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The Impossibility of a Phenomenological Constitution of the Own Body

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Presence and Coincidence

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 119))

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Abstract

We have already learnt that there can be no such thing as a phenomenological constitution of the transcendental ego. We have also seen that the ultimately constitutive flux of consciousness is also exempt from the possibility of a constitutional analysis. Furthermore, we have been able to identify the condition to which this impossibility can be attributed, namely, the condition of coincidence. The Transcendental ego is the self, the flux is the self - and it is for this very reason that there can be no constitution of the ego or of the flux by the self. More specifically, the (transcendental) ego is the self in its static abstraction from the basis of its being, whereas the (transcendental) flux is the self in its connection with the dynamic process whereby it alters and transforms itself.

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Notes

  1. Marbach, Edouard, Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 299.

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  10. see, e.g., Claesges, op. cit., S. 114–5.

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  11. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 203.

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  12. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 74 [H. 48].

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  13. ibid., p. 86 [H. 56], p. 142 [H. 107], p. 419 [H. 368].

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  14. ibid., p. 79 [H.54].

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  17. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 32 [H. 12].

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  18. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 174.

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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Macann, C. (1991). The Impossibility of a Phenomenological Constitution of the Own Body. In: Presence and Coincidence. Phaenomenologica, vol 119. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5670-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3754-6

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