Abstract
Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, in particular, it will also do away with truth. I shall argue that there is, indeed, no way for Quine to protect truth against the type of argument he himself advanced in “Two Dogmas” against Carnap’s notion of analyticity. If he wants to keep his argument, Quine has to discard truth along with analyticity. At the end of the paper I suggest an interpretation of Quine on which he can be seen as having done just that.
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References
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David, M. (1997). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. In: Lehrer, K., Marek, J.C. (eds) Austrian Philosophy Past and Present. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 190. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5720-9_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5720-9_14
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