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Inflationary Bias of the Federal Reserve System

A Bureaucratic Perspective

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Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy

Part of the book series: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies ((FMPS,volume 13))

Abstract

The creation of the Federal Reserve System coincides with a turning point in the inflationary history of the United States. Before 1914 there was no overall trend in the price level. Generally, during war time periods the consumer price index increased significantly, but during the intervening periods prices gradually declined to approximately their former levels. However, since the creation of the Fed, there has been an unmistakable, and almost continuous, upward trend in prices.(l)

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© 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Toma, M. (1986). Inflationary Bias of the Federal Reserve System. In: Toma, E.F., Toma, M. (eds) Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8473-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4432-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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