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The Issue of Protection

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International Economics

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 11))

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Abstract

Protection may be defined as intervention by government in markets for internationally traded goods and services in order to provide an artificial competitive advantage to a domestic industry vis-à-vis foreign competition. This type of governmental intervention is part of what is generally known as commercial policy. It generates price discrimination between goods and services of domestic origin and those produced abroad. This definition can be applied equally to protection of home industries against competition from imports, and to measures that enable domestically produced goods to be sold more favorably abroad in competition with foreign goods or services. The usual means of aiding the sale of home-produced goods in foreign markets is to subsidize their production or export.

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© 1987 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston

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Peter Gray, H., Walter, I. (1987). The Issue of Protection. In: Officer, L.H. (eds) International Economics. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3263-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3263-0_2

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