Abstract
In order to shed light on the origins of Hegel’s concept of phenomenology, I will begin by considering some of his first essays.
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Notes
The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism,trans. D.I. Behler, Philosophy of German Idealism,ed. E. Behler (New York: SUNY, 1987), 161–163; Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, G.W.F. Hegel Werke,20 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), vol. I, 234–36. Above all, G.C. Storr, professor of theology at the University of Tübingen during Hegel’s time there, is intended as the main target of the author’s polemics. See Schelling’s letter to Hegel from the beginning of January 1795, and Hegel’s reply at the end of January, as well as Schelling’s letter of February 4, 1795; Briefe von und an Hegel,ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969) vol. I, 13f, 16f, 21. (For the English translation of all of Hegel’s letters see Hegel: The Letters,trans. C. Butler and C. Seiler (Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1984).) For further insight see also the first Zusatz (supplement), written in the winter of 1795–96, to the Positivität der christlichen Religion, Werke I,192f. The identity of the author of the Oldest Systematic Program is still disputed. Franz Rosenkranz, the discoverer of the fragmented manuscript, maintained that Schelling was the author, but that the text was written in Hegel’s hand. For our purposes, the question as to whether it was Schelling or Hegel can remain open; in the light of the letters, it is obvious that both shared the same contempt for theological sophistry. For further discussion see Das älteste Systemprogramm. Studien zur Frühgeschichte des Idealismus,ed. R. Bubner, Hegel-Studien (Bonn 1973) Beiheft 9.
Early Theological Writings,trans. T.M. Knox, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 167–181; Werke I,217–229. The revisions to the Preface of the Positivity essay were written September 24, 1800.
Ibid,168; Werke I, 217–18.
Ibid,170, 172; Werke I,221, 222.
Ibid,170; Werke I, 220.
Systemfragment von 1800, Werke I,419–427, 422; Fragment of a System (1800), Early Theological Writings,309–319, 313 (my translation, CGR).
Ibid,317; Werke 1425.
Ibid,318–19; Werke I, 425–27.
Glauben und Wissen oder Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie, Werke II, 287–432; Faith and Knowledge,trans. W. Cerf and H.S. Harris, (Albany: SUNY, 1977).
Ibid,57, (translation modified); Werke II, 287.
We have O. Pöggeler’s on-going research to thank for uncovering the circumstances surrounding the writing of the Phenomenology of Spirit and presenting all available philological evidence as the key to its structural articulation. See among others of Pöggeler’s works, Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes, ( Freiburg: Alber, 1993 ).
In this connection, however, it is worth pointing out that Reinhold’s “Phänomenologie” is largely ignored and, if one is allowed to speculate, most likely prompted Hegel’s choice of title: K.L. Reinhold Elemente der Phänomenologie oder Erläuterung des rationalen Realismus durch seine Anwendung auf die Erscheinungenin Beyträge zur leichtem Übersicht des Zustands der Philosophie beym Anfang d. 19. Jh.Heft 4, (1802) [Elements of Phenomenology or the Explanation of Rational Realism by means of Its Application to Phenomena in Contributions toward a More Facile Overview of the State of Philosophy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century.]
For a good standard work on the Phenomenology see W. Marx, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: Its Point and Purpose, (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). In my opinion, the most important new work on the Phenomenology to appear in English is T. Pinkard’s Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 ).
The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, trans. H.S. Harris and W. Cerf, (Albany: SUNY, 1977) 89ff., 101, 177, 192–93; Differenz des Fichteschen and Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie, Werke II, 20ff., 33f., 119, 136. In the light of Herder’s concept of Bildung, understood as the education of mankind up to its own humanity through the realization of reason and freedom, Hegel’s use of the word is indeed curious. To my knowledge, only Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, gives the word Bildung a similar, negative emphasis: Fichtes Werke, (Berlin, 1971), vol. 1, 284–85; Science of Knowledge, trans. P. Heath and J.Lachs, ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 ) 251.
