Incongruous Counterparts, Intrinsic Features and the Substantiviality of Space

Abstract

Kant argued, as part of his argument that space is an a priori intuition, from the existence of incongruous counterparts (such as right- and left-handed gloves otherwise alike) to the existence of space as an entity over and above the material objects in it and their spatial relations to one another. Peter Remnant and John Earman have argued that Kant’s argument is incoherent.¹ Graham Nerlich has recently invoked the dependence of facts about handedness on global features of space to attempt to revindicate Kant’s argument.² I will argue here that, even taking account of the dependence of facts about handedness on global features of space, noticed by Earman and utilized by Nerlich, there is no good argument against relationism founded on facts about handedness. Or, more precisely, there is no good argument against relationism based on handedness which goes beyond the best standard arguments against relationism which invoke no facts about handedness at all.