Abstract
Among the many problems that face the student of the actus exercitus/actus significatus distinction there is first of all a question of form. In medieval texts the second member of the distinction frequently appears as actus signatus, alongside the form actus significatus. This alternation is no doubt originally due to the fact that in manuscripts significare was often abbreviated and then wrongly read as signare.1 On the other hand, there is some evidence that scholastic authors themselves were rather uncertain as to which form is to be preferred. Mauritius a Portu Hibernicus, for instance, who prepared an edition of Duns Scotus’s logical works (1504), remarks in his annotations on Super universalia Porphyrii quaestiones acutissimae 2 that one can say both, but that actus signatus has the advantage of being less pronouncedly passive. Such a praedicatio signata as Genus praedicatur de specie is not, strictly speaking, a predication, but rather an indeterminate and very general sign of such predications as Homo est animal. A predication is called signata in the sense of: significativa, vel figurativa, vel implicite sive obscure importans in communibus conceptionibus praedicationem exercitam. Apparently, an actus signatus was not seldom understood as an act that is, at a higher and more abstract level, the sign of an expression of lower order.
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Notes
Cf. L. M. de Rijk, Review of Thomas of Erfurt, Grammatica speculativa, an edition with translation and commentary by G. L. Bursill-Hall, London, 1972, in: Linguistics. An International Review (Mouton, The Hague), No. 157 (1975), 160–1.
J. Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, I, Vivès, Parisiis, 1891, p. 124, 182.
See, for instance, Enciclopedia filosofica, I, Sansoni, Firenze, 21967, p. 602; Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, I, Schwabe & Co, Basel-Stuttgart, 1971, p. 78.
L. M. de Rijk, Logica modernorum. A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, II, 2, Assen, 1967, pp. 703–30, in particular pp. 707–11, 721.
Cf. Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, XI, 7, ed. M. Hertz, Leipzig, 1855, p. 552: Quid enim est aliud pars orationis nisi vox indicans mentis conceptum, id est cogitationem?
Cf. Donatus, Ars maior, II, 17, ed. L. Holtz, Paris, 1981, p. 652; Ars minor, 9, ed. L. Holtz, Paris, 1981, p. 602; Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, XV, 40, ed. M. Hertz, Leipzig, 1859, p. 90.
Cf. Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, VIII, 63, ed. M. Hertz, Leipzig, 1855, p. 421: Modi sunt diversae inclinationes animi, varios eius affectus demonstrantes.
Compare such uses as: Est namque sensus quaedam vis animae quae numquam ducitur in exercitium nisi per instrumentum corporeum (L. M. de Rijk, Logica moder norum, II, 1, Assen, 1967, p. 210).
H. A. G. Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische termen, Meppel, 1979, I, pp. 117–67, in particular pp. 141–2, 148, 153, 160, 162, 164.
Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus syncategorematum, translated by J. P. Mullally, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1964, pp. 21–2.
J. R. O’Donnell, ‘The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood’, Mediaeval Studies, 3 (1941), 79. See also William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, translated with an introduction and notes by N. Kretzmann, Minneapolis, 1968, pp. 117–8; Braakhuis, o.c., I, p. 316, 462.
M. L. Roure, ‘La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe, suivie de l’édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age, 45 (1970) (= Tome 37, 1971), 257–8.
Braakhuis, o. c., I, pp. 184–246, in particular pp. 194–5, 205, 233–4.
A late echo of this remark about the act of affirmation is found in A. Arnauld & C. Lancelot, Grammaire générale et raisonnée, Paris, 1660, II, 13 (= A. Arnauld & P. Nicole, La logique ou l’art de penser, Paris, 51683, II, 2).
Compare: ut affectus — vel actus ut actus, quod idem est -; actum ut actum per exercitium (the manuscript has: exercitum, which is quite acceptable) in an objection mentioned by Nicholas of Paris (Braakhuis, o.c., II, p. 338).
Braakhuis, o. c., I, pp. 259–308, in particular p. 259, 265–6, 269, 277, 290–1, 295. In addition to the excerpts edited by Braakhuis, I have also made some use of the Textus omnium tractatuum Petri Hispani, Coloniae, 1489, which contains the Tractatus syncategorematum that has been translated by J. P. Mullally (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1964), and of the Parva logicalia, published in Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis claríssima expositione, Venetiis, 1572, pp. 264–311. Note, however, that the latter texts do not always faithfully represent Peter’s own views.
Cf. Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales, Venetiis, 1572, p. 254 R: equitatio significatur ut concepta per hoc nomen ‘equitatio’ et per hoc verbum ‘equito’, significatur ut exercita, ut cum aliquis exercet equitationem equitando; p. 272 R: cursus significatur ut conceptus per hoc nomen ‘cursus’ et per hoc verbum ‘curro’ aliter autem significatur cursus ut exercitus, ut cum aliquis exercet ipsum currendo.
Braakhuis, o. c., I, p. 265.
