Abstract
R. Hasdai Crescas’ magnum opus, The Light of the Lord, written in Spain and completed in 1410,1 is a study in contrasts. It is a treatise devoted to a systematic presentation of Jewish dogma that contains probably more original and profound purely philosophic insights and arguments than any other Jewish treatise of the Middle Ages. It is an Anti-Aristotelian work that not only attacks the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy from a religious standpoint but also from a philosophic one. In many ways it anticipates Spinoza’s 17th century critique of Aristotle, and may well have influenced it.2 At the same time, Aristotelian thought pervades the Light of the Lord. Despite the fact that Crescas clings to the view of a freely willing personal deity of Jewish tradition and makes it the foundation of his philosophy, he in many ways remains in the orbit of the Aristotelian tradition in his thinking.
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Literatur
For a summary of this treatise see Isaac Husik, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (New York: Atheneum, 1969): 388–405.
For Spinoza’s indebtedness to Crescas see in particular Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1948): 264–95.
The surviving treatise has been translated into English from the medieval Hebrew translation by Daniel J. Lasker, The Refutation of the Christian Principles (New York: SUNY Press, 1992).
See Aviezer Ravitzky, Crescas’ Sermon on the Passover and Studies in his Philosophy [Heb.] (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1988).
Portions of the chronicle appear in English translation in: Franz Kobler, A Treasury of Jewish Letters, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1954): 272–5.
For a discussion of Crescas’ activities see Yitzhak Fritz Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1966): 110–30.
This is particularly true of Crescas’ discussion of free will. For a discussion of this issue see Ravitzky, Crescas’ Sermon on the Passover, 34–60; Warren Zev Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1998): 137–49. Harvey brings another example of how Crescas’ views evolved on pages 11–13.
Shlomo Fischer ed., Sefer Or Hashem (Jerusalem: Sifrei Ramot, 1990): 7. All references to Light of the Lord in this chapter will be to this edition.
See Sara Klein-Braslavy, “The Influence of R. Nissim Gerondi on Crescas’ and Albo’s “Principles” [Heb.]”, Eshel Beer-Sheva, 2 (1980): 177–97. Leon A. Feldman edited both R. Nissimben Reuben Gerondi’s Commentary on the Bible (Jerusalem: Institute Shalem, 1968); and his Derashot (Jerusalem: Institute Shalem, 1973).
See Warren Z. Harvey, “Kabbalistic Elements in Crescas’ Light of the Lord [Heb.]”, jerusalem Studies in jewish Thought, 2 (1982): 75–109. It should be noted that Harvey brings a good summary of the research dealing with Crescas’ sources at the beginning of his ar ticle.
See in particular Shlomo Pines, “Scholastic ism aft er Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and his Predecessors”, Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1 (1967): 1–51 [repr. in his Studies in the History of jewish Thought, W.Z. Harvey and M. Idel eds. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997): 489–539].
Crescas basis his discussion on the 25 premises of Aristotelian philosophy brought by Maimonides at the beginning of part 2 of the Guide, and upon which he builds the Aristotelian proofs for th e existence and unity of God. See Harry A. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1957).
Crescas’ proof shares much in common with that of another Aristotelian philosopher, Avicenna. For a discussion of the relation, see Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas, 73–88.
For a study of Crescas’ approach to dogma see Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986): 108–39.
See Kellner, Dogma, 34–49.
Guide of the Perplexed 2.37. See chapter 3.
Maimonides discusses attributes in Guide 1.51–60. In a series of studies Harry A. Wolfson as dealt with the issue of attributes both in Maimonides and Crescas (as well as other philosophers). See his Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 2, I. Twersky and G. Williams eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977): 161–337, 433–457.
Guide 1.54. In his earlier treatments of the revelation to Moses, Maimoni de s appears to hold that God’s “back” refers to the “negative” attributes; see chapter 3 for a discussion of this revelation.
Wolfson in his article, “Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes”, devotes much effort to extricating Crescas from the apparent contradictions his views entail. See Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 247–337.
See Guide 1.38.
Light 1.3.3: 108–9.
Ibid. 1.3.5: 116–17.
For a discussion of this issue see my discussion of Wars 2.6 in chapter 4.
Light 2.1.3: 135.
Ibid. 138.
Ibid. 139.
For a discussion of Averroes’ view and Gersonides’ critique see the section in chapter 4 on Gersonides’ commentary on Epitome of Paroa Naturalia.
See my discussion of Wars 2.6 in chapter 4.
Light, 139–40.
Ibid. 140.
Light Ibid. 2.1.4: 148. Crescas ultimately approaches a deterministic view, thereby parting company with his Jewish philosophical predecessors who maintained both divine knowledge of contingents and human freedom. For a discussion of this issue in Crescas’ thought see: Ravitzky, Crescas’ Sermon on the Passover, 34–60; Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas, 137-55; Seymour Feldman, “Crescas’ Theological Determinism”, Daat, 8 (1982): 3–28; Seymour Feldmanidem. “A Debate Concerning Determinism in Late Medieval Jewish Philosophy”, PAAJR, 51 (1984): 15–53. For a dis cussi on of God’s knowledge and future contingents in Scholastic philosophy see William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1988).
