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From Sensations to World Elements: Neutral Monism

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Ernst Mach’s World Elements

Part of the book series: The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 68))

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Abstract

Mach’s Elementenlehre of neutral elements and functions was complete on the physical side by his “Raumvorstellungen” paper of 1866, and his first extension of that theory to psychophysics and psychology was made in 1872 in the Conservation of Energy, where his early thinking on the unity of science had developed into a program.

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Notes

  1. (CE), p. 91.

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  2. (AS), p.312.

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  3. (CE), pp. 9–10.

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  4. (Heidelberger Die Innere Seite der Natur, p. 214.

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  5. (AS), p. 313.

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  6. (Whether there are specific mental reflexes designed for development into thinking, Mach says little. He does admit that the most primitive concepts are obtained by experience with carrying out operations with the body that can be repeated in different circumstances. However his attitude towards such mental reflexes of assuming a body or lump behind every stable complex of elements or seeking for absolute permanences in the ego or in the natural world, these metaphysical reflexes of mind he deplores as negative and unhelpful prejudices.

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  7. (AS), p. 235.

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  8. (Über die Abhangigkeit der Netzhautstellen von einander“ Vierte jahrsschrift fir Psychiatrie 1868 (quoted in AS p. 10 and translated in Floyd Ratliff Mach Bands (San Francisco: Holden Day, 1966).

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  9. (AS), p.11.

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  10. (Mach added some delightful sections to the Analysis where he considered hallucinations and phantasms to be important physiological facts about the independent life of the sense organs, 201–208.

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  11. (AS), p. 16.

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  12. (AS), p. 16.

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  13. (AS), p. 311.

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  14. (Joachim Thiele quotes this passage as a follow up to Carus’s letter regarding Clifford and the mind-stuff hypothesis (WK) p.183.

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  15. (Hans Kleinpeter “On the Monism of Professor Mach” Monist 16(2) April 1906: 161–168.

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  16. (AS), pp. 90–91.

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  17. (AS), p. 361.

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  18. (AS), p. 27.

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  19. (AS), p. 12.

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  20. (AS), p. 19.

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  21. (Rabel, p. 434.

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  22. (Mach to Adler January 23, 1910 (AU).

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  23. (AS), pp. 6, 24–29.

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  24. (AS), pp. 29–30.

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  25. (KE), p. 359, Cf. (AS) p.26.

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  26. (KE), pp.31–32.

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  27. (KE), p. 360.

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  28. (AS), p.13.

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  29. (K,), pp. 6–7.

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  30. (AS), 13n.

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  31. (See also his objection to Ribot’s epiphenomenalism (AS), p. 22.

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  32. (K,), pp. 6–7.

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  33. (KE), pp. 6–7. See also p. 46–47.

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  34. (AS), p.17.

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  35. (AS), p. 344.

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  36. (AS), p. 345.

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  37. (Constanthalten, Ausschaltung des Leibes von zufälligkeiten befreien. Nicht absolut, quant. und qualitchwr(133) Man kann KLM nicht ausschalten, aber constant halten. Dann Begriffliche Beziehungen von ABC. Bei begrifflich constanten ABC den reinen Einfluss von KLM auf ABC. Notebook dated 4 September 1901 (NL 174/2/44).

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  38. (KE) p.12n.

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  39. (Richard Avenarius Der Menschliche Weltbegriff Third Edition (Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1912), pp. 4–5; Wilhelm Schuppe “Der Bestätigung des naiven Realismus” Offner Brief an den Herrn Prof. R. Avenarius Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie XVII(1893), p. 390 ff.

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  40. (KE), p. 361.

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  41. (Gabriele Rabel, “Ernst Mach und die Realität der Aussenwelt” p. 434.

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  42. (AS), p.27.

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  43. (AS), p. 61. Mach mistakenly attributes this view to G.T. Fechner.

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  44. (AS), p.22.

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  45. (AS), pp.235–244. Ewald Hering represented the same point of view extending memory to organized material more generally, see his On Memory as a General Function of Organized Matter ( Chicago: Open Court, 1913 ).

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  46. (Über die Wirkung der räumlichen Vertheilung des Lichtreizes auf die Netzhaut“ SW 52(2) 1865 translated in Floyd Ratliff Mach Bands (San Francisco: Holden Day, 1966), pp. 270–271.

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  47. (AS), p.62, see also p.43.

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  48. (AS), p. 27.

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  49. (Ibid. loc.cit.

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  50. (Such causal maps with “multiple perspectives” of an object were also outlined by Clifford. Russell also argued that objects be broken up into multiple “perspectives.” In the Analysis of Mind (London:1921) for example he represented objects as concentric rings of perspectives, some of which, as in Mach’s and Clifford’s causal maps, included unsensed sensibilia. However Russell thought that an object is all perspectives and that there was an “empty center” where the object and its elements an und für sich would be. This is out of line with both Mach’s and Clifford’s versions.

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  51. (Empfindungen, Vorstellungen nur die auslösende, nicht die handelnde Energie des Organismus. Aber beide von derselben Natur. Bewusstsein der Zusammenhang. Der ist allerdings nicht physiochemisch “geläufig.” Bewusstsein Zusammenhang der Energien. Kommt auf die Grösse nicht an. Lächerlich klein. Aber Folgen unbezahlbar gross. Notebook dated 14 July, 1907 (NL 174/2/51).

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  52. (Physio-chemisch bis ins central Nervensystem wenigstens ein Theil davon Empfindung aber doch nicht solche wie durch Sinnesorgane, Mikroscop, Galvanometer, Reagenz vermittelt werden. Empfindung löst andere analoge im Nerv und Muskel aus. Dort erscheinen sie als physikalisch-chemische. Notebook dated 14 July 1907 (NL 174/2/51).

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  53. (AS), p.29.

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  54. (KE), pp. 239–240. Mach here makes the explicit point that quantitative determinations supervene on like qualitative ones.

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  55. (AS), p. 55 n.

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  56. (CE), pp. 70–71.

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  57. (KE), p. 359.

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Authors
  1. Erik C. Banks
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Banks, E.C. (2003). From Sensations to World Elements: Neutral Monism. In: Ernst Mach’s World Elements. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0175-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0175-4_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6444-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0175-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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