Abstract
The early history of the patent institution shows that, while most of the motives underlying contemporary patent legislation were already then considered, the relative weights given these respective motives differed considerably from those during the system’s later evolution. The fact, nevertheless, that most motives behind contemporary patent legislation existed already several centuries ago, may indicate that the developments of the late eighteenth century, with their heavy emphasis on the “natural rights” of inventors, were a passing thing rather than the birth of the patent institution. It is of particular interest to the contemporary problems concerning the acquisition of foreign technology by the developing countries to see how some of the now industrialized countries themselves secured foreign technology during their own period of economic development.
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References
Cf. M. Frumkin, The Early History of Patents for Invention, Paper presented at a joint meeting of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents and the Newcomen Society (London, 1947) p. 1.
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 8.; G. Mandich, “Venetian Patents (1450–1550)”, J.P.O.S., 30: 172, March, 1948.
Quoted by Frumkin, op. cit., p. 8.
Ibid., p. 9.
Mandich, op. cit., pp. 177, 184, while recognizing that the Venetian Act begins by declaring patents a means to a social end, points out that it also takes cognizance of an “honor” to safeguard. After examining individual patent applications the author concludes that “apparently at least a vague feeling is involved that the supplicant has the right to the products of his mind”, see also F. D. Prager, “A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787”, J.P.O.S., 26: 733, November, 1944. M. Silberstein, Erfindungsschutz und merkantilistische Gewerbsprivilegien, (Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1961) pp. 23-24, states that the protection of the inventor’s rights was the major objective of the law.
Though the same text as quoted by Mandich, op. cit., pp. 177-78, reads “shall give notice” instead of “will be obliged to register”, the author interprets the wording in the imperative sense.
Ibid., p. 195.
Cf. Frumkin, op. cit., p. 9; Mandich, loc. cit.
F. Machlup, “Patentwesen—I. Geschichtliche Uberblick [und] II. Wirtschaftsteo-retische Betrachtung”, Handwörterbuch des Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. XLII. (Göttingen: G G. Fischer, J. C. B. Mohr, 1962), p. 233.
M. Frumkin, “Les anciens brevets d’invention: les pays du continent européen au XVIIIe siècle”, Bijblad bij De Industriële Eigendom, 23: 46–49, April, 1955. In a study of the birth and decline of early patent systems in some continental countries, the author compares their evolution with the emergence and decline of particular countries as centers of culture and economic activity. The author’s conclusion appears to be that the patent institution followed (rather than preceded) the economic and cultural development and later lost its importance when these activities became less intensive.
Ibid., p. 46.
H. Pohlmann, “The Inventor’s Right in Early German Law”, J.P.O.S., 43: 121–35, February, 1961.
From Section VI of the statute quoted by W. Jarratt, “The English Patent System”, J.P.O.S., 26: 761–68, November, 1944, p. 761.
E. W. Hulme, “On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present”, Law Quarterly Review, 13: 314, 1897, quoted by E. T. Penrose, Economics of the International Patent System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), p. 138.
E. Blum, “Abuse of Monopolies and its Prevention”, Souvenir—Indian Patents Centenary 1856–1956 (Calcutta: Patent Office, 1956), p. 55.
Prager, op. cit., p. 711, referring to J. Kohler, Lehrbuch des Patentsrechts (Leipzig: J. Bensheimer, 1908).
Penrose, op. cit., p. 7.; J. Vojáček, A Survey of the Principal National Patent Systems (New York: Prentice Hall, 1936; addenda: 1951, 1956) pp. 97-98.
Machlup, “Patentwesen …”, p. 234, expresses this opinion saying that the concept of “true and first inventor” was used in the Venetian Act in the purer form of “geistigen Urheber.”
Cf. Penrose, op. cit., p. 7.; Silberstein, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
In this sense, see Vojácek, op. cit., p. 6.
A. Troller, Immaterial-güterrecht (2 vols., Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn 1959–62), vol. 1, p. 21.
In that case there is no difference between the English and Venetian systems. See F. Neumeyer, Patent: reflexioner kring, patent-institutionens uppkomst, utveckling och ställning i vâr tid (Studier och Debatt No. IV 1958; Stockholm: SNS, 1958) p. 7.