These forms of providence are presented by Gersonides in Wars of the Lord 4.6.
Light, 163.
See chapter 4, particularly the discussion of Wars Book 6, Part 2.
Light 3.1.5: 312–13.
Narboni advances such a view in his Commentary on Guide 2.29. See Be’ur le-Sefer Moreh Nebukim, J. Goldenthal ed. (Vienna, 1852): 38b.
The story is found in 2Kings 13:20–21. Gersonid es too deals with this story in Wars 6.2.14. See the previous chapter.
Light 2.4. Introduction:183.
Ibid. 183.
Light 2.4.1: 183–5.
Light 2.4.1: 185.
Ibid. 186.
Guide 3.20. See Light 2.1.4.
See my discussion of Guide 2.36 in chapter 3.
See chapter 3, particularly the discussion of Guide 2.34–35 and Guide 2:45.
See chapter 3 (Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah) and chapter 4 (Wars Book 6, Part 2).
Light 2.4.2: 187.
Ibid. 189.
Ibid. 188; see chapter 4 (Wars Book 6, Part 2).
Ibid. 189.
Ibid. 190–1.
Ibid. 191.
Ibid. 191–2.
Ibid. 192.
Derashot (note 9), no. 2, pp. 28–9.
Light, 193.
Crescas brings the example of Elisha in 2Kings 13:20–20. See above, note 43.
See my Maimonides’ Political Thought (New York: SUNY Press, 1999): 225–31.
See Kuzari 4.16 and the discussion of this section in chapter 2.
Light 2.4.2:195.
See chapter 1 (“The Verification of Prophecy”).
See chapter 3 (Guide 3.24).
Sifre Deuteronomy, 357.
Light 2.4.3:195–6.
Ibid. 196–7.
Ibid. 197–8.
Jeremiah 28:1–11.
Light, 199.
Derashot, no. 3, p. 36; no. 5, p. 64. R. Nissim specifically mentions Moses’ speech impediment. Crescas cites this idea in the name of R. Nissim in his Sermon on the Passover, 145.
Light, 199–200.
Kuzari 1.79, 97. For a discussion of the term r iyyiit see Shlomo Pines, “On the term R and its Origin and on Judah Halevis Doctrine [Heb.]”, Tarbiz, 57 (1988):511–40; Dov Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought [Heb.] (Rarnat-Can, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, 1999): 166–199.
Light 4.5:399–402.
For a study of different attitudes to magic on the part of Jewish medieval thinkers see Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought.
See chapter 3 (Guide 2.35) and chapter 4 (Wars Book 6, Part 2).
For a discussion of this point see Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas, 55–6.
Light, 202. For a discussion of Mosaic prophecy, see below.
Light, 203. See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Laws of Kings 11:4.
Ibid. 203
Crescas expands upon this point in Light 2.6. See below.
Ibid. 2.4.4:204.
See my “The Land of Israel and Prophecy in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Heb.]”, The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought, M. Halamish and A. Ravitzky eds. (Jerusalem: Ben-Zevi In stitute, 1991): 40–51. For a survey of the doctrine of climatology in Jewish thought see Abraham Melamed’s article in the same volume, “The Land of Israel and Climatology in Jewish Thought [Heb.]”, 52–78. It is inte resting to note that in his discussion of individual providence, Crescas adds a further factor that contributes to perfection — the temporal one. Certain periods are better suited than others for the preparations necessary in order to attain perfection. This is either due to astrological factors orthe acts that Jews are commanded to perform at certain times of the year. See Light of the Lord 2.2.6:177–8. In the present discussion he omits this factor. The juxtap osition of geographical and temporal factors in the attainment of prophecy is characteristic of the approach of earlier Jewish philosophers, most notably, R. Judah Halevi. R. Abraham Ibn Daud is yet an other philosopher who presents both these factors in his discussion of the conditions for prophecy, and whose treatise was known to Crescas. See Exalted Faith. See S. Weil ed., Emunah Ramah (Frankfurt, 1852): 2.5.1:74. An English trans lation of this treatise was made by Norbert Samuelson (Rutheford, NJ.: Farleigh Dickinson University, 1986). See page 195. For a discussion of Ibn Daud’s approach to prophecy see T.A.M. Fontaine, In Defense of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud (Assen / Maastricht, the Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1990): 137–167; Amira Eran, From Simple Faith to Sublime Faith [Heb.] (Israel: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1998): 207–227.
See Kuzari 1.4.
See chapter 2. Halevi sees philosophy as his main antagonist but deals also with Christianity (and Islam) in the Kuzari. For a study of his approach to these religions, see Daniel J. Lasker, “Proselyte Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the Thought of Judah Halevi”, JQR, 81 (1990): 75–92.
Guide 2.32; see chapter 3.
Light 2.4.4:205.
See Guide 2.36.
Light 2.6. Itroduction-1:225–251.
Guide 3.13.
Light 1.3.5:118-121.
Ibid. 2.6.4-5:265-272.
