Abstract
What can the philosophy of mind tell us about the furniture of the world? Those who wish to place philosophy of mind at the helm of the philosophical enterprise will likely want to answer ‘Quite a lot’. Those who are sceptical about the power of philosophical reflection about mind and meaning to deliver on broad philosophical issues will want to answer ‘Not very much’. In what follows, I discuss one initially promising way in which philosophical reflection on mind — and belief, in particular — might be felt to shed some light here. The strategy in question attempts to vitiate or secure the claim of various sorts of discourse to truth-aptness by exploiting those ways in which the concept of truth-aptness is linked to that of belief.
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O’leary-Hawthorne, J. (1994). Truth-Aptness and Belief1 . In: Michael, M., O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 60. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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