Abstract
What are the basic characteristics of supranational organization, the type of structure of which the CSC is at present the sole example? Most observers agreed that the Community went far beyond the traditional attempts to organize international society, whether on a world-wide or regional level. At the same time it was generally admitted that the CSC did not even come close to constituting a federal-type system. Consequently, commentators referred to the “in-between” characteristics of supranational organization: the CSC was “a new structure in the marches between internal and international law”; “‘supranational’ organizations stood ... midway between ‘international’ and federal organizations.” 1 Robert Schuman used similar terms:
The supranational is situated at equal distances between, on the one hand, international individualism which considers national sovereignty untouchable and accepts only limitations of sovereignty in the form of occasional, temporary treaty clauses; and, on the other hand, the federalism of states which are subordinated to a super-state with complete territorial sovereignty.... 2
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References
E. van Raalte, cited by J. L. Kunz, “Supra-National Organs,” American Journal of International Law, Oct. 1952, pp. 693–8.
Reuter, op. cit., p. 7. (Preface by R. Schuman.)
Cited by Th. Würtenberger in Archiv des Völkerrechts (Tubingen), Vol. 3, 1951–2, pp. 435–6.
Reuter, op. cit., pp. 96–99, 106.
Wehberg, op. cit., p. 205.
Ibid., pp. 208–210.
Quoted in European Union (New York), III, p. 8.
Quoted by H. Mosier, “Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle and Stahl; Entstehung and Qualifizierung,” Zeitschrift far Ausländisches 0ffentliches Recht and Völkerrecht, XIV, No. 1/2 (Oct. 1951), p. 24.
Cited in Reuter, op. cit., p. 5.
Institut des Relations Internationales, op. cit., pp. 266–7.
H. Mosler, op. cit., pp. 39, 43–44. Mosler reported that a drafting committee, during the negotiations, wanted to call the Treaty: “Traité portant Constitution de la Communauté….” This was whittled down in the actual text to: “Traité instituant la Communauté….” (Ibid., pp. 36–7.)
K. H. Klein, Die Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten (Berlin, 1952), pp. 34–37. C. Bilfinger found the CSC non-federal in character, yet “a concrete step… toward a federal structure sui generis….” (“Vom politischen und nicht-politischen Recht in organisatorischen Kollektivverträgen,” Zeitschrift für Auslândisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, XIII, No. 3 [March 1951], p. 621.) B. Wegmann noted that of “the three characteristics of a state — territory, population, and sovereignty [Staatsgewalt]” — only part of the latter had been given to the Community. (Op. cit., p. 23.)
Wehberg, op. cit., pp. 206–209.
K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951 ), p. 15.
Reuter, op. cit., p. 138.
Cf. ibid., pp. 138–140.
K. Deutsch, “The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration,” World Politics, Jan. 1953, pp. 194–195. (The above is a somewhat simplified version of Deutsch’s list of prerequisites for integration.)
That great “European,” Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, in 1950 called for a rebirth of Charlemagne’s empire, in the form of a “Union Charlemagne,” to unite the six CSC nations in a tight federation. (Cited by H. J. Schlochauer, “Europäische Fragen von völkerrechtlicher Bedeutung,” Archiv des Völkerrechts, III, No. 2, p. 150.)
Quoted in A. J. P. Tammes, Hoofdstukken van Internationale Organisatie (The Hague, 1951 ), pp. 44–45.
Concerning the Sugar Convention, also note, N. Politis, “L’Organisation de l’Union Internationale des sucres,” Revue de science et de législation financières, Jan.-March 1904;
F. B. Sayre, Experiments in InternationalAdministration (New York, 1919), p. 124; C. Bilfinger, op. cit., pp. 628–630.
P. S. Reinsch, Public International Unions (1911), p. 51. (Quoted in Tammes, op. cit., p. 45.)
K. H. Klein, op. cit., p. 31. On the Danube Commission, also note, J. P. Chamberlain, The Regime of the International Rivers: Danube and Rhine (New York, 1920 );
Sayre, op. cit; D. S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Organizing for Peace (New York, 1954 ), pp. 36–37.
Specialized organizations like the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunication Union are in some respects related to the CSC, especially as concerns their decisions by majority vote, which — de facto at least — impose obligatory regulations on member states.
H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (New York, 1950), p. 276.
Also the League’s Silesian activities, as a result of the German-Polish convention of 1922, had supranational aspects, including petitions from individuals and binding decisions in minority questions by international officials and the League Council. Cf. G. Kaekenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (New York, 1942 ).
C. B. Randall, “European Steel: Monopoly in the Making,” The Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1951, p. 34.
Cf. C. H. Hahn, Der Schuman-Plan (Munich, 1953 ), pp. 19–22.