Translator’s note: The German noun Entzweiung comes from the verb entzweien, which literally means divide or split in two halves, sunder, separate, bifurcate, disunite, and in the extended sense of to turn people against each other or to sow dissension. Hegel’s use of Entzweiung has been rendered in English by various translators as “bifurcation” (Benhabib) “diremption” (Surber), “dichotomy” (Harris). According to S. Benhabib, “Entzweiung is particularly important in the context of Hegel’s early diagnosis of modernity and civil society as conditions of division, separation and alienation,” (H. Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, trans. S. Benhabib, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 ] 336 ).
In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel formulates the concept of Bildung in much the same way and creates an historical parallel between the Enlightenment and the ancient sophist movement with which, according to Hegel, the “principle of modernity” begins; Werke XVIII, 404, 409ff., see also 435. For a similar analogy see the Vorrede zu Hinrichs Religionsphilosophie (1821), Werke XI, 60f.
As is well known, the outward “occasion” for the Difference essay was the first installment of Reinhold’s Contributions to a More Facile Overview of the State of Philosophy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century (1801). For the most part, later acquaintance with the Beyträge has been limited to Hegel’s commentary. As a result, the tendency is to accept sight unseen Hegel’s critical assessment. The later installments of the Beyträge (Hefte 1–6, 1801–3) remain by and large unknown. The tenor of Hegel’s own essay is comparable to Reinhold’s consideration of the historical situation in that Reinhold surveys the various philosophical systems of the age, their rise and fall, as well as describes the advent of the need for true philosophy. (In this connection, Some Thoughts about Philosophical Systems in general and the Science of Knowledge in particular is especially pertinent. The Preface for this installment of the Beyträge is dated March 30, 1801, and as the note in the Difference essay attests, was known to Hegel [Difference essay, 178–79; Werke II 120].) In the face of Reinhold’s lumping together of Schelling’s and Fichte’s systems in the name of Bardili’s logic and his condemnation of both as “speculative philodoxy,” Hegel, who was at this time a dyed-in-the-wool Schelling supporter and an equally adamant Fichte critic, felt directly called upon to account for the “difference” between the two systems (Ibid.7980, 82, 174–75; Werke II 9, 12, 116). Hegel also knew of Reinhold’s article The Spirit of the Age as the Spirit of Philosophypublished in Wieland’s (Reinhold’s father-in-law) journal Neuer Teutscher Merkur (March 1801, n. 3, pp. 167–93) (Ibid.178–79 Werke II, 120). As H.S. Harris has observed, this essay had a preliminary note which announced that it consisted of “fragments from a treatise” included in the second volume of the Beyträge. The “treatise” (Beyträge II, 104—40) was entitled: “On Autonomy as the Principle of the Practical Philosophy of the Kantian School — and of the Whole Philosophy of the School of Fichte and Schelling,” (see Harris’ note Difference essay, 178). Hegel alludes to both works. In the Spirit essay, Reinhold explains speculation in terms of the age’s general tendency toward “egotism” and “impeity.” Concealed behind the concept of transcendental philosophy and the mere semblance of speculation of Fichte’s and Schelling’s systems is only the interest of “philosophers going by the name Peter and Paul” in the free despotism of their individual egos. Reinhold voices similar objections in the Beyträge (for example, Heft I,153f; Heft 2, 58). Hegel repudiates the moralizing calumny, but concedes Reinhold’s point that the various forms philosophy takes on are determined by historical circumstances. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, there is, at any rate, a good deal more in common between Reinhold and Hegel of 1801, than the widely accepted view that Hegel’s inspiration for the Difference essay was completely original. Hegel’s polemics have contributed to an unfair picture of Reinhold’s accomplishments.
Difference essay, 187, 192; Werke II, 130f., 136. Compare also Wesen der Kritik, Werke II, 179f.
Ibid,82, 114; Werke II, 12f., 47; see also Wesen der Kritik Werke II, 181f.