Peter’s actual text betrays some confusion between the word securis and the tool it denotes. Cf. Braakhuis, o. c., I, p. 269: Sicut dicitur securis incisiva ab incisione exercita et non ab incisione significata; ‘securis’ enim nullo modo significat incisionem, sed significat securim, sicut ‘homo ‘hominem, et exercet incisionem sive ipsum scindere.
In this respect there is a curious resemblance to the way David Hume treats the notion of belief. Compare, for instance, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, V, 1, 39–41.
Cf. Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales, Venetiis, 1572, p. 289 V - 290 R: si haec dictio ‘an’ significat electionem per modum affectus, oportet quod sit adverbium vel interiectio vel accidat verbo tamquam modus, quod est impossibile.
Cf. J. Pinborg, Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter, Münster-Kopen hagen, 1967, p. 50 (from one of Kilwardby’s commentaries on Priscian).
H. A. G. Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische termen, II, Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parijs’ Sincategoreumata, Meppel, 1979, in particular pp. 2–6, 87–91, 131–3, 168–9, 219, 247, 336–40. For excerpts from the Summae Metenses see L. M. de Rijk, Logica modemorum, II, 1, Assen, 1967, pp. 452–90, in particular p. 467, 481–4.
Braakhuis, o. c., II, p. 88, has: (cum dicitur ‘currit’, hoc verbum significat cursum,) sed non exercet quod significat, whereas the manuscript has: sed non significat quod significat. Although it is undeniable that the verb currit does not itself run, that is not the point here. The reading of the manuscript is corroborated by such a passage as Petrus Hispanus, Summulae Logicales, Venetiis, 1572, p. 272: sicut se habet dictio in communi (ad) actum suum communem quem exercet, qui est significare, similiter dictio specialis ad actum suum specialem. Sed dictio (in) communi non significat actum suum communem. Dictio enim non significat actum suum significare, sed exercet ipsum.
Compare what Henry of Ghent says about negation (Braakhuis, o. c., I, p. 356): est in dictione ut modus significandi et intelligendi, et ita ut exercita.
L. M. de Rijk, Logica modemorum, II, 1, pp. 482–3.
For excerpts see Braakhuis, o. c., I, pp. 351–73, in particular p. 351, 354, 356, 359–62,371–3.
Braakhuis, o. c., I, p. 356.
N. Kretzmann, ‘Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata’, in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 211–45, in particular pp. 224–30.
Braakhuis, o. c., II, pp. 168–9.
Cf. Kretzmann, o. c., pp. 227–8, n. 67 and 69.
Thomas Aquinas, In IV libros Sententiarum, IV, dist. 8, q. 2, a. 1.
Bonaventure, In IV libros Sententiarum, IV, dist. 8, pars 2, a. 1, q. 1.
Bonaventure, In IV libros Sententiarum, I, dist. 4, a. unicus, q. 4, dubium 1.
Thomas of Erfurt, De modis significandi sive grammatica speculativa, ch. 19 and 51 (in J. Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, I, Vivès, Parisiis, 1891, p. 16, 45.
J. Duns Scotus, Super universalia Porphyrii quaestiones acutissimae, q. 8, 11, 14 (in particular), 16 (Opera omnia, I, Vivès, Parisiis, 1891, p. 120, 136, 178, 206, 212); In librum Praedicamentorum quaestiones, q. 9 (Ibidem, p. 460, 462). See also the abundant annotations on Scotus’s commentary on Porphyry by Mauritius a Portu Hibernicus in Opera omnia, I. A forerunner of the distinction between praedicatio significata and praedicatio exercita may be the distinction between two ways of formulating inferences that is mentioned in the Tractatus Anagnini, dating from about 1200 (L. M. de Rijk, Logica modernorum, II, 2, Assen, 1967, pp. 235–8, 243). The inference, for example, from a universal negative proposition to its simple converse is said to be expressed nominate when mention is made of the conversion itself, as in Haec propositio ‘Nullum mortuum est homo’ est universalis negativa et vera et habet simplicem conversam; ergo eius simplex conversa est vera. The same inference is said to be expressed innominate when it is directly about things, propositions, or dicta, as in Nullus homo est lapis; ergo nullus lapis est homo, or in Vera est ista ‘Nullum mortuum est homo’; ergo vera est ista ‘Nullus homo est mortuus’, or in Verum est nullum mortuum esse hominem; ergo verum est nullum hominem esse mortuum. About three centuries later a kindred distinction is found in discussions of the question as to whether such first principles as the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are explicitly assumed as premisses in proofs. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, for instance, states in his comments on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, I, 11, 77 a 5 ff. (Venetiis, 1556, p. 65 V) that such first principles may enter proofs in a twofold way, either virtually or formally. In the former case they are leading principles according to which a demonstration is conducted, while in the latter case they are explicitly assumed as premisses in the demonstration itself. When they are formally assumed as premisses, a further distinction should be drawn between cases where they are taken in actu significato, as in the formulation Non contingit simul esse et non esse, and cases where they are taken in actu exercito, as in A est ens et non est non ens. The difference is said to lie in the fact that in the first formulation the principle that an affirmation and a negation concerning the same things are incompatible is signified, without the affirmation and negation being performed, whereas in the second formulation the compounding affirmation and separating negation are actually carried out. See also Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in universam dialecticam Aristotelis, Coloniae Agrippinae, 1607, p. 626 (Commentarii in libros de Posteriori Resolutione, Cap. VIII, De principiis, q. 1, a. 3).
