Abstract
The aim of this paper is to put to question certain remarks which Professor Rescher has made about Leibniz’s doctrines of individual notions and individual substances. As this is related to some of the conceptual issues which have been involved in recent talk about models of modal logic, it may be worthwhile to try to make as clear as possible this somewhat obscure doctrine of Leibniz. An investigation of these doctrines will lead me to a disagreement with another important thesis Professor Rescher makes — namely that for Leibniz relations which hold between individual substances are reducible.
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Nicholas Rescher,The Philosophy of Leibniz., Prentice Hall, 1967.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Ishiguro, H. (1979). Substances and Individual Notions. In: Sosa, E. (eds) The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9407-2_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9407-2_17
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