Abstract
In his book “The Rediscovery of the Mind” (hereafter referred to as “RM”), John Searle proposes a view that incorporates the following five claims1:
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See John Searle, “The Rediscovery of the Mind”, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992.
Alternatively I could have chosen to talk of ‘conscious properties’, but this sounds odd, since properties are not conscious. Another alternative would be to use the introduced term of ‘phenomenal properties’, but this term is often used in a broader sense that allows for states of people to have phenomenal properties (a specific state may be said to have a specific phenomenal character where having this character is a phenomenal property of this state). C-properties in the sense introduced here can only be had by people and other conscious individuals. When Searle talks of properties in this context, he uses the term mental properties most of the time, but while all c-properties are mental properties it is at least controversial whether all mental properties are c-properties. The reason why I wish to focus the discussion on properties (avoiding the rather vague talk of conscious phenomena, or talk of processes, or events, or states) is that the claim HOP plays a central role in an adequate understanding of Searle’s views about consciousness. Therefore it is helpful to formulate his related claims with explicit reference to the specific kind of properties at issue.
I presuppose here that explaining the instantiation of c-properties by the causal powers of neurobiological processes and explaining these instantiations in terms of the causal interactions between elements of the brain at a micro level amounts to the same thing.
An epiphenomenalist denies that c-properties have causal powers, in which case (ECP) is trivially false (or at least not true).
According to the functionalist, being in a specific mental state is nothing but having the property of being in a state that realizes a specific causal role. Now, being in a state that plays the causal role R can be explained by pointing out that (a) the brain is in a neurophysiological state N that plays the role R and (b) by explaining why N plays role R. Maybe both parts of the explanation can be given entirely in terms of causal interactions at the micro level of the brain. But still, in this view, the mental property of being in a state that plays the role R is not caused by being in the state N. The assumptions (a) x is in the neurophysiological state N and (b) N plays the causal role R entail logically that (c) x is in the mental state M (where being in M means being in a state that plays role R). To say that M is caused by N seems inappropriate.
The account given only describes what David Chalmers calls the primary intension of’ solidity’; it doesn’t describe what Chalmers calls the secondary intension of a term. So, to be precise, it is at best a partial account of the meaning of’ solidity’, but the secondary intension is irrelevant in the present context.
Searle cites the dependence of macrophysical properties such as solidity on microstructure as a typical example of bottom-up causation (see RM, p. 114 and Chapter 10 of his Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1983).
See Ansgar Beckermann: “Superveninece, Emergence, and Reduction”. In: A. Beckermann, J. Kim & H. Flohr (eds.), Emergence or Reduction? — Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1992, David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, Joseph Levine: “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1983): 379-404 and Joseph Levine: “On Leaving Out What It’s Like”, in: M. Davies & G.W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
As has been pointed out by Levine and others, the notion of explainability denied by those who claim that the instantiation of c-properties cannot be explained requires that we understand why the property is instantiated in a stronger sense than knowing.
A related problem is discussed in detail by David Chalmers in his book “Conscious Experience” under the title “The paradox of phenomenal judgement”, while of course in a more general context related issues are discussed in the debate about mental causation.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Nida-RÜmelin, M. (2002). Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology. In: Grewendorf, G., Meggle, G. (eds) Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0861-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0589-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive