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The Demand for and Supply of Liability Insurance

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Contributions to Insurance Economics

Abstract

The demand for and supply of liability insurance arise from the legal liability of individuals and corporations for injuries caused to third parties. Tort liability rules and liability insurance markets have attracted substantial attention in recent years. This paper introduces the literature on the demand for and supply of liability insurance. The focus is on issues that distinguish liability from first party insurance. Particular emphasis is given to the relationships between liability law, liability insurance, and risk reduction.

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Danzon, P.M., Harrington, S.E. (1992). The Demand for and Supply of Liability Insurance. In: Dionne, G. (eds) Contributions to Insurance Economics. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1168-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1168-5_2

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