Cf. P. Roubier, Le droit de la propriété industrielle, (Paris: Sirey, 2 vols, 1952, 1954), Vol. I., pp. 20, 63-64, and “Droits intellectuels ou droit du clientèle”, Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Civil, 34: 255, No. 2, 1935; Prager, op. cit., pp. 719-20, though he contends that an “embryonic” recognition of intellectual property first appeared in a French Copyright Statute of 1545, makes no mention of t he existence of such a concept in England at the time of the Statute.
Penrose, op. cit., p. 138.
Supra, n. 15.
An illustrative example of this type of derivation is provided by H. Isay, Die Funktion der Patente im Wirtschaftskampf (Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1927), pp. 6–10.
Supra, n. 25.
F. Neumeyer, “Die historischen Grundlagen der ersten modernen Patentgesetze in den U.S.A. und in Frankreich”, G.R.U.R.: Ausl., 58: 242, June, 1956.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Commentary on Article I, par. 8 of the U.S. Constitution by Madison (1888) quoted by Neumeyer, “Die historischen Grundlagen …”, p. 244.
Ibid. Other authors, including some contemporary ones, have no reservations at all to the recognition of “inherent” rights of inventors. One author quotes Daniel Webster [citation probably from the Great India Rubber Suit Case (in 1852) in which Webster successfully defended some Goodyear patents] to make his point: “The Constitution does not attempt to give an inventor a right to his invention … No such thing. But the Constitution recognizes an original, pre-existing, inherent right of property in the invention, and authorizes Congress to secure to inventors the enjoyment of that right.” H. G. Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the Patent Monopoly (Toronto: University of Toronto Studies, Legal Series, Extra Vol., 1947) pp. 200-01.
One feature of the American patent law, which was introduced in 1793 and remained in force until 1836, which might have been taken to support the theory of “inherent” or “pre-existing” rights, was the absence of any provision requiring examination of the merits of patent applications.
Prager, op. cit., pp. 742-43.
G. Washington, Inaugural Adress, quoted by H. A. J. Toulmin, Invention and the Law (New York: Prentice Hall, 1936), p. 11.
When developing countries today are told of the necessity of having an “adequate” patent system (“adequate” meaning accepting at least the minimum requirements of the international patent system) and the “historical examples” of the now industrialized countries are referred to in support, the fact that several of the latter at certain periods used their patent systems chiefly as an incentive to “importers” of foreign-made inventions is understandably never mentioned.
Neumeyer, “Die historischen Grundlagen…”, p. 244.
Prager, op. cit., p. 711.
Ibid., p. 727.
Ibid., pp. 730, 734; Neumeyer, “Die historischen Grundlagen…”, p. 249.
Roubier, Le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. Vol. I., p. 69.
For the development in the particular field of design patents during the 18th century, see Prager, op. cit., p. 731. After several laws had been passed successively, contradicting each other on the question of the existence of a legal right to claim protection, a law of 1787 became, according to Prager, the immediate forerunner of the general patent law of 1791, in this respect. In discussions of “inventor’s rights” it is often unclear whether the terminology refers to the right of a patentee in his patent or the right of an inventor in his invention. It does not seem consistent to maintain that a right in the latter sense existed before 1789, while recognizing that up to that date, patent grants were given as a royal privilege.
Neumeyer, Patent …, pp. 10-11.
Roubier, analyzing the juridical configuration of the rights of the inventor as recognized by this law, stated that besides being rights to exclusive exploitation for a limited period, these rights did not constitute just a concession by the State; they were created as a direct result of the invention and the State could only act in a declaratory manner. Roubier, “Droits intellectuels ou droit de clientèle”, Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Civil, 34: 250, No. 2, 1935.
F. Machlup, E. T. Penrose, “The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of Economic History, 10:2, January 1950, p. n., n. 35, give a typical example of such theoretical constructions by quoting the principal author of the Law, de Bouffiers: “If there is for a man any genuine property it is thought … and the tree which grows on a field does not so incontrovertibly belong to the owner of the field as the idea which springs from a man’s mind belongs to its author. Invention, the source of the arts, is also the source of property: it is primary property while all other property is merely conventional.”
Vojáček, op. cit., p. 59.
Machlup, op. cit., p. 235; Neumeyer, Patent …, p. 11.
S. Pretnar, “The International Protection of Industrial Property and the Different Stages of Economic Development of the States”, [translation supplied by BIRPI of “La protection internationale de la propriété industrielle et les différents stades de développement économique des Etats”, P.I., 69: 213–221, December, 1953] 10 pp. [BIRPI library] p. 2.