Also, E. Hexner, International Steel Cartel (Chapel Hill, 1946 );
Institut des Relations Internationales, op. cit., pp. 269–303.
Mendershausen, op. cit., p. 288. Cf. also, Reuter, op. cit., p. 34. Raymond Aron admitted this, but feared that the CSC would add political troubles to old economic rivalries, where the old steel cartels had provided “discreet compromises” with a minimum of political emotion. (R. Aron, “Nationale Gesundung and Integration,” Der Monat, March 1953, p. 590.) Hahn praised the old steel cartels for their contribution to the economic well-being of Europe, but believed that after World War II the time was ripe for a more radical solution, the CSC, which would attack the causes, and not just the symptoms of crisis. Besides, nationalizations and other economic, social, and political changes had made the private cartels unfeasible. (Hahn, op. cit., p. 23.)
Reuter, op. cit., p. 13.
Ibid., pp. 16–20.
F. Haussmann, Der Schuman-Plan im Europäischen Zwielicht (Munich-Berlin, 1952), pp. 12–13,16.
For an English translation of the EDC treaty, cf. 82d Congress, 2d Session, Senate Executives Q and R, pp. 167–254. As a supranational organ the Commissariat was quite inferior to the HA. While the HA is clearly the leading organ of the CSC, its chief executive and policy maker, the Commissariat was subordinate to the Council of Ministers in almost all respects, depending on the latter’s approval in most of its decisions. Also, financially, the Commissariat could not levy its own taxes, but had to obtain its funds from the Council of Ministers and the national governments. Finally, it should be pointed out that the EDC was not fully autonomous, but was under control of NATO in several important ways.
An English text of the “Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community” has been printed. (Ad Hoc Assembly Publications, CSC, Luxembourg.) The original name, European Political Community, was later changed to European Community, although the term “Political” has been retained in general usage.
Norbert Muhlen, “The Young Germans and the New Army,” The Reporter (New York), Jan. 13, 1955, p. 26.
Taylor Cole, “Neo-Fascism in Western Germany and Italy,” American Political Science Review, March 1955, p. 142.
The proposals and counter-proposals made at this conference, which met in Brussels on August 19–22, 1954, have been published in full detail. They reveal the other countries’ readiness to sacrifice crucial supranational aspects to please Mendès-France.
The Assembly’s vote actually was on a motion to adjourn debate on the EDC sine die. However, it was understood that the vote was in effect on the acceptance or non-acceptance of the treaty. The Gaullists and Communists were united in their rejection of the EDC, while the Popular Republicans and a considerable majority of Independent Republicans were in favor. The decisive factor was that the other parties, especially the Socialists and Radical Socialists, were evenly divided into pro and antiEDC groups. (New York Times, Aug. 31, 1954.)
Prof. Northrop saw the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy as the devil in the defeat of the EDC: “The shift in United States foreign policy from containing Communism to rolling it back, announced in the fall of 1952, would have, in the opinion of Europeans, the practical effect of turning the Germans from a westward-minded to an eastward-minded people.” This would bring out the old imperialist tendencies in the Germans, and thus the EDC and NATO would be dominated by an axis of American and German expansionists. (Northrop, op. cit., pp. 148–150, 152, 164.)
New York Times, Nov. 15, 1954. Interestingly enough, after defeating the EDC, Mendès-France came out in favor of a supranational war production board to supervise the manufacture and distribution of arms within the Western European Union. This, of course, had been one of the most crucial functions of the EDC. (Cf. ibid., Jan. 7 and Jan. 9, 1955.) This plan was unfavorably received by the other nations; it was charged — inter alfa — that such a production board, without the elaborate and balanced provisions of the EDC treaty, would develop into a “dictatorship of functionaries.” (Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, Jan. 14, 1955.)
L’Information (Paris), Nov. 13, 1954; Le Monde, same date.
Monnet has been amazingly successful as a political fighter, although usually operating behind the political scene, without much publicity and without direct affiliation with a party. “He may be called a specialist in getting things done and in persuading men to act together…. He succeeds because he is driven by a deep faith in the practicability of what he likes to call the United States of Europe, and by fear of what may happen if Europe falters in its tentative steps in that direction.” (H. Callender, New York Times, May 8, 1955.)
It should be noted that Monnet acquired enemies in France after he took over at the Rue de Martignac, the Commissariat général. This organization has been called a “Super-Ministry of Economics,” with Monnet as the “Grey Eminence” of the Fourth Republic, exerting tremendous powers without being subject to parliamentary controls, and surviving all cabinet changes. (Cf. Hahn, op. cit., p. 12.)
Cf. New York Times, May 3 and 8, 1955. Monnet’s resignation became final on June 1, 1955, when René Mayer was appointed as his successor.
