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Efficiency and Swiss Contract Law

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Law and Economics in Europe

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 1))

Abstract

When you look at contract law in the USA, it is almost impossible to escape the economic analysis of law , also called Law and Economics (LAE). It is probably the dominant academic style of US contract theory, even if it does not seem to have a strong influence in contractual practice.1 LAE does not have the same weight in Europe, where its role in law school curriculum remains sparse,2 nothwithstanding a possible trend to use economic analysis of law , evidenced by a growing number of references to LAE in scholarly writings, most notably about contract law.3

In this essay, I will try to determine to what extent LAE can really influence the development of civil contract law. My field of analysis is thus limited: the idea is neither to discuss LAE as it is in the USA, nor to look at civil contract law de lege ferenda, nor to examine generally the use of economic reasoning to decide a case in civil law . Rather the goal is to form an opinion about the validity of transposing some US legal-economic theories de lege lata in civil contract law, as some European scholars try to do. My point is that the main issue here is the confrontation between efficiency , the value at the core of these theories, and the values founding civil contract law. After a general presentation of the problem, the analysis of this confrontation will be made using Swiss contract law as a representative example.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Di Matteo, Prentice, Morant and Barnhizer, pp. 48 et seq.; Grechenig and Gelter, p. 297; Hackney, pp. 164 et seqq.; Eric A. Posner , pp. 868 et seqq.; Smith, pp. 133 et seq.; Von Bogdandy, p. 3.

  2. 2.

    Grechenig and Gelter, p. 295.

  3. 3.

    One good example of the influence of LAE on civil contract law that is the assertion by the authors of the academical DCFR that de lege ferenda, efficiency should be one of the leading principles of european contract law, cf. Von Bar and Clive, p. 37.

  4. 4.

    Faust, pp. 842 et seqq.; Polinsky, pp. 7 and 163 et seqq.; Richard A. Posner , pp. 10 et seqq.; Schäfer and Ott, p. 1.

  5. 5.

    Cohen, p. 126; Crasswell, p. 508; Hatzis, pp. 162 et seqq.; Mackaay, p. 425; Posner and Rosenfield, pp. 88 et seq.; Smith, pp. 108 et seqq.

  6. 6.

    Mackaay and Rousseau, N 98 et seqq.; Mathis, pp. 11 et seq.; Richard A. Posner , pp. 3 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Crasswell, p. 508; Polinsky, p. 29; Richard A. Posner , p. 14; Posner and Rosenfield, pp. 88 et seq.

  8. 8.

    Gillette, pp. 119 et seq.; Mackaay, pp. 425 et seqq.; Mackaay and Rousseau, N 1333 et seqq.; Posner and Rosenfield, pp. 88 et seq.; Von Bar and Clive, pp. 38 and 60 et seqq.

  9. 9.

    Eric A. Posner , pp. 833 et seq.; Schäfer and Ott, pp. 278 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Grechenig and Gelter, p. 300.

  11. 11.

    Vandenberghe, pp. 401 et seq. and 412–414; Georgakopoulos, pp. 59–66; Kornet, p. 367; Mackaay and Rousseau, N 50.

  12. 12.

    Ackermann, pp. 944 et seq.; Eidenmüller , pp. 8 et seq.; Faust, p. 849; Graziadei, p. 464; Eric A. Posner , pp. 864 et seqq.; about the doctrinal tradition followed in Europe, see Grechenig and Gelter, pp. 345 et seqq., 353 and 359 et seq.; Hatzis, pp. 169 et seqq.; Kramer, ‘Rechtswissenschaft’, pp. 51 et seqq.; Von Bogdandy, p. 3.

  13. 13.

    Eidenmüller , pp. 8 et seq. and 404 et seqq.; Faust, pp. 842 et seqq. and 848; Fikentscher, pp. 14 et seqq.; Mackaay and Rousseau, N 22. For examples, see Bieri, ‘Responsabilité’, pp. 519 et seqq.; id. ‘Possibilité’, pp. 201 et seqq.; Hatzis, pp. 176 et seqq.; Schäfer and Ott, p. 11; Mackaay and Rousseau, N 1326 et seqq.

  14. 14.

    Eidenmüller , pp. 7 et seqq.

  15. 15.

    Grechenig and Gelter, p. 335; Eidenmüller , pp. 169 et seqq.; Fezer, p. 823; Hausman and McPherson, pp. 675, 693 et seq. and 702 et seqq.; Mathis, pp. 49 and 143 et seqq.; Mattei, ‘Rise and Fall’, pp. 229–234 and 240 et seqq.; pp. 655 et seqq.; about the US context, see also Feldmann, pp. 91 et seqq.; Fletcher and Sheppard, pp. 454 et seqq.; Hackney, pp. 108 et seqq.

  16. 16.