Ibid. 2.6.1:2 32-237. Crescas returns to this subject in the course of dealing with the immortality of the soul in 3.2.2:320-23. For a study of this issue, see Warren Zev Harvey, “Hasdai Crescas’ Critique of the Theory of the Acquired Intellect”, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University (1973).
Gersonides deals with this topic in Book 1 of the Wars of the Lord.
Crescas already introduced this critique in his discussion of the nature of God in Light 1.3.5:119. See Warren Zev Harvey, “Crescas versus Maimonides on Knowledge and Pleasure”, in: R. Link-Salinger ed., A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture in Honor of Arthur Hyman (Washington, D.C., 1988): 113–23; Gabriella Berzin, “The Concept of Happiness in the Teachings of Maimonides and Rabbi Chasdai Crescas [Heb.]”, Masters Thesis, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (1998): 79–112.
Light 2.6.1:238.
For Halevi’s critique of the philosophers’ approach to intellection and immortality see Kuzari 5.14.
Light 2.6.1:244. See also 1.3.5.
Ibid. 3.Introduction:272–3. Crescas’ indebtedness to R. Nissim Gerondi on this point has been pointed out by Klein-Braslavy, “The Influence of R. Nissim Gerondi on Crescas” and Albo’s “Principles”, 177–97.
Maimonides distinguishes Moses’ miracles from those of all other prophets in Guide 2.35.
Laws of the Principles of the Torah 8.1. See, however, Guide 3.50.
Light 3.6.1:358. For Halevi’s view, see Kuzari 1.80–86.
Light 3.6.2:357-8.
Laws of the Principles of the Torah 8.1. See chapter 3.
Sermon on the Passover, 141–56.
See chapter 2. Crescas mentions the shekhinah in several other passages. He writes in 3.3.1:328: “In its [the soul’s] conjunction with the shekhinah, which is the most wondrous spirituality [ruhaniyyut] possible, it necessarily attains boundless happiness and pleasure”. In most passages Crescas speaks of conjunction with God, and in some passages he refers to conjunction with the “divine light”, or to the “light of the shekhinah”, See Light 2.6.1:250; 2.6.2:263. It is not clear then whether shekhinah is a reference to a certain aspect of God or to some type of spiritual entity. It should be noted that Crescas speaks of “spiritual entities” (devarim ruhaniyyim) but does not identify the shekhinah as one of them. In 2.6.2:264 he mentions the “glory” of God that dwells in the country by means of the Temple. He brings this point in connection with the high priest’s attainment of conjunction and divine emanation when wearing the urim and tummim, and indicates that the Temple aids the high priest to complete all the necessary preparations for this state. See below for a further discussion of the device worn by the high priest. Insofar as Halevi, following R. Saadiah, identifies the glory with the shekhinah, and presents a view on the significance of the glory for prophecy similar to th e on e voiced here by Crescas in regard to the high priest’s prophetic-like ability, it appears that he served as Crescas’ primary source on this issue.
Light 2.6.2:263.
For Crescas’ relation to kabbalah see Harvey, ‘Kabbalistic Elements in Crescas’ Light of the Lord” (note 10), 75–109.
Crescas cites also Deuteronomy 34:10
Light, 359–60.
Ibid. 360. There is some ambiguity in Crescas’ description since the only intermediary he explicitly identifies here is the imagination, who may also be termed an “angel”. Thus “face to face” may be interpreted as equivalent to: “without the mediation of the imagination”, and need not refer to the Active Intellect. Certainly the focus of his discussion is on purely intellectual prophecy vs. one in which the imagination is involved. In light of his discussion of providence, however, I prefer to interpret him as referring to two different intermediaries.
See chapter 4 (Wars 2.6).
Guide 2.33. For a discussion of this issue see chapter 3.
Light, 362. For a discussion of this issue in Maimonides see chapter 3 (Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah; Laws of Principles of the Torah 9.5).
Derashot no. 5, pp. 81–3.
This breastplate is described in Exodus 28:15–30; Numbers 27:21. The sages deal with the nature of the urim in B.T. Yoma 73a-b.
Light 2.6.2:263.
This interpretation is based on Ibn Ezra’s commentary on Exodus 28:6. The Talmud (Yoma 73a-b) presents a miraculous description of the manner in which the urim. reveals the answer to the query.
Light 3.7.1:363; cf. 2.6.2:263.
Ibid. 3.7.2:364.
Halevi exclaims in Kuzari 4.16: “Man yearns for Adonai [the personal Name of God, indicative of God’s immediate relation with the individual] as a matter of love, taste and conviction; while attachment to Elohim [God of nature] is the result of speculation”. Crescas agrees with this distinction between Aristotelian and Jewish thought on the experience of God.
For a study of this topic in kabbalistic thought see Elliot R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994). See also Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University, 1988); Haviva Pedaya, “‘Possessed by Speech’: Towards an Understanding of the Prophetic-Ecstatic Pattern among Early Kabbalists [Heb.]”, Tarbis, 65 (1996): 565–636.
See above, note 10.
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Hasdai Crescas, R. (2001). The Light of the Lord. In: Prophecy. Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0820-4_6
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