As in the case of the U.S. patent law (between 1793 and 1836) the French law did not require examination of patent applications as to their merits (novelty, inventiveness, etc.), a fact which may have given support to the idea of “inherent” or “pre-existing” rights. Unlike the case of the U.S., French patent law still maintains this feature.
Neumeyer, “Die historischen Grundlagen …”, p. 251.
Ibid., p. 249.
Ibid., p. 251.
L. Le Grand, Etude économique de la propriété industrielle; fondement et fonction économique de “cette propriété” (Paris: Sirey, 1937), p. 52; for the same opinion, see M. Plaisant, Traité de droit conventionnel international concernant la propriété industrielle (Paris: Sirey, 1950), p. 6.
Machlup, op. cit., p. 242.
Machlup, Penrose, op. cit., p. 16.
Machlup, loc. cit. After pointing out de Bouffiers’ deliberate use of the “property theory”, Machlup says that “this tactical device has lead to century-long debates on intellectual property.” See further below, and n. 65.
See for instance, M. Waline, L’Individualisme et le Droit (Paris: Editions Domat Montchrestien, 1945).
Ibid., pp. 376 ff.
G. Ripert, Les forces créatrices du droit (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1955), p. 196.
Waline, op. cit., pp. 394-95.
Roubier, “Droits intellectuels ou droit de clientèle”, pp. 278-79.
The first country after France and the United States to introduce a patent law was Austria, in 1810. The Austrian law expressly declared that inventors had neither any property rights in their inventions nor any rights to patents. The law also affirmed that “the government reserved its prerogative to grant privileges to restrict what was called their subjects’ ‘natural rights’ to imitate an inventor’s idea.” F. Machlup, “An Economic Review of the Patent System”, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Study No. 15 of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 3. Thus within the span of twenty years from the date which, in the opinion of many authors, constitutes a landmark in the evolution of the patent institution, or even its birthdate, one is back to the system of “privileges”, which had been in practice for over three hundred years. Admittedly it was so far the position of only one country, but it indicated the future evolution. In France, the stronghold of the theory of property rights in inventions, a patent law of 1844 omitted any reference to such rights. Roubier, Le Droit de la propriété industrielle, p. 69. According to Roubier, the motives of the law expressly stated that its authors wished to leave the metaphysical speculations in order to take account of facts and realities. Roubier, “Droits intellectuels ou droit de clientèle”, p. 277.
Machlup, Penrose, op. cit., pp. 16-17, referring to the use de Bouffiers made of the theory of “inherent” rights when introducing the patent bill, have said: “This appraisal of popular ways of thinking was certainly correct. For more than seventy years afterwards scholars seriously debated the notion of a property in ideas, a notion first proposed, to put it bluntly, as a political ruse.”
Waline, op. cit., p. 346.
Ripert, op. cit., p. 90.
“Il ne s’agit plus seulement de condamner celui qui mésuse de son droit en agissant mal; ce qu’on veut c’est empëcher l’exercise des droits individuels, mëme légitimes, lorsque cet exercice paraît contraire à l’intérët général.” G. Ripert, Le régime démocratique et le droit civil moderne (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1936) p. 229; A similar definition is given by Waline, op. cit., pp. 411-412.
“… whilst the right of property is normally a definite set of powers, the underlying good … may be of the most varied kind.” Kruse, op. cit., p. 107; in the same sense R. Sava-tier, Les métamorphoses économiques et sociales du droit civil d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 3 vols., 1948–59). Vol. III, pp. 107-08, 145.
This has been admirably expressed by Ripert, Les Forces Créatrices du Droit, p. 28, when he says: “Quand on modifie la portée d’une règle juridique pour l’étendre ou la restreindre à raison des considérations nouvelles, c’est à fin de la conserver et non de la détruire. On pourrait mëme soutenir qu’on maintient ainsi son véritable sens. Ainsi le droit à la propriété individuelle n’est pas atteint ou compromis si le législateur impose des restrictions nouvelles à son exercice, soustrait certains bien à l’appropriation privée … Le réglementer, le limiter par la loi, c’est reconnaître son existence et sa nécessité, le sauver peut-ëtre en empëchant des abus.”
See Waline, op. cit., p. 345.
