Abstract
Management systems seeking to forecast and/or contain risks are prolific in organizations. However, there is another way to deal with risks: to transform them into moral issues. Instead of calculating possible courses of action and deriving subsequent measures, organizations call on the responsibility and diligence of their members to abate risks. This can be seen, for example, in cases where technological failure is attributed to the incorrect behavior of employees. The implicit assumption is that if organizational members behave in a morally correct way, risks can be avoided.
This is often considered a problem because, when they recur to morality, organizations avoid the search for systemic deficiencies in structures or in decision-making processes and therefore renounce efforts which could lead to their own improvement. This contribution examines from a sociological perspective how, in highly uncertain situations characterized by conflicts and divergent opinions about specific technical issues, moral communication can become a functional manner of dealing with risks. Two typical situations are analyzed that involve the moralization of risks: the aftermath of catastrophes and innovation processes. I show how by displaying themselves as moral actors, organizations acquire the internal and external backing necessary to continue operating. This is vital in the short term, but can be dangerous over time, because morality sets high expectations, but gives little specific advice for action in complex systems.
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Notes
- 1.
This can be seen, for example, when warning devices, which are expected to signal problems, fail to function or malfunction and provoke damage (Perrow 1989, 39).
- 2.
This is explicitly recognized by the Incident Commanders for Louisiana (Austin and Laferriere 2011).
- 3.
While environmental values are crucial, the process is also accompanied by other values such as the idea of a decentralized energy supply or justice toward third world countries. This can motivates projects with the aim of diffusing technology or adapting existing technology to different economic and natural conditions (Mautz et al. 2008).
- 4.
While the value of sustainability can motivate different actors, it diverts attention to the question of climate protection and the economic potential of renewable energies. Traditional environmental values such as nature or biodiversity protection become secondary (Bruns et al. 2009, 477).
- 5.
The experience that value-oriented projects can lead to innovation is not new. Jackall’s analysis of the morality of bureaucracy (1983) shows how there had been no significant innovation had occurred for several decades in production technologies in the U.S. chemical industry well into the 1970s. Then, a wave of innovation was suddenly sparked by a discussion of the health risks associated with cotton dusk. This moral discourse, which also reached the political level and prompted new regulations, acted as a trigger that led a relatively conservative industry to improve its production processes (Jackall 1983, 129).
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Besio, C. (2014). Transforming Risks into Moral Issues in Organizations. In: Luetge, C., Jauernig, J. (eds) Business Ethics and Risk Management. Ethical Economy, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7441-4_5
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