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Principles of Economic Policy in the Common Market

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Book cover Market Evolution

Part of the book series: Studies in Industrial Organization ((SIOR,volume 20))

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Abstract

The chapter analyzes economic policy in the European Community against the background of recent, often heated discussions about the Community’s future. Principles of policy-making are used from both the traditional theory of economic policy and the German concept of a social market economy. Considering issues of the Community’s internal and external economic policies, we argue in favor of a rational approach to economic policy as opposed to policy-making merely based on an alleged dichotomy between government and market.

This is the written version of an invited lecture delivered by Reinhard Blum at the 19th EARIE Conference, September 4–6 1992, at Hohenheim University, Stuttgart.

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Blum, R., Welzel, P. (1995). Principles of Economic Policy in the Common Market. In: van Witteloostuijn, A. (eds) Market Evolution. Studies in Industrial Organization, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8428-9_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8428-9_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4523-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8428-9

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