Abstract
The method of reflective equilibrium (RE) — and, subsequently, the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) — has been advocated as a device for theory acceptance in ethics, the justification of moral beliefs and testing the adequacy of conceptions of morality and of moral conceptions, respectively.1 In this article, I shall primarily address the application of (W)RE to the question of the adequacy of moral conceptions. Nevertheless, the views which I shall put forward also have important consequences for the application of (W)RE to matters of moral justification and the testing of moral theories and conceptions of morality. My main interest in all this will be with the role played by considered judgements or intuitions, as some authors prefer to call them, in (W)RE when applied to questions of conceptualisation.
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References
See, for instance, respectively: Daniels (1979a); Heeger (1992b); Nielsen (1982a) and Swanton (1991).
The formulation is Nielsen’s (1982a).
Note that Nielsen (1982a) talks of consensus as a result of applying the method of WRE, whereas Rawls (1971, 580–581) had already pointed to some common starting points as a necessary preliminary for making the application of RE work.
See also: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1, 5, 1145b1 ff.; Nussbaum (1986, 240–263).
Berlin’s critique, cited in S wanton (1992, viii-ix). For a thorough critical, though constructive, review of philosophical contributions on the subject of freedom during the last decades, see S wanton (1992).
Wittgenstein’s pessimism in a sense is shared by Austin (1979, 180) in his views on so-called ‘defeasibility notions’: complex notions, the meaning of which can only be found by investigating occasions and situations in which we think that the notion certainly cannot be applied.
Although Wittgenstein (1967, 174) thinks that certain phenomena, such as hoping and promising, are only possible through language, he nevertheless supposes that there is a reality outside language (1967, 230) and that non-linguistic, or rather pre-linguistic, thinking is possible (1967, 106–110, remarks 327–340); talking about the latter, however, would make very little sense, according to him.
For a critical discussion of Kovesi’s main ideas as well as a reply to these criticisms, see Graham (1975) and Shiner and Bickenbach (1976).
This is a simplification of her view. From the complicated ways in which she expresses herself, it is clear that S wanton (1992, 162–190) is wrestling with the problem, and allows of other solutions.
Cf. Vedder (1995, 57, 63, 67–69, 81); Feinberg (1986, 115, 118–122) and Benn (1988, 132, 136).
Kovesi (1967, 14–15, 17).
Cf. Vedder (1997) for an example of the ways in which legal and ethical theory have narrowed the meaning of privacy.
The meaning of a word can be subject to controversies. However, against Gallie (1955–56) I would argue that because of the public character of our language not even moral concepts are essentially contested.
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Vedder, A. (1998). Considered Judgements: Meaning, Community and Tradition. In: van der Burg, W., van Willigenburg, T. (eds) Reflective Equilibrium. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4972-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4972-3_4
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