    Grechenig and Gelter, pp. 307 et seq. and 335 et seqq.

  17. 17.

    Collins, Contracts, p. 30; id., ‘Cosmopolitan’, pp. 314 et seq.; Eidenmüller , p. 273; Hausman and McPherson, p. 676; Hesselink, p. 50; Mahlman, pp. 218 et seq.; Mak, ‘Legal-Economic Reason‘, pp. 285 et seqq.; Mathis, p. 201; Von Bar and Clive, p. 37. See also Ackermann, pp. 934 et seq.

  18. 18.

    Caroni, pp. 125 et seqq.; Mak, ‘Europe-Building’, p. 329; Pichonnaz, pp. 127 et seq. and p. 179.

  19. 19.

    Mattei, Law and Economics, p. 24.

  20. 20.

    Wiegand, pp. 230 et seq.

  21. 21.

    Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, pp. 177 et seqq.; Peyer, pp. 110 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Fezer, pp. 821 et seqq.; Mattei, ‘Rise and Fall’, pp. 236 et seqq.; Smith, p. 134; Stürner, pp. 17 and 22 et seq. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the resurgence of nationalism in European legal thinking could notably be explained as a reaction against the development of an European private law too much focused on wealth maximization, cf. Collins, ‘Cosmopolitan’, pp. 319 et seqq.; Mak, ‘Europe-Building’, pp. 335 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, pp. 177 et seqq.; Graziadei, pp. 459 and 464 et seq.; Fikentscher, pp. 16 et seq. and 117; Mattei, ‘Rise and Fall’, p. 234; Michaels, pp. 786 et seqq. and 791 et seqq.; von Bogdandy, pp. 3 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, pp. 174 et seq. and 191; Kramer, ‘Einfluss’, pp. 371 et seqq.; Kunz, pp. 43 et seq.; Pichonnaz, pp. 126 et seqq.; Schwenzer, pp. 60 and 79 et seqq.; Walter, pp. 92 et seqq.

  25. 25.

    Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, p. 199; Kunz, pp. 53 et seq.; Morin, p. 219; Zweigert and Kötz, pp. 169 and 175 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Pichonnaz, p. 216.

  27. 27.

    Supra, 9.1.1

  28. 28.

    BGE 131 II 562; Steinauer, N 27 et seqq.

  29. 29.

    BGE 131 III 33; BGE 135 III 20; BGE 139 III 283; Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 194 et seqq.; Pichonnaz, pp. 207 et seq.

  30. 30.

    It can also be explained by the multilingual character of Swiss Civil Code: the German, French and Italian version of the code have in principle the same weight (Art. 14 para. 1 PublG), which makes difficult to determine what is the litteral meaning of the law, cf. Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 208 et seqq.

  31. 31.

    Morin, p. 219; According to Eugen Huber, who wrote the Swiss Civil Code: “The code must speak in popular ideas. The man of reason who has thought about his times and needs should have the feeling, as he reads it, that the statute speaks to him from the heart […] The injunctions of the legislator must therefore, so far as the material permits, be comprehensible to everyone, or at least to those who are involved in the activities regulated by the statute. Its provisions must mean something to educated laymen, even it they will always mean more to the specialist”; see original text in German in Huber, N 10; Zweigert and Kötz, p. 169.

  32. 32.

    This is essentially this feature which explains the large influence of Swiss Civil Code in XXth century civil law codifications, and in international contracts, Morin, p. 219; Zweigert and Kötz, p. 175.

  33. 33.

    Morin, pp. 219 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Example: Art. 337 OR gives to the employer and the employee the right to terminate the employment relationship at any time “for valid reasons”, without explaining what a valid reason is. Art. 4 ZGB orders the judge to complete this rule and define when there is a valid reason to terminate an employment contract without notice, cf. BGE 127 III 351.

  35. 35.

    Morin, pp. 219 et seqq.; Werro, N 43.

  36. 36.

    BGE 74 II 106; Morin, pp. 219 et seq. and 224 et seqq.; see also Steinauer, N 363 and 369 et seq.; Werro, N 30 and 42 et seqq. Contra (but with similar practical results): Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 367 et seqq. and 445; Kramer, Methodenlehre, pp. 184 et seq. and 282 et seqq.

  37. 37.

    Supra, 9.1.1.

  38. 38.

    BGE 129 III 656; BGE 123 III 292; BGE 126 III 129; Amstutz, pp. 318 and 322 et seq.; Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 457 et seq.; Kramer, Methodenlehre, pp. 180 and 281 et seqq.; Martenet, p. 283; Morin, p. 230; Steinauer, N 324 et seqq. and 406 et seqq.; Werro, N 33.

  39. 39.

    Cf. Eidenmüller , p. 171.

  40. 40.

