Abstract
In recent developments of utilitarian theory, emphasis has been placed on how to formulate a statement defining a right action such that a right action should always produce maximal utility. It was contended by nonutilitarians that a prescription for a right action by act-utilitarianism occasionally does not result in maximal utility. For instance, in some exceptional cases, such as the slave system and the punish-the-innocent problem, the prescription in accordance with the principle of utility is said, by nonutilitarians, to be wrong because the prescription seems to them incompatible with the principle of justice. As a consequence, rule-utilitarianism was developed as a substitute for act-utilitarianism but, unfortunately, rule-utilitarianism has not been satisfactory either. The assessment of rule-utilitarianism is a very delicate and complicated problem, which I shall not discuss until Section 9.2, where a comparison will be made between the unified utilitarian theory and existing forms of utilitarianism.
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Notes
G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). p. 106.
J. 0. Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1955), pp. 33–39.
L. W. Sumner, “The Good and the Right,” in New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, ed. Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nelson and Steven C. Patten (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979), pp. 99–114.
David Copp, “The Iterated-Utilitarianism of J. S. Mill,” in New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, ed. Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979), pp. 75–98.
David Copp says, “On such interpretation there is a schism in Mill’s theory of practical reason which I think it is clear Mill would not tolerate.” What Copp originally means by schism is perhaps the separation of Mill’s principle of the good into act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. But Wesley E. Cooper interprets it as a schism of Mill’s theory into the principle of the good and the principle of the right, as can be seen from the following excerpt: “Sumner tries to show that this schism between Mill’s principle of good and his principle of right is motivated by a complex view of moral decision-making, … ” which is taken from W. E. Cooper, “Introduction,” New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, ed. Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielsen, and Steven C. Patten (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979). I think the original schism meant by Copp is not as important as the clarification and distinction of the principle of the good and the principle of the right. Therefore, what I mean here by “schism” is Cooper’s interpretation, but not the original schism of Copp.
See Note 3. L. W. Sumner says, “Mill holds not one theory but an ordered pair. His theory of the good (what Mill calls practical reason) evaluates actions in terms of their consequences — the goodness of acts is a function of their utility. But it equally evaluates all other products of human choice (rules, conventions, policies, lives, political systems, societies) in terms of their utility. At this level the theory is not (exclusively) act-utilitarian but it is not (exclusively) rule-utilitarian either. Mill’s theory of the right (what he calls morality) evaluates actions in a manner which certainly includes essential reference to rules.”
D. P. Dryer, “Justice, Liberty and the Principle of Utility in Mill,” in New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, ed. Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979), pp. 63–73.
See Section 2.3.
See Note 6.
See Note 4.
Ibid.
See Note 3.
L. W. Sumner says, “Mill never wrote a treatise in ethics. The essays on ethical subjects, including utilitarianism itself, are short pieces intended for popular consumption. … But they are composed with too little exactness to please the philosopher. And above all they are too slight—a mere pencil sketch of a theory — to support close analysis. ”
See Note 3, pp. 111-114.
Jan Narveson raised this question in a private communication.
John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 44 (1955), pp. 3–32.
David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 22–23.
C. L. Sheng, “On the Flexible Nature of Morality,” Philosophy Research Archives, Vol. XII (1986-87), pp. 125–142.
L. W. Sumner, private communication.
See Note 15, pp. 23-25.
Jan Narveson, private communication. As pointed out by Professor Narveson in his comments on my original draft, “Obviously there are an infinite number of distinguishable specific things I could do, any of which would count as repaying a loan. And some of these might well be more admirable than others. I can repay it in such a way as to impose a fair amount of trouble on you (I give you a cheque which is in a foreign currency; you have to exchange it, which is time-consuming and perhaps costs you a few dollars. Or …) And as you say, I can do any number of things, which differ greatly in their blameworthiness, which would be ways of not repaying it strictly on time. (I give you the full amount, in cash, but one day late; I never bother to do anything about it at all and move to Missouri; I …)” Strictly these cases belong to the class of not repaying a loan completely on the date due. However, since the substantive difference between these cases and the case of repaying properly is relatively small, these cases are considered trivial and are ignored.
Jan Narveson, private communication. Professor Narveson, in his comments on my original draft, gives a counter example of discrete donation: “But one can easily imagine cases where there is a maximum amount that it is possible to give for the purpose in question. E. g., I donate a sum toward poor little Jennifer’s hospital bills; if I give 100% of the bill, then that is all there is to do, whatever my resources.” I admit that, for specific situations like this example, the action of donating is discrete, but my example of donating refers to donation in general.
David Lyons, “Mill’s Theory of Morality,” Nous 10 (1976), pp. 101–120.
The materials in the several paragraphs that follow are almost all inspired by the comments on the original draft by Professor L. W. Sumner.
Jan Narveson, private communication.
See Note 17.
See Note 21.
See Note 17.
Ibid
In fact law represents a somewhat lower requirement than morality. More accurately, the minimum requirement of morality is as high as, or slightly higher than, that of law, so that morality covers certain areas not covered by law. That is to say, an illegal action so usually considered immoral too, but an immoral action is not necessarily illegal. For instance, cheating in an examination by a college student is regarded as very bad conduct and the student will receive some sort of academic punishment, but legal punishment still does not apply.
Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 37–38.
R. G. Frey, “Introduction: Utilitarianism and Persons,” in Utility and Rights, ed. R. G. Frey (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 3–19.
D. G. Brown, “Mill’s Criterion of Wrong Conduct,” Dialogue, Vol. 21 (1982), pp. 27–44.
See Note 30.
J. L. Mackie, “Rights, Utility, and Universalization,” in Utility and Rights, ed. R. G. Frey (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, (1984), pp. 86–105. Mackie writes, “… on a utilitarian view, transferring a satisfaction from one person to another, while preserving its magnitude, makes no moral significance. … the maximizing of utility may turn out to require that his well-being should be sacrificed, without limit, in order to promote that of others.
R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequent ial ism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
Arthur Fleming, “Reviewing the Virtues,” Ethics, Vol. 90 (1975), pp. 587–595.
Gregory E. Pence, “Recent Work on Virtues,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21 (1984), pp. 281–297.
Robert B. Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 227–236.
Robert B. Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 227–236 Ibid.
As will be pointed out in the following, there are Chinese virtues referring to conduct too.
R. B. Brandt, “Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,” in Contemporary Ut ilitarianism, ed. Michael D. Bayles (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978), pp. 143–186.
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Sheng, C.L. (1991). A Particular Interpretation of Utilitarianism. In: A New Approach to Utilitarianism. Theory and Decision Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3192-6_2
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