Abstract
Since the middle 1960’s philosophers and historians of science have been concerned with possible relations between philosophy and history of science,1 and more particularly with answers to three questions: (i) How exactly should history of science be incorporated into the work of the philosopher of science, if at all?2 (ii) What weight should be given to historical matters? (iii) To what extent ought history of science be regarded as normative? As these questions were raised and answers formulated, it became apparent that deeper questions needed to be discussed. What are the central tasks of philosophy of science? What is the ontological nature of science? What is the primary concern of a philosopher qua philosopher?3 Many began to argue that philosophy of science, as it had been conceived was not a neutral meta-discipline pursuing pure interests, but rather involved a set of assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the analysis of its structure—assumptions, indeed, which many felt were wrong and should be abandoned.4
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References
See the following: R.H.Stueuver, ed. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science vol.V, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press 1970). For a review of this volume and an expression of his own views on the relations of History and Philosophy of Science, see: R. Giere “History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (1973); p.282–97.
Also, R.D.Burian “More than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and the Philosophy of Science,” Philosophy of Science 44 (1977); p. 1–42.
Ernan McMullen, e.g., argues that history of science provides important clues to the ontological implications of science. See: E.McMullen “The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy,” in Stuewer p. 12–67. Also: D.Shapere “What Can Theory of Knowledge Learn from History of Knowledge?” The Monist 60 (Oct. 1977); p.488–508; and, L.Briskman “Historicist Relativism and Bootstrap Rationality,” The Monist 60; p.509–537.
Two thinkers who have been concerned to raise the more central issues are Karl-Otto Apel and R.Rorty. See: K.O.Apel Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, tr. G.Adey & D.Frisley (London: RKP 1980)
R.Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton U.P. 1979).
H.I.Brown,in Perception, Theory and Commitment, The New Philosophy of Science (Chicago U.P. 1977), points to philosophy of science as “research controlled by a body of presuppositions” (see, e.g., p.30).
For an excellent overview of ‘the received view’ and the developments leading to its demise, see: F.Suppe “Afterword—1977,” in F.Suppe, ed. The Structure of Scientific Theories 2 ed. (University of Illinois Press 1977); p.615–716.
Op. cit., p.5.
Ernan McMullin “The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy,” in Stuewer, p.24.
Ibid., p. 15.
For discussion of these problems, see: M.Scriven “Explanations, Predictions and Laws,” in Feigl & Maxwell Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol.VII (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press 1962); p. 170–230
S. Toulmin Foresight and Understanding (N.Y. Harper Torchbook 1963)
Ch.2, and S.Bromberger “Why Questions,” in R. Colodny, ed. Mind and Cosmos: Explorations in the Philosophy of Science (U. of Pittsburgh Press 1966); p.86–111 J.G.Greeno, “Explanation and Information,” p.89–104, and R.CJeffrey, “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference,” p. 19–28
S. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference (U. of Pittsburgh Press 1966); p.1–18.
See C.Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind 54; 1–26, 97–121. Reprinte d in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation & other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (N.Y. Free Press 1965), and N.Goodman, “On Likeness of Meaning,” Analysis 10; 1–7.
K.Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson 1959), and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 2 ed. (N.Y. Basic 1965).
Op. cit., p.71.
T.S.Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago U.P. 1962, 2 ed. 1970).
Norwood R. Hanson “Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery,” Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science ed. H.Feigl & G.Maxwell (N.Y. Holt 1961).
Op. cit., p.35.
R.Rorty, The Mirror of Nature, p.358.
L.Briskman, “Historicist Relativism and Bootstrap Rationality,” Monist 60 (1977); p.509.
See P.Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books 1975)
H.G.Gadamer, Truth and Method (N.Y. Crossroad 1975).
E.Nagel, Introduction Teleology Revisited, and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science (Columbia U.P. 1977); p.2.
For an excellent discussion of Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, and Lakatos, see: F.Suppe, The Waning of the Weltanschauung Views, and his “Afterword-1977” in Suppe ed. The Structure of Scientific Theories.
Op. cit., R.H.Stuewer, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science.
Ibid., p.62.
The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame U.P. 1963), and The Concept of Matter in Modern Philosophy (Notre Dame U.P. 1963).
Op. cit., p.65.
Ibid., p.63f. This argument reminds one very much of the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.
R.N. Giere “History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience,” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 24 (1973); p.289.
Ibid. p.293.
Ibid. p.296.
Op. cit., R.Burian “More Than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science.”
Ibid. Abstract, p.1.
Ibid. p.29–31.
Op. cit. Burian, p.31.
Ibid. p.32.
Ibid. p.34.
D.Shapere “What Can Theory of Knowledge Learn from the History of Knowledge?” The Monist October, 1977; p.521.
Ibid. p.491
Ibid. p.501–503.
Burian op. cit., p.18f.
Op. cit. Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories. Suppe describes Shapere’s three postulates of Scientific Rationality, Generalizability of Scientific Reasoning, and the Systematizability of Scientific Reasoning; p.683f.
D.Shapere, “What Can Theory of Knowledge Learn from the History of Knowledge?”; p.506.
L.Briskman, “Historicist Relativism and Bootstrap Rationality,” The Monist October 1977; p.521.
Ibid. p.525.
Op. cit. Suppe on Shapere, p.684.
Op. cit. McMullin, p.63.
Op.cit. Suppe, p.716–728.
Ibid. p.726, and 728.
Ibid., p.174.
Marx Wartofsky, “The Relation Between Philosophy of Science and History of Science,” p.134.
G.Ganguilhem, Ideologie et Rationalite (Paris: Vrin 1977) M. Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge.
Quoted in Ganguilhem Etudes d’histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences (Paris: Vrin 1970); Intro, p.20.
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Kegley, J. (1989). History and Philosophy of Science: Necessary Partners or Merely Roommates?. In: Lavine, T.Z., Tejera, V. (eds) History and Anti-History in Philosophy. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2466-6_9
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