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Part of the book series: Studies in Contemporary History ((SICH,volume 3))

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Abstract

While London and Washington searched for ways to deal with the increasing rumors about the Lublin Committee’s intended proclamation, the Arciszewski government continued to issue pronouncements which were hopelessly unrealistic in view of the West’s overall effort to come to terms with Stalin for the sake of Allied unity. In an interview in the Sunday Times the Polish Prime Minister, apparently unimpressed by previous negative replies, insisted that only after obtaining formal guarantees for Polish independence and non-interference in internal affairs could his government undertake a discussion of frontier adjustment. Emphasizing that the London government was the only legal and actual representative of the Polish people, he expressed certainty that when all the outstanding problems were settled with the Soviet Union “that of the Lublin Committee will solve itself by the recognition of the legal Polish government as the only authority for dealing with Polish affairs.”1 The genuine tragedy of this pantomine lay in its perpetuation after the self proclaimed Provisional government was recognized by the Soviet Union. Unable to face the fact that the Kremlin had installed a puppet government, the London Poles continued to speak in terms of bilateral agreements with the Soviets. In a broadcast to Poland on January 19, Arciszewski outlined his government’s readiness to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union provided the agreement would afford the Polish nation its independence. In what amounted to a desperate plea the Prime Minister declared: “I hold out my hand to the Soviet Union. From the bottom of my heart I believe that in spite of all that has been said and all that has been done, such an agreement can be reached.”2 A few days later the Polish government issued a memorandum to the American and British governments again proclaiming its willingness to achieve a friendly settlement with the Soviet Union suggesting that if the Kremlin, despite Polish efforts, should not agree to an understanding, then a Military Inter-Allied Commission be set up to monitor the administration of liberated territory until the government in London returned and elections could be held to form a new legitimate government.3

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References

  1. Sunday Times, London, December 17, 1944. 2 Dziennik Polski, January 20, 1945.

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  2. Memorandum, London, January 22, 1945, General Sikorski Historical Institute, ed., Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, II, (London: Heinemann, 1967), No. 300. Cited hereafter DPSR.

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  3. Cadogan-Raczynski Conversation, London, January 23, 1945. (GSHI, A.11.49/Sow/6) DPSR, II, No. 301.

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  4. Stalin to Roosevelt, Moscow, January I, 1945, Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–1945(New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958), Vol. II, No. 256.

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  5. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 679, p. 789. Cited hereafter Yalta Conference.

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  6. The relevant portion of the Declaration reads:The establishment of order in Europe.. must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people and to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. For the complete Declaration on Liberated Europe see Appendix.

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  7. Parliamentary Debates (Commons) February 27, 1945, Vol CCCCVIII, Col. 1282.

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© 1979 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

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Kacewicz, G.V. (1979). Epilogue. In: Great Britain, The Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile (1939–1945). Studies in Contemporary History, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-9274-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9272-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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