Abstract
When empiricism began to decline, because it could in no way explain the nature of logic and mathematics while keeping its principles with respect to empirical knowledge, it evolved toward pragnatism in order to account for the a priori aspect of logical deduction and mathematical truth. For the Vienna Circle, logic was a kind of shorthand, whose rules were only the rules of an arbitrary syntax, justified because they could express in a concise and precise way the content of empirical science. This alliance between empiricism and pragmatism led, in a natural way, to relativism. This kind of relativism ruled the philosophical scene for many years as far as logic and mathematics are concerned, and even today one can say without exaggeration that a vast nunber of philosophers of science abide by it.
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Quesada, F.M. (1984). On the Concept of Reason. In: Garcia, J.J.E., Rabossi, E., Villanueva, E., Dascal, M. (eds) Philosophical Analysis in Latin America. Synthese Library, vol 172. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_21
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