Abstract
This paper deals with information transmission in a special class of signaling games often used in economic applications.
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Umbhauer, G. (1994). Information Transmission in Signaling Games: Confrontation of Different Forward Induction Criteria. In: Munier, B., Machina, M.J. (eds) Models and Experiments in Risk and Rationality. Theory and Decision Library, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2298-8_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2298-8_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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