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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 141))

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Abstract

Eliminative materialism, basically speaking, is the doctrine that the entities typed by folk psychological categories, such as belief and desire, are to be eliminated from our ontology. This doctrine should be distinguished from reductive materialism which does not deny the ontological status of the entities in question, but claims that the folk psychological concepts can be reduced to physiological or even physical concepts.

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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Houng, YH. (1993). Eliminative Materialism and Connectionism. In: Lin, CH., Fu, D. (eds) Philosophy and Conceptual History of Science in Taiwan. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 141. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2500-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2500-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5103-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-2500-0

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