William of Ockham, Summa logicae, I, 66; Quodlibeta, VII, 9 (ed. J. C. Wey, St. Bonaventure, 1980; = VII, 15, in other editions); Walter Burleigh, De Puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, 1955, pp. 16–7; De puritate artis logicae tractatus brevior, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, 1955, p. 219.
Cf. M. Nizolius, De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos libri IV, Parma, 1553, I, 7,
For a general survey of the subject see P. V. Spade, ‘Insolubilia’, in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 246–53.
L. M. de Rijk, ‘Some Notes on the Medieval Tract De insolubilibus, with the edition of a tract dating from the end of the twelfth century’, Vivarium, 4 (1966), 83–115, in particular pp. 104–15.
Petrus de Aliaco, Conceptus et insolubilia, Parisiis, 1498; Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, an annotated translation by P. V. Spade, Dordrecht, 1980, p. 69, 143. See also Pseudo (?)-Scotus, In libros Elenchorum quaestiones, q. 52 (J. Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, II, Vivès, Parisiis, 1891, p. 75): qui interimit omnem loquelam virtute dici de omni negat suam loquelam, sed quia non potest negare loquelam nisi per loquelam, ideo per actum exercitum ponit loquelam, virtute tarnen dici de omni negat suam, sicut et aliam. Compare Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 8, 1012 b 15–8.
Compare Walter Burleigh, De puritate artis logicae tractatus brevior, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, 1955, p. 241: ‘et’ quae coniunctio copulativa dicitur, non quia copulationem significat, sed quia per ipsam copulado habet existere.
Cf. M. L. Roure, ‘La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe, suivie de l’édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age, 45 (1970) (= Tome 37, 1971), 251.
For the term copulado see, for instance, Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Assen, 1972, p. 80: Copulado est termini adiectivi acceptio pro aliquo.
Roure, o.c., p. 294.
Roure, o. c., p. 296. This opinion is also found in Paul of Venice’s Logica magna, Venetiis, 1499, fol. 192 V, from which it has been translated by I. M. Bochenski, Formale Logik, Freiburg-München, 21962, pp. 281–2 (35.33).
The reading in dici seems to me to be the right one, rather than Roure’s indici, or iudicii, on which Bochenski’s translation appears to be based.
Bochenski’s translation of this passage contains a serious error.
Compare John le Page in Braakhuis, o. c., I, p. 205: oratio non significat actum qui exercetur per ipsam. Quod patet: cum dicitur ‘Socrates currit’, haec oratio non significat affirmationem (but performs the act of affirming).
Aristotle, De sophisticis elenchis, 25, 180 b 5.
J. Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, II, Vivès, Parisiis, 1891, pp. 75–6. Part of this question has been translated—rather unsatisfactorily—by I. M. Bochenski, Formale Logik, Freiburg-München, 21962, p. 277 (35.09).
Compare Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII, 10, 1051 b 6.
The published text has: Dico me dicere falsum; ergo etc. Both the sense and the context, however, demand the replacement of Dico by Verum est.
In sed est secundum quid et simpliciter Bochenski (o. c., p. 277) inserts non before simpliciter. That insertion makes the whole passage well-nigh unintelligible.
Aristotle, De sophisticis elenchis, 25, 180 a 38. The Latin translation of that passage is: Neque si bene iurat id quidem et qua, necesse est et bene iurare, nam qui iurat se periuraturum, bene iurat periurans hoc solum, at non bene iurat. Compare also, for example, Lambert of Auxerre’s comment on this passage (Logica, ed. F. Alessio, Firenze, 1971, pp. 186–7): respondendum est quod male iurat simpliciter; periurat enim se. Secundum quid autem bene iurat (this is no doubt the right reading; Alessio badly distorts it).
See, for instance, Thomas de Vio Caietanus’s comments on Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 3 (editio Leonina, V, Roma, 1889, pp. 300–2; F. Suarez, Metaphysicae disputationes, disp. 31, 6, 21 (Moguntiae, 1605, II, p. 161); Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in universam dialecticam Aristotelis, Coloniae Agrippinae, 1607, p. 384, 397 (In Praedicamenta Aristotelis, Cap. V, De substantia, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2).
J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford, 1962, p. 12. See now also Gabriel Nuchelmans, ‘Ockham on Performed and Signified Predication’ in: E. P. Bos & H. A. Krop, eds., Ockham and Ockhamists (Artistarium, Suppl., IV), Nijmegen, 1987, pp. 55–62.
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Nuchelmans, G. (1988). The Distinction Actus Exercitus/Actus Significatus in Medieval Semantics. In: Kretzmann, N. (eds) Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Synthese Historical Library, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2843-5_3
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