Abstract
The core of the action theory advocated by me is constituted by the finding or invention of action alternatives and programs as well as by their teleological weighing in an optimization process in accordance with the ends and preferences of the practical system assigned to the agent. However, an action theory which aspires to grasp the complex reality of action must consider yet another component and another system of action-determining elements, namely the existence of institutions as frameworks of the action. The theory of the institutions, the explication of this phenomenon of the basis, both ideal and concrete, of action and human interaction, forms the second supporting leg of a realistic action theory, besides the structural theory of the action-determining processes of information processing.
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References
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965, p.27–66.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.34.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.33.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.34 et seq.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.65.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.32.
“By this, Claude Bernard’s ‘idée directrice’ (guiding idea) is undoubtedly understood in a vitalistic sense, and this assuredly will resound all the way to the biologists, too. It is particularly among them, however, that vitalism has its adherents, and finally it also remains a fact: projected onto the social plane, the guiding idea appears as objective in the factually existing phenomenon of the union or association; it is this guiding idea which influences the members, and it is its mysterious effect which sets masses in motion.” M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.47.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.39.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.35 et seq.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.42 et seq.
Cf. J. Delos, La Théorie de l’Institution (Institution Theory), Archives de Philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique (Archives of Legal Philosophy and Juridical Sociology) 1931, p. 119 et seq.
G. Renard, La Théorie de l’Institution. Essai d’ontologie juridique (Institution Theory. An essay in legal ontology), Paris 1930, p.XIII.
M. Hariou, Sozialordnung, Gerechtigkeit und Recht (Social order, justice and law), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (Institution Theory), op.cit., p.67–95; p.91.
M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den Sozialen Vitalismus (The Theory of the Institution and of its Founding. Essay about Social Vitalism), in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution (The Theory of the Institution), Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5, Berlin 1965 op.cit., p.95.
See: N. MacCormick, O. Weinberger, Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus (Foundations of institutionalistic legal positivism), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1985 [English version: id., An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches to Legal Positivism, D. Reidel, Dordrecht et al. 1986; Italian version: id., Il diritto come istituzione, Dott. A. Giuffrè editore, Milan 1990; French version: id., Pour une théorie institutionelle du droit. Nouvelle approche du positivisme juridique, Brussels, Paris 1992]; O. Weinberger, Recht, Institution und Rechtspolitik. Grundlagen der Rechtstheorie und Sozialphilosophie, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1987 [English version: id., Law, Institution and Legal Politics. Fundamental Problems of Legal Theory and Social Philosophy, Kluwer, Dordrecht et al. 1991]; id., Norm und Institution. Eine Einführung in die Theorie des Rechts (Norm and Institution. An introduction to the theory of law), Manz, Vienna 1988 [Czech version, Masarykova univerzita, Brno 1995].
Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, Analysis 18. 3. 1958, p.69–72; furthermore J. R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Wiggershaus, Cambridge 1969.
To connect this with the reflections of F. A. v. Hayek, cf. F. A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy (3 vols.), vol.1 “Rules and Order”, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1973.
Cf. A. Ross, Tu-tu, Harvard Law Review 70, (1956/57), p.812–825.
Cf. D. N. MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact), in: id., O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches of Legal Positivism, D. Reidel, Dordrecht et al, p.49–76.
“From the fact that something is it cannot follow that something ought to be, just as it cannot follow that something ought to be from the fact that something is. The reason for the validity of a norm can only be the validity of another norm. A norm which constitutes the reason for the validity of another norm is figuratively termed the higher norm in relation to a lower one.”... “Yet in the syllogism whose major premise is the Ought-sentence: One ought to obey God’s (or His Son’s) commandments (which sentence expresses the higher norm), and whose conclusion is the Ought-sentence: One ought to obey the Ten Commandments, or the commandment to love one’s enemies (which sentence expresses the lower norm), an essential term is constituted, as minor premise, by the sentence: God has ordained the Ten Commandments (or: the Son of God has commanded us to love our enemies), which sentence ascertains an Is fact. Major and minor premise are both conditions of the conclusion. But only the major premise, which is an Ought-sentence, is a conditio per quam in relation to the conclusion, which is likewise an Ought-sentence; which means that the norm expressed in the major premise is the reason for the validity of the norm expressed in the conclusion. The Is sentence acting as minor premise is only a conditio sine qua non in relation to the conclusion; which means... that the Is fact ascertained in the minor premise is not the reason for the validity of the norm expressed in the conclusion.” H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law), 2nd ed., 1960, p. 196 et seq. Kelsen misinterprets the principle that Ought does not follow from Is. Correctly understood, it merely says that without an Ought premise (or without a practical premise) no Ought conclusion is possible. It says nothing, however, as to whether sometimes, for deduction purposes, descriptive premises need not be resorted to as well. E.g. in the case of subsumptive inferences this is always the case.
