Abstract
In the previous chapter I came to the point that the general distribution problem is considered an optimization problem, with a chosen or designed social welfare function as the objective function. An optimization problem necessarily has some constraint(s), which is a preset condition(s) that has to be satisfied. Philosophers sometimes do not emphasize these mathematical details. Since I incorporate the general distribution problem into the quantitative maximization problem of social utility, it seems essential to identify the constraint. In fact, welfare economists have already set a constraint on this distribution problem, although, as will be discussed later, I do not consider it satisfactory.
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Notes
John Ralws, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 75–80.
Yew-Kwang Ng, Welfare Economics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p. 30.
Ibid., p. 147.
The material in Section 11.3 has been presented in the following paper. C. L. Sheng, “Comments on Rawls’ Difference Principle As a Criterion for Distribution,” presented at the Third World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Kobe, Japan, August 20-26, 1987; also to be published in a volume of selected papers for the congress.
See Note 1. p. 75.
Robert Paul Wolf, “A Refutation of Rawl’s Theory of Justice,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 63, No. 7 (March 1966).
Dan W. Brock, “Contratualism, Utilitarianism, and Social Inequalities,” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1971), pp. 33–44.
J. E. J. Altham, “Rawls’s Difference Principle,” Philosophy, Vol. 48 (1973), pp. 75–78.
Scott Gordon, “John Rawls’s Difference Principle, Utilitarianism, and the Optimum Degree of Inequality,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70 (May 1973), pp. 275–280.
T. M. Scanlon, “Rawls’ Theory of Justice,” in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A theory of Justice, ed. Norman Daniels (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), p. 205.
Amartya K. Sen, “Rawls versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the Pure Distribution Problem,” in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A theory of Justice, pp. 284–291.
Benjamin B. Barber, “Justifying Justice: Problem of Psychology, Politics and Measurement in Rawls,” in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A Theory of Justice, pp. 292–318.
John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve As a Basis for Morality? A critique of John Rawls’ Theory,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 59 (1975), pp. 594–606.
See Note 1, p. 77.
Ibid.
See Note 9, p. 277.
Ibid., p. 279.
See Note 1, p. 76.
See Note 9, p. 278.
See Note 2, p. 148. Fig. 11.3-4 is reproduced from Yew-Kwang Ng’s Fig. 6.1 on p. 148.
Ibid., pp. 38, 147.
Ibid., p. 148.
See Note 13.
See Note 2, p. 151.
The maximization of utility coincides with the choice based on the maximin principle only when a very special welfare function is used. For instance, let where α < 1, α O. Then as α →-∞, SWF comes to depend solely on the income of the poorest person. See, for instance, P. R. G. Layard and A. A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978), p. 48.
Amartya K. Sen, On Economic Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 24–46.
Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice: A Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), p. 40.
L. H. Powers, “A More Effective Average: A Note on Distributive Justice,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 24 (1970), pp. 74–78.
See Note 27, p. 40.
Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., pp. 40-41.
See Note 28.
See Note 27.
See Note 28.
The material in Section 11.6 has been presented in the following paper. C. L. Sheng, “Utilitarianism Is Not Indifferent to Distribution,” presented at the Fourth International Conference on Social Philosophy, Oxford, U.K., August 16-19, 1988; also to be published in Rights, Justice, and Community (The Edwin Meilen Press).
See Note 1, p. 77.
J. L. Mackie, “Rights, Utility, and Universalization,” in Utility and Rights, ed., R. G. Frey (Minneaplis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 86–105.
H. J. McCloskey, “Respect for Human Moral Rights versus Maximizing Good,” in Utility and Rights, pp. 121–36.
John Gray, “Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights,” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol 1, Issue 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 73–91.
For instance, David Gauthier writes, “Value, as understood here, is identical with utility.” See David Gauthier, “On the Refutation of Utilitarianism,” in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlen B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 144-63.
See Note 1.
In Chapter 17 I shall show that, if two persons A and B have the same utility function U(V) but A deserves cA/B times as much as B deserves, then it is justified to adopt a social welfare function (for the society of two members A and B) of the form
Ibid.
R. G. Frey, “Introduction: Utilitarianism and Persons,” in Utility and Rights, pp. 3–19.
Ibid.
D. G. Brown, “Mill’s Criterion of Wrong Conduct,” Dialogue, Vol. 21 (1982), pp. 27–44.
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Sheng, C.L. (1991). The Constraint. In: A New Approach to Utilitarianism. Theory and Decision Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3192-6_11
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