Abstract
This book has been, to a large degree, polemical. It has presented a thesis, but has occupied itself more, perhaps, with defense than with exposition. There is some justification for this besides the disputative disposition of its author.
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Notes
Plato, Ion, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, 535.
ibid.
Ibid., 533.
Ibid., 536.
For a defense of the Ion as an examination of criticism, see Craig La Drière, “The Problem of Plato’s Ion,”Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, X (1951).
Ion, 536. It is important to observe that Plato is concerned here only with the way we talk about poetry. In fact, he contrasts poetry-talk sharply with the way we talk about painting, sculpture, and music (532–533). One who knows painting, sculpture, or music can make knowledgeable judgments about all painting, sculpture, or music. But Ion can only say sensible things about one poet: Homer. And this is supposed to show, according to Socrates, that talking well about painting, sculpture, and music gives evidence of knowledge, whereas speaking well only of Homer does not give evidence of knowledge at all — hence the “inspiration” theory of the rhapsode. But as the modern system of the arts developed, Socrates’ conclusion about poetry was extended to all of the other “fine arts” as well.
Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (London: Oxford University Press, 1904), vol. II, p. 3.
Ibid., vol. I, p. 195.
“Of Beauty,” Essays, Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis, and Other Pieces, ed. R. F. Jones (New York: Odyssey Press, 1937), p. 125.
Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, ed. J. E. Spingarn (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. I, pp. 4–5.
Republic, trans. F. M. Cornford, 596.
Ibid., 597.
Ibid., 598.
Ibid., 600.
Marcia Cavell, “Critical Dialogue,” The Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (1970), p. 340.
George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 50.
Toulmin, op. cit., p. 10.
G. E. Moore, Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 63–64.
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, p. 206.
Ibid., pp. 51–52.
“Wittgenstein On Aesthetics,” p. 386.
J. D. Mabbott, “Freewill and Punishment,” Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed. H. D. Lewis (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 306–307.
Sibley and Tanner, “Objectivity and Aesthetics,” p. 34.
“Of the Standard of Taste,” p. 3.
Sibley and Tanner, op. cit., p. 66. The remark quoted is Tanner’s.
Cf. R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959) pp. 99–101.
Ibid.
Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music, trans. Gustav Cohen (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p. 29.
Edmund Gurney, The Power of Sound (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1880), pp. 339–340.
Charles Hartshorne, Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 186.
“The Concept of Expression in Art,” pp. 42–43.
Sibley and Tanner, op. cit., p. 38.
Tanner, “Objectivity and Aesthetics,” Ibid., p. 35.
Tanner, “Objectivity and Aesthetics,” Ibid. p. 63.
See, for example, Marcia P. Freedman, “The Myth of the Aesthetic Predicate,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXVII (1968).
Cf. Dorothy Walsh, “Aesthetic Descriptions,” The British Journal of Aesthetics, X (1970).
Eva Schaper and Frank Sibley, “Symposium: About Taste,” The British Journal of Aesthetics, VI (1966), p. 60.
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© 1973 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Kivy, P. (1973). Art and Objectivity. In: Speaking of Art. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2412-9_6
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