See A. Procházka, Normative Theorie und Rechtserzeugung (Normative theory and the generation of law), in: V. Kubeš/ O. Weinberger (eds.), Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule (Normative Theorie) [The Brno law-theoretical school (normative theory)], Manz, Vienna 1980, p.304–323. In cases of the aforecited type the author speaks of “automatic norm generation“.
This can be asserted despite certain erratic developments. The most important influence on this development of European jurisprudence was probably exerted by Kelsen. His investigations started out with the “Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatz“ (Main Problems of Constitutional Law as Developed from the Theory of the Legal Sentence), 1911, continued with the “Reine Rechtslehre“ (Pure Theory of Law), first edition 1934, second, enlarged edition 1960, and ended with the posthumously published and not completed “Allgemeine Theorie der Normen“ (General Theory of Norms), 1989. These investigations were always directed at logical structures and were most influential, even though frequently based on problematical foundations, and they culminated finally in a norm-logical skepticism actually implying the negation of the possibility of a logical analysis of law. For if one claims that there exist no logical relationships and no valid norm-logical inferences — which is the fundamental thesis of Kelsen’s “General Theory of Norms“ — then the “Logic of Law“ and the intention of analytical jurisprudence are at bottom illusory undertakings. For a critique of Kelsen’s “logic“ of law, see O. Weinberger, Normentheorie als Grundlage der Jurisprudenz und Ethik. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hans Kelsens Theorie der Normen (Theory of Norms as Basis of Jurisprudence and Ethics. A Critique of Hans Kelsen’s Theory of Norms), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1981; id., Kelsens These von der Unanwendbarkeit logischer Regeln auf Normen (Kelsen’s Thesis of the Non-Applicability of Logical Rules to Norms), in: Die Reine Rechtslehre in wissenschaftlicher Diskussion. Referate und Diskussion des Internationalen Symposiums zum 100. Geburtstag von Hans Kelsen (The Pure Theory of Law Scientifically Discussed. Proceedings of the International Symposium on the occasion of Hans Kelsen’s 100th birthday) Vienna 1982, p.108–121; id., Logic and the Pure theory of Law, in: R. Tur, T. Twining (eds.), Essays on Kelsen, chap.8, p.187–199; id., Der normenlogische Skeptizismus (Norm-logical skepticism), in: Rechtstheorie, 17/1986, p.13–81.
See O. Weinberger, Rechtslogik (Logic of Law), 2nd ed., Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1989, p.6.
Here, various ways of asking questions are possible: the argumentation will either be governed by the objectives set by the very system of norms being examined, or the examination can be conducted from the point of view of other systems of ends and values. (This happens e.g. if a legal system is evaluated from the point of view of a pre-assumed religious system or a political conception.) Cf. R. von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (The End as Pursued in Law), vol.1, 2nd ed., Breitkopf & Härtel, Leipzig 1884. K. Engliš, Kritik der Normativen Theorie (A Critique of the Normative Theory), in: V. Kubeš, O. Weinberger (eds.), Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule (The Brno School of Legal Theory), Manz, Vienna 1980, p.176–193 (especially p.185 et seq.)
Attention is invited here to the analyses by Dworkin, who clearly demonstrated the logical difference between deciding on the basis of behavioral norms, and justifying decisions with the aid of principles. (R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd ed., Harvard, Harvard University Press 1978.)
The term ‘functional analysis’ is understood differently in different contexts: in the understanding variety of sociology as explanation of the contents of institutions as well as of the co-operation of institutions and individuals. Meaning is explained out of functional relationships, in which connection various explication models can be applied — e.g. after Habermas the craftsman model, the stage model and the cybernetic model [J. Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (On the Logic of the Social Sciences), Suhrkamp, Tübingen 1967.] With Luhmann, the functionalist approach is so understood that equal effects of different moments are regarded as equivalent. If e.g. the stability of an institution is taken into view, he considers it irrelevant, from a functionalistic point of view whether stability, is achieved by consensus, violence or other moments. I shall understand the functionality of institutions, of their norms and organization as a test of their effectiveness from the point of view of the guiding ideas.
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Weinberger, O. (1998). Action and Institution. In: Alternative Action Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5062-0_9
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