Northrop, op. cit., pp. 52–53.
Goriély, op. cit., p. 610.
P. A. Reynolds, “The European Coal and Steel Community,” Political Quarterly ( London ), July-Sept. 1952, pp. 290–291.
Hahn, op. cit., p. 95.
Common Assembly, First Report to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, p. 48.
Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel, Feb.-March 1955, p. 4.
Mendershausen, op. cit., p. 278.
Hahn, op. cit., p. 103. Cf. also F. W. Meyer and A. Zottmann, Der Schuman-Plan and seine Problematik (Munich-Düsseldorf, 1951 ?), p. 35;
R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 581582.
A commission of experts of the Bonn Ministry of Economics wrote: “As long as the prerequisite convertibility of currencies does not prevail, part-integrations are bound to lead to disintegration in other sectors, because the measures which will continue to be required to adjust the balance of payments… must then be concentrated on the remaining non-integrated sectors….” (Die Wirtschaftliche Integration Europas [V. Klostermann: Frankfurt, 1953], p. 16.)
However, the CSC Assembly reported to the Assembly of the Council of Europe that “it had never forgotten that the founders of the CSC had always intended that this market should be extended to other States,” either by full integration or “coordination.” (First Report, p. 48.) Art. 98 of the Treaty provides that “any European State” may become a member of the CSC, if the Council approves unanimously.
The CSC nations produced more steel in 1954 than ever before in their history, 43,800,000 metric tons. Also coal production in 1954 was higher than at any time since 1939. (Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel, Feb.-March 1955.) “For the first time in more than a quarter of a century Europe is having a steel boom not directly dependent on war, preparation for war, or rumors of war. It is primarily a boom in light steel products, sheets, tinplate and other things used mainly for the manufacture of mechanical and household products. This too is rather new for Europe, where the proportion of such products to steel used for heavy construction work, armaments and ships is normally about where it was in the United States thirty years ago.” Orders for finished steel products were coming in at a rate of about 3,200,000 tons monthly in late 1954, while the CSC industry’s capacity was only about 2,800,000 tons. (Michael L. Hoffman, New York Times, Oct. 31, 1954.) It should be remembered that this boom was not necessarily the consequence of the Community’s efforts, as the CSC Assembly admitted very modestly in October 1954. (First Report to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, p. 18.) It must also be noted that the first years of the Community were greatly facilitated by the fact that the market happened to be in a relatively stable condition, without real shortages nor excess of supplies — a very unusual situation in European coal and steel. Again, the CSC itself had very little to do with this; it has been called a consequence of the slow ebbing of the Korean boom, coupled with a significant expansion of production due to progressive postwar recovery, especially in W. Germany. (S. Wolff, “The Coal and Steel Pool in Operation,” Swiss Review of World Affairs [Zurich], Feb. 1953, p. 3.)
Cf. the excellent article by R. Loewenthal, “Die Westeuropäische Wirtschaftseinheit,” Der Monat (Berlin), Aug. 1952. In Reuter’s words, investments and specialization will not be the consequence of the common market, but the instruments of its realization. Only new investments can make the Community feasible; they will determine its future. (Reuter, op. cit., pp. 303–304.)
Cf. M. Duverger, “Le dilemme du M.R.P.,” Le Monde, Feb. 13–14, 1955. In this article Prof. Duverger called on the M.R.P. to get rid of the “grande frénésie européenne” which had taken possession of it during recent years, and to emphasize again domestic programs of economic reform and social justice, considered the heart of the Christian Democratic doctrine. Duverger maintained that “Europeans” in France found more supporters on the Right than on the Left, and that especially within the split parties the “Europeans” were among the more conservative elements.
Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 480. The head of the French Steel Association, P. Ricard, severely criticized the CSC and Monnet in early 1955: “If it [the CSCJ were abolished tomorrow, nothing would be changed and nobody would feel that ‘a living thing’ had been killed.” He accused Monnet of not spending enough time on coal and steel affairs, and added that an inventor should never be called upon to administer his invention. (New York Times, Feb. 23, 1955.) For criticisms from the Ruhr, see above, p. 82.
It is felt that the Benelux countries, and even Italy, are safely in the “European” camp for years to come: except for the Communists and their sympathizers, integration has been accepted by all political parties there.
See above, fn. 52.
M. Debré (ex-Gaullist), Journal Officiel, Conseil, March 25, 1952, p. 733. 67 A. Coste-Floret (M.R.P.), ibid., Assemblée, Dec. 6, 1951, p. 8862.
G. Vixseboxse (Protestant Conservative), Handelingen Eerste Kamer, Feb. 12, 1952, p. 212.
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Mason, H.L. (1955). Conclusions. In: The European Coal and Steel Community. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7555-3_4
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