Transcendental Arguments, Synthetic and Analytic

Abstract

How far may and should we keep to the original Kantian theory in developing a transcendental philosophy that is both tenable and illuminating in a contemporary setting? Right to the end, Doctor Baum replies. His account of transcendental proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason tries to defend every one of Kant’s main doctrines in theoretical philosophy; or, at least, he tries to give the principal ideas by means of which the whole doctrine might be defended in a more elaborate presentation. We all know how extremely hard this would be to do, if it could be done at all, and we should be grateful to Doctor Baum for pursuing this line of argument in full, so that there is a more solid basis for judging the prospects of a transcendental philosophy in the Kantian manner. Yet, considering the evidence Baum has offered, I should judge the prospects to be dim. As a defense of Kant’s theory, Baum’s attempt has failed. To argue for this general contention, however, a detailed examination of a large number of points in his paper would be called for, a task that could not be carried out in the allotted time. So let me concentrate on one point, Kant’s doctrine of synthesis; and let me place this doctrine in the focus of some more general considerations on how a transcendental argument could proceed. That synthesis is the heart of Kant’s theory does not need arguing, least of all against Baum. He rightly places the main burden of Kant’s proof on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, and the Deduction, in turn, he finds relying heavily on synthesis.

This is a revised version of the paper read at the Bielefeld conference. For critical comments on earlier drafts I am especially grateful to Peter Bieri, Dieter Henrich and David Krell.