Ibid,115, 121f., 125; Werke II, 48, 53f., 59f; Faith and Knowledge,60ff., 143, 183; Werke II, 293ff., 383, 425.
Reinhold proclaimed that transcendental philosophy had come to an end by declaring himself to be for “rational realism” (i.e., Bardili’s Outline for the First Logic, Purged from the Errors of Previous Logics, Kant s in particular; not a Critique, rather a Medicina Mentis Primarily Useful for Germany’s Critical Philosophy (Stuttgart: Fromann, 1800). Reinhold in following Bardili also criticizes Kant and Fichte and points to failings in both which Hegel takes over as his own. See in particular Reinhold’s Ideas for a Heautogony or Natural History of the Pure Absolute Ego [Ichheit], Called Pure Reason in Heft I of the Beyträge
Difference essay, 101–2; Werke II, 34; Faith and Knowledge,56–57, 61–62, 189; Werke II, 289, 295f., 430. Compare Phenomenology of Spirit,trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 15–16; Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke III, 31–32. See also Reinhold’s Key to Philodoxy in general and to the So-called Speculative in particular in Heft IV of the Beyträge,186, (Foreword from March 21, 1802).
Faith and Knowledge,189 (translation modified); Werke II, 431.
Werke II, 171ff.
Ibid,175.
Ibid,181f.
Ibid,175.
O. Pöggeler’s approach to understanding the philosophical task of the Phenomenology of Spirit is obviously influenced by Heidegger. This orientation manifests itself when Pöggeler maintains that Hegel places experience and the problem of history “at the center of metaphysics” so that “truth itself can be seen as historical and thus, in a certain way, also as ‘a goal to be aspired to’ [Streben] and as `problematical,”’ (Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch (1963/64) 316f., 311, 308). This interpretation, however, fails to realize that Hegel, in according the problem of history a place in his system, is by no means interested in making truth dependent on history and, therefore, contingent. Rather, for Hegel, it is a question of endeavoring to comprehend such dependency in all its forms in order to rescue the truth of the one, atemporal philosophy from the influence of history and those inadequacies that undermined the viability of Reflexionsphilosophie, which was itself shaped by the spirit of the times. (See, for example, the Phenomenology 486–87; Werke III, 584–85.) In his reading of the Introduction to the Phenomenology, Heidegger, because he failed to distinguish sufficiently between phenomenology and logic and, thus, excluded from consideration the function phenomenology has in Hegel’s system (Hegels Begrii f der Erfahrung in Holzwege [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1980] 111–204), treats phenomenal spirit as if it were a manifestation of the Absolute. For English translation of Heidegger’s essay, see Hegel’s Concept of Experience, trans. J.G. Gray ( New York: Harper and Row, 1970 ).
Werke II, 185.
Phenomenology,48–49, see also 15–16; Werke III, 72, 30–31.
Ibid,52; Werke III, 75.
Briefe von und an Hegel,Bd. I, 59.
Difference essay, 87,88,96–97; Werke II, 17, 19, 28.
See Introduction to Harris and Cerf’s translation of Faith and Knowledge,9–10, where the entire excerpt is quoted (translation modified); Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben,(Berlin 1844; reprint, Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges, 1969) 190f. Omitted here is the reference to the three-tiered structure of logic.
Compare Faith and Knowledge, 170–171; Werke II, 413–14; and also Difference essay, 90; Werke II,23f.
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, Logic,trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) §19.
Science of Logic,trans. A.V. Miller, (Atlantic Highlands: 1990) 45–46; Werke V, 38.
Ibid
Difference essay, 98ff; Werke II, 30ff. See also Hegel’s Krug review first published in the Critical Journal of PhilosophyJanuary 1802, under the title Wie der gemeine Menschenverstand die Philosophie nehme dargestellt an den Werken des Herrn Krug Werke II, 188ff
Phenomenology,14–15, 49; Werke III, 29–30, 72.
Ibid,7–8, 14–15; Werke III, 19–20, 29–30.
