55.
Puzzlingly, the Court justifies its decision by recalling the principle that “[r]estricting the right of association in the interest of protecting third persons from the infringement of their rights and liberties is constitutional if the restriction is made necessary by the other right and the extent of restriction is proportionate to the desired aim”, id. at 337, emphasis added.
56.
Id. at 339.
57.
In Joel Feinberg’s language, it is a “single-party paternalism”, see The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 3: Harm to Self (Oxford University Press: New York, 1986) at 9.
58.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing”, Yale Law Journal 16 (1987): 943–1005.
59.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, “solemnly proclaimed” by the European Council in Nice in December 2000, spells out expressly the principle of proportionality and the requirement of necessity (Art. 52.2), in contrast to the European Convention on Human Rights, which “acquired” the principle of proportionality through the doctrine of the Strasbourg Court.
60.
Aleinikoff, supra note 58 at 962.
61.
Poland Art. 31 (3), Albania art. 17 (2).
62.
Art 4 (4) of Czech Charter, Slovakia art 13 (4); Hungary art I (3).
63.
Moldova Art. 54 (2); Romania Art. 49 (2).
64.
Estonia Art. 11.
65.
E.g., Albania, which has an “essence” proviso, art. 17 (1), but a relatively weak constitutional court.
66.
E.g., one of the most important decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in which death penalty was declared unconstitutional, was based, inter alia, on the argument that such a penalty necessarily intrudes upon the essential content of the right to life; see Decision 23/1990 of 31 October 1990, reprinted in Sólyom & Brunner, supra note 54 at 118–38.
67.
Decision no 18/98, of 2 June 1999, Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1999 (1): 44–45, CZE-1999-007.
68.
Decision P.2/98, of 12 January 1999.
69.
Id. at 27.
70.
E.g. Albania Art. 17; Czech Charter Art. 4 (1); Moldova art. 54 (1); Poland Art. 31 (3); Romania Art. 49 (1); Slovakia Art. 13 (2).
71.
Decision no. U-I-920/1995 and U-I-950/1996 of 15 July 1998, Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1998 (3): 401–402, CRO-1988-3-015.
72.
Decision no. U-I-262/1998 and U-I-322/1998 of 15 July 1998, published (in Croatian) in Narodne novine, 98/1998, 2434–2437, see Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1998 (3): 401–402.
73.
Decision no. U-I-58/1995 and U-I-772/1998, of 5 October 1999, Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1999 (3):366–367, CRO-1999-3-014.
74.
Decision no. U-I-241/1998 of 31 March 1999, Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1999 (1): 33, CRO-1999-1-004.
75.
Decision of 26 October 1995, http://www.lrkt.lt/1995/n5a1026a.htm
76.
Decision of 19 December 1996, http://www.lrkt.lt/1996/n6a1219a.htm
77.
Decision of 13 February 1997, http://www.lrkt.lt/1997/n7a0213a.htm
78.
Decision of 4 March 1999, http://www.lrkt.lt/1999/n9a0304a.htm
79.
Section 4 of the Court’s decision.
80.
Section 6.1 of the Court’s decision.
81.
Decision of 10 March 1998, no. 14/97, http://www.lrkt.lt/1998/n8a0310a.htm
82.
Section 6 (5) of the judgment.
83.
Czech Charter art. 4 (3); Macedonia art. 54 (3); Slovakia art. 13 (3).
84.
See Sect. 8.1 above.
85.
Decision Pl. US 1/92 of 26 November 1992, http://www.concourt.cz/angl_ver/decisions/doc/list.html
86.
Id., at 8.
87.
E.g. Czech Charter art. 3 (3); Slovak Const. Art. 12 (4).
88.
Decision no. PL. ÚS 18/97 of 28 May 1998, summarised in Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1998(2): 299–300; SVK-1998-2-005.
89.
Article 25(2): “No person may be forced to perform military duties if it is contrary to his or her conscience or religious faith or conviction”.
90.
Art. 12 (4).
91.
Decision no. 12/97 of 25 September 1997, Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1997 (3): 357; BUL-1997-3-003.
92.
See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press: Mineola, 1988, 2nd ed.) at 681–82.
93.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, “Categorization, Balancing, and Government Interests”, in Stephen E. Gottlieb, ed., Public Values in Constitutional Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993): 241–68 at 256.
94.
For such an argument see Wiktor Osiatynski, “Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 26 (1994): 111–166 at 152–55.
95.
Tadeusz Jasudowicz, “Granice korzystania z praw czlowieka – rozwiązania Konstytucji RP na tle standartów europejskich”, in Cezary Mik, ed., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 roku a czlonkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej (TNOiK: Torun, 1999): 33–73 at 50.
96.
Id at 54.
97.
Art. 56 (3).
98.
Art. 21 (2).
99.
Art. 48.
100.
Art. 21 (1).
101.
Art. 23 (1).
102.
Art. 28.
103.
On a distinction between the strength and the scope of rights, see James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1987) at 48–50.
