Abstract
We have already learnt that there can be no such thing as a phenomenological constitution of the transcendental ego. We have also seen that the ultimately constitutive flux of consciousness is also exempt from the possibility of a constitutional analysis. Furthermore, we have been able to identify the condition to which this impossibility can be attributed, namely, the condition of coincidence. The Transcendental ego is the self, the flux is the self - and it is for this very reason that there can be no constitution of the ego or of the flux by the self. More specifically, the (transcendental) ego is the self in its static abstraction from the basis of its being, whereas the (transcendental) flux is the self in its connection with the dynamic process whereby it alters and transforms itself.
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Notes
Marbach, Edouard, Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 299.
Husserl, Edmund, Ideen II, hrsg. Marly Biemel, Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1952, S. 33.
Husserl, Edmund. Ideen II, op. cit., S. 90.
Husserl, Edmund, Ideen II, op. cit., S. 90.
Husserl, Edmund, Ideen II, op. cit., S. 97.
Husserl, Edmund, Ideen II, op. cit., S. 167.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., pp. 103–123.
Husserl, Edmund, Ideen II, op. cit., S. 150.
Claesges, Ulrich, Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, S. 101.
see, e.g., Claesges, op. cit., S. 114–5.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 203.
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 74 [H. 48].
ibid., p. 86 [H. 56], p. 142 [H. 107], p. 419 [H. 368].
ibid., p. 79 [H.54].
Theunissen, Michael, Der Andere, tr. by Christopher Macann as The Other,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984, p. 170.
Theunissen, Michael, The Other, op. cit., p. 173.
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 32 [H. 12].
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 174.
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Macann, C. (1991). The Impossibility of a Phenomenological Constitution of the Own Body. In: Presence and Coincidence. Phaenomenologica, vol 119. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_6
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