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The Rupture in Polish-Soviet Relations

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Great Britain, The Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile (1939–1945)

Part of the book series: Studies in Contemporary History ((SICH,volume 3))

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Abstract

The record of Polish-Soviet relations from the second half of 1942 until the actual rupture in the spring of 1943 is one of constant friction and steady deterioration. In light of the dramatic events of the years immediately preceding this period, in particular what British historian Llewelyn Woodward called “a grim record of deportations and other savage measures of administrative repression”1 against the deportees, to hope that the two governments could work together in harmony was to harbor illusions. Atop the list of outstanding issues was the ongoing dispute over Poland’s eastern frontiers with the Kremlin now demanding a settlement along the so-called Curzon Line and the Poles not only unwilling to consider such a possibility but clearly refusing to discuss the issue. Aside from this overriding controversy there was a steady flow of unresolved issues which at each stage fostered mutual distrust and escalated tension. In accordance with the July 30, 1941 agreement reestablishing relations between the two governments all Polish citizens who had been interned in the U.S.S.R. as prisoners of war and deportees were to be granted amnesty and released. While large numbers of these people were set free from labor camps, many were not accounted for. In answer to the numerous inquiries made by the Polish government as to the whereabouts of missing persons, the Soviets claimed that since a release order had been given, those in question must certainly have been released. Inquiries into the whereabouts of some 8,000 Polish officers and 6,000 additional military personnel known to have been deported received no answer. Among those who were released many found themselves with no food or money on which to subsist and, as winter set in, died of cold or hunger.2

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References

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  1. George V. Kacewicz
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© 1979 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

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Kacewicz, G.V. (1979). The Rupture in Polish-Soviet Relations. In: Great Britain, The Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile (1939–1945). Studies in Contemporary History, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6_7

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