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Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 14))

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Abstract

The merit and also the fault of Berkeley’s argument are immediately clear. Berkeley has successfully exposed the absurdity of abstract images. The real fault of his argument does not lie in the fact that he exaggerates the definiteness of our imagery. Warnock has rightly pointed out that Berkeley survives such criticism. The real fault lies in Berkeley’s imagist notion of thinking. Locke’s abstract idea was understood as an abstract image, and it is no wonder that Berkeley’s blow should prove fatal. The abstract image dwindled. But the victory was poor, for the enemy had put up only a poor defence. General idea and general image are not the same. Locke did not distinguish between idea in the sense of image and idea in the sense of meaning.

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References

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© 1976 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Mohanty, J.N. (1976). Thingking and Meaning. In: Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning. Phaenomenologica, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1337-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1337-6_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1339-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1337-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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