A. Berle, “Property, Production and Revolution”, Columbia Law Review, 50: 9, January 1965.
“La transition du droit privé peut ëtre formulée: substitution à un régime de possession d’un régime de valeurs.” E. Levy, Les fondements du droit (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1933), p. 87; in the same sense, G. Ripert, Aspects juridiques du capitalisme moderne (Paris: Libraire Générale de Droit de Jurisprudence, 1946), p. 129.
Ripert, Les forces créatrices du droit, p. 211, discarding the theory of intellectual property and emphasizing that only the exploitation of an activity gives value to a monopoly grant, says that one is led to ask whether a like consideration of the notion of exploitation ought not to be of primary importance for material property as well.
Roubier, “Droits intellectuels ou droit de clientèle”, pp. 280-81.
The fact that while all of Europe was involved in the controversy, it did not spread to the United States with its strong protectionist policies, appears significant. Silberstein, a contemporary advocate of inventor’s “inherent” rights, however, explains the non-participation of the United States in the controversy by stating that the conviction of the necessity of protecting inventors was more securely implanted. Silberstein, op. cit., p. 279, n. no.
Machlup, Penrose, op. cit., p. 6.
The Netherlands abolished their patent system in 1869. It was reintroduced in 1910.
Germany introduced its patent system in 1871 and Switzerland in 1887, in both cases after initially strong opposition.
Ibid., p. 9.
C. Ackerman, L’Obligation d’exploiter et la licence obligatoire en matière de brevet d’invention (Paris: Sirey, 1936), p. 329.
E. Picard, “Embryologie juridique” Journal du droit international privé, 10: 565–85, November-December, 1883; J. Kohler, Handbuch des Deutschen Patentrechts (Mannheim: J. Bensheimer, 1900).
“La législation de la ‘propriété industrielle’ repose sur la notion économique de valeur d’échange, établie sur l’utilité et la rareté des choses.” Le Grand, op. cit., p. 75.
Roubier, “Droits intellectuels ou droit de clientèle”, p. 290.
C. Magnin, “Une mise au point des notions de base de la propriété industrielle”, P.I., 68: 144, October, 1952; in the same sense P. J. Pointet, “Du défaut d’exploitation des brevets d’invention”, Revue Suisse de la Propriété Industrielle et Droit d’Auteur, May, 1952, p. 28, 39. See also J. B. Brown, “The Situation Confronting Our Patent System”, J.P.O.S., 21: 159-94, March, p. 161 ff.
Magnin, loc. cit.
In this sense A. Van Der Haeghen, “Partage des droits intellectuels en propriété industrielle et en droit d’auteur”, L’Ingénieur Conseil, 44: 198, Novembre-Décembre, 1954, whose conclusion is that: “Le but économique des brevets se rapproche de celui des privilèges de l’ancien régime, en ce qu’il vise la création de richesses par la mise en exploitation de quelque chose d’intéressant. A cet égard, la nouveauté de l’invention n’a qu’une importance secondaire.” “Le but économique de la loi sur les brevets … apparaît encore en ce que c’est ne pas à l’inventeur qu’est réservé l’exclusivité.”
Cf., for instance, M. Plaisant, “De la protection international de la propriété industrielle”, Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 39(1): 361, 1932, and Toulmin, op. cit., p. 89.
J-M. Mousseron, Le droit de breveté d’invention—contribution à une analyse objective, (Paris: Librairie de droit et de jurisprudence, 1961), p. 251: “Le droit du breveté défini comme une ‘propriété’ en 1791, un ‘droit exclusif d’exploiter’ en 1844, se transformera peu à peu à un simple droit de créance.”
With the exception of Roubier, no attempts seem to have been made to define the contents of patent rights further than as being rights to exclusive exploitation. Roubier, after criticizing all property theories, finds that, as the patent grant confers the right of exclusive exploitation of an industrial activity, the aim is to vest the patentee with certain prerogatives vis-à-vis the public, the consumers. Though it might appear that those rights are established vis-à-vis the consumer, Roubier maintains that, for all practical purposes, the right to monopolistic exploitation is established against the patentee’s competitors. As therefore the rights conferred by patent grants provide certain favorable positions in the competition for the consumer, Roubier has suggested to name these rights “droit de clientèle.” Roubier, “Droits intellectuels ou droit de clientèle”, p. 295.
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Anderfelt, U. (1971). Society and the Inventor. In: International Patent-Legislation and Developing Countries. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9218-7_1
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