Abstract
In this chapter we begin our consideration of politicians as brokers in the wealth transfer process. The first order of business in this regard is to develop some understanding of how the market for politicians functions — that is, what forms does competition take in this market? Our basic approach will be to consider politicians as participants in a labor market and to analyze the nature of competition for the legitimate returns from holding office. As we shall see, this competition has a monopolistic and a competitive variant. The question of extralegal returns in the political sector is deferred until Chapter 5.
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References
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© 1981 University of Rochester Center for Research in Government Policy and Business
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McCormick, R.E., Tollison, R.D. (1981). Legislatures as Wage Cartels. In: Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy. Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy Issues, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8153-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8153-9_3
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