In his Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, second edition 1975), H.F. Fulda extensively argues this thesis in its systematic implications while, at the same time, maintaining an understanding of the Phenomenology, based on the later Logic and Encyclopaedia, as proof for the necessity of a standpoint biased toward philosophical science. See Science of Logic, 48–49; Werke V, 42–43; and also Encyclopaedia, remark §25.
Phenomenology,15, 49–50; Werke III,30, 72–73.
Compare Jenenser Realphilosophie I. ed. J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1931–32) 266, Anmerkung II to the fragment “Die Wissenschaft”
Phenomenology 49–50; Werke III, 72. - The idea is already contained in Hegel’s Habilitation’s theses of 1801: “VI. Idea est synthesis infiniti et finiti et philosophia omnis est in ideis. VII. Philosophia critica caret ideis et imperfecta est Scepticismi forma” (Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben,158f.). In the Difference essay, Hegel similarly calls one variety of philosophy, “genuine scepticism,” which does not actually fulfill the need for philosophy (Difference essay, 193–94; Werke II, 136–37). See also the essay, Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie, Werke II, especially 239f., 249, 224, 228, as well as the Encyclopaedia,§78, and remark §81.
Phenomenology, 20; Werke III, 38.
Ibid., 56; Werke III, 80.
Compare, for example, the Encyclopaedia, remark §415.
This can already be observed in the chapter “Phänomenologie des Geistes oder Wissenschaft des Bewußtseins” from Hegel’s Nürnberg Philosophische Propädeutik (1809), Werke IV, 111; The Philosophical Propaedeutic, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 55. (The English translation does not retain the chapter heading, “Phenomenology of Spirit or Science of Consciousness.”)
Compare Phenomenology, 56–57; Werke III, 80–81.
H.F. Fulda’s closely reasoned argumentation attempts to address this paradox. For the most part, he bases his argument on the famous statement at the end of the Phenomenology that for every one of science’s abstract moments there is a corresponding, individual shape of manifest spirit (Phenomenology, 491; Werke III, 589). In a comparison with speculative logic, Fulda tries to get to the root of the logic specific to the Phenomenology through a more concrete understanding of the Phenomenology’s techniques and methodological form. All told, this results in a subtle interpretation of the concept of correspondence (Fulda, Zur Logik der Phänomenologie von 1807, in Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 3, 1966). - Fulda’s line of reasoning concerning the Phenomenology’s formal structure seems to me to be on the right track. The question is, however, whether it is legitimate to base such an interpretation on a formulaic and synoptic statement as encapsulated in the sentence drawn from the last chapter of the Phenomenology. - It is not by chance that what is still by far the best grounded attempt to track down behind every individual shape of the Phenomenology a corresponding moment in the third chapter. See W. Purpus, Zur Dialektik des Bewußtseins nach Hegel (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1908 ).
Logic,Bk. II, 390; Werke VI, 13. See also Encyclopaedia §414.
For further insight see R. Wiehl, Der Sinn der sinnlichen Gewißheit, in Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 3 (Bonn 1966 ).
Phenomenology,64–5, 71, 102–3, 141; Werke III, 90, 98, 134–5, 180.
Compare Jenenser Realphilosophie I, 267.
Phenomenology,141; Werke III, 180.
It is important to guard against the standard sceptical objection to “absolute knowledge” as being an endpoint which Hegel dogmatically presupposes from the beginning of the Phenomenology For a detailed discussion of this problem see my essay What is Critical Theory?,in R. Bubner, Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory,trans. E. Matthews, (New York: Columbia Press, 1988).
For further consideration of Hegel’s insight, see my essay Philosophy Is Its Time Comprehended in Thought,which first appeared as a contribution to the Gadamer-Festschrift (Hermeneutik and Dialektik I [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1970]), and is translated in Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory,37–61.
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Bubner, R. (1997). Hegel’s Concept of Phenomenology. In: Browning, G.K. (eds) Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Reappraisal. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées, vol 149. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8917-8_4
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