104.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia.
105.
See generally Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance (Duke University Press: Durham, 1996) at 230. For an example of duties in a contemporary European constitution, see Spanish Const., art. 30(1) (declaring that citizens have “the right and the duty to defend Spain”) (emphasis added); id. at art. 31(1) (declaring that citizens have the duty to pay taxes); id. at art. 35(1) (declaring that citizens have the duty to work).
106.
Belr. Const. art. 55; Bulg. Const. art. 55; Croat. Const. art. 69; Czech Rep. Charter art. 35; Est. Const. art. 53; Geor. Const. art. 37; Lith. Const. art. 53; Maced. Const. art. 43; Mold. Const. art. 59; Pol. Const. art. 86; Rom. Const. art. 41; Russ. Const. art. 58; Slovk. Const. art. 44; Slovn. Const. art. 72; Ukr. Const. art. 66; Mont. Const. art. 19.
107.
Belr. Const. art. 32; Bulg. Const. art. 47; Croat. Const. art. 63; Czech Rep. Charter art. 32; Est. Const. art. 27; Hung. Const Art. XVI (3); Maced. Const. art. 40; Mold. Const. art. 48; Rom. Const. art. 44; Russ. Const. art. 38; Slovn. Const. art. 54; Ukr. Const. art. 51; Mont. Const. art. 59; Serb. Const. art. 29.
108.
Belr. Const. art. 57, Bulg. Const. art. 59; Croat. Const. art. 47; Est. Const. art. 24; Hung. Const. (old) art. 70/H, (new) Art. XXXI (3); Lith. Const. art. 139; Maced. Const. art. 28; Mold. Const. art. 57; Pol. Const. art. 85; Rom. Const. art. 52; Russ. Const. art. 59; Ukr. Const. art. 65; Serb. Const. art. 51. In addition, the Slovak Constitution proclaims cryptically that the defense of the Slovak Republic is “the duty and matter of honor of citizens.” art. 25(1).
109.
Croat. Const. art. 47; Est. Const. art. 124; Pol. Const. art. 85; Russ. Const. art. 59. Articles 70/H of the old Hungarian Constitution (Art. XXXI (3) of the 2011 Constitution) and 139 of the Lithuanian Constitution, contain this as an implicit right, suggesting that the duty of protection of the state can be fulfilled by non-military service.
110.
Belr. Const. art. 56; Bulg. Const. art. 60; Croat. Const. art. 51; Hung. Const. art. 70/I (old Constitution) and Art. XXX(1) (Constitution of 2011); Maced. Const. art. 33; Mold. Const. art. 58; Pol. Const. art. 84; Rom. Const. art. 53; Russ. Const. art. 57; Ukr. Const. art. 67; Mont. Const. art. 49; Serb. Const. art. 52.
111.
Belr. Const. art. 32; Croat. Const. art. 63; Maced. Const. art. 40; Mold. Const. art. 48; Russ. Const. art. 38; Ukr. Const. art. 51; Mont. Const. art. 59; Serb. Const. art. 29, Hungarian Constitution of 2011, art. XVI (4).
112.
Bulg. Const. art. 61; Mont. Const. art. 51; Serb. Const. art. 54, Hungarian Constitution of 2011, art. XXXI(6).
113.
Est. Const. art. 54(1).
114.
Article 82 of the Polish constitution is typical: “Loyalty to the Republic of Poland, as well as concern for the common good, are the duty of every Polish citizen.” For similar articulations of generalized, state-based duties, see Geor. Const. art. 44; Mold. Const. art. 56; Rom. Const. art. 50(1).
115.
“Bulgarian citizens have the right and obligation to study and use the Bulgarian language.” Bulg. Const. art. 36(1).
116.
Roman Graczyk, Konstytucja dla Polski (Kraków: Znak, 1997) at 158; see also Malgorzata Kozuch, “Konstytucyjny obowiązek wiernosci Rzeczypospolitej (Art. 82 Konstytucji RP) a czlonkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej”, in Cezary Mik, ed., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 roku a czlonkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej (Torun: TNOiK, 1999): 353–73 at 357–59.
117.
Decision K. 39/97 of 10 November 1998, Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1998 (C.H. Beck: Warszawa, 1999), poz. 26, at 491–557, discussed in Chap. 9 above.
118.
Articles 82 and 85 of the Constitution, respectively.
119.
Decision K. 39/07, supra note 117 at 501.
120.
Id. at 520–21.
121.
Similarly Graczyk, supra note 116 at 158.
122.
Soviet Constitution of 1977, art. 59.
123.
Moldova, Poland and Romania.
124.
Consider, as an example, article 63(1) of the Croatian Constitution: “Parents shall have the duty to bring up, support, and educate their children, and have the right and freedom to independently decide on the upbringing of their children.”
125.
Consider, as an example, article 37(3) of the Georgian Constitution: “All have the right to live in a healthy environment and use natural and cultural surroundings. All are obliged to protect the natural and cultural surroundings”.
126.
Bulg. Const. art. 61.

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University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Wojciech Sadurski
University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Wojciech Sadurski

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Sadurski, W. (2014). Restrictions of Rights. In: Rights Before Courts. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8935-6_10

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