    BGE 129 III 42; BGE 129 III 276; BGE 131 I 333; Gauch, Schluep, Schmid and Emmenegger, N 612; Guillod and Steffen, N 4 et seqq.; Kramer, ‘Kommentar’, N 20 and 37 et seqq.; Oftinger, pp. 48 and 52 et seqq.; Wolf, pp. 10 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Eric A. Posner , pp. 849–852.

  42. 42.

    BGE 127 III 449; Belser, p. 28; Gauch, Schluep, Schmid and Emmenegger, N 618 and 624 et seqq.; Guillod and Steffen, N 48 et seq.

  43. 43.

    BGE 105 II 15; BGE 136 III 142.

  44. 44.

    Collins, Contracts, p. 30; Eidenmüller , p. 273; Guillod and Steffen, N 10, 13 and 26; Hesselink, p. 50; Whittaker, pp. 372 et seqq.; Wolf, pp. 8 et seqq.

  45. 45.

    Huber, N 65; Belser, pp. 11 et seqq.; Kramer, ‘Kommentar’, N 21 et seqq.; Oftinger, p. 52.

  46. 46.

    Chirico, pp. 37 et seq.

  47. 47.

    BGE 83 II 345.

  48. 48.

    Belser, p. 166; Morin, p. 209.

  49. 49.

    BGE 45 II 486; BGE 83 II 345; BGE 113 II 203; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 23 et seq. and 66; Martenet, p. 249; Morin, pp. 209, 220 et seq. and 227; Zimmermann and Whittaker, pp. 30 et seq. Art. 2 ZGB is not especially original in its content. Art. 1132 of French Civil Code and § 242 BGB also refer to good faith, well known in Europe since at least ius commune. What makes Art. 2 ZGB original is that it expresses the principle of good faith in a very general way. When French and German law refer to good faith only in relation with contract law, Swiss legislator openly established this principle as the leading basis of whole private law. The Swiss civil Code asserts so the social vocation of private law, Morin, pp. 208 et seq.; Zimmermann and Whittaker, pp. 51 et seq.

  50. 50.

    Supra, 9.2.2; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 91; Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 97 et seqq.; Morin, pp. 221 and 230.

  51. 51.

    Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 64 et seqq.; Morin, pp. 227 et seqq. In practice, Swiss judges materialize Art. 2 ZGB mainly through analogy, because it is the safer way to insert their solutions in the existing legal system. They compare the individual problem they have to solve with similar situations already settled in written or judicial rules, necessarily deducted from good faith, as it is the ratio legis of any private law provision. This done, they can adapt those rules to the new situation and create by this way a new rule. Later, it is possible to establish typical groups of cases (Fallgruppen) with the concretization of art. 2 ZGB, and infer from those groups more general and abstract rules, which will apply as a judicial codification to all new and similar cases, cf. Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 376 et seqq. and 445; Morin, pp. 225 and 230 et seqq.; Steinauer, N 276 and 386 et seqq.; Zimmermann and Whittaker, pp. 22 et seqq.

  52. 52.

    Schäfer and Ott, p. 375.

  53. 53.

    Guillod and Steffen, N 25; Lurger, pp. 365 et seqq.

  54. 54.

    BGE 133 III 449; Morin, pp. 214 et seqq.

  55. 55.

    Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 4 et seq.; Morin, p. 215.

  56. 56.

    Collins, Contracts, pp. 121 et seq.; Morin, p. 215.

  57. 57.

    BGE 122 III 97; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 225 et seqq.; Morin, pp. 214 and 232.

  58. 58.

    BGE 125 III 86; Gauch, Schluep, Schmid and Emmenegger, N 956 et seqq.

  59. 59.

    Morin, ‘Clauses’, pp. 505 et seq.; Pichonnaz, p. 189; That shows that a legal system that combines individual freedom and good faith is necessarily concerned with distributive justice, cf. Mathis, p. 201; Eidenmüller , pp. 315 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Bäuerle, pp. 271 et seqq.; Eidenmüller , pp. 404 and 457.

  61. 61.

    Bieri, ‘Possibilité’, p. 204. This author considers quite surprisingly that the other party’s interests would nevertheless be saved through the so called Ungewöhnlichkeitsregel, without realizing that this rule is the logical consequence of the rule about the presentation of the standard clauses, cf. BGE 119 II 443; BGE 135 III 1; Klett and Hurni, pp. 82 et seqq.; Morin, ‘Clauses’, pp. 519 et seq.

  62. 62.

    BGE 77 II 154; BGE 100 II 200; BGE 119 II 443; BGE 135 III 1; Belser, pp. 283 et seqq.; Gauch, Schluep, Schmid and Emmenegger, N 1140 et seqq.; Klett and Hurni, pp. 80 et seqq. See also § 305 (2) BGB; art. 2.1.19 and 2.1.20 Unidroit Principles; art. II.-9:103 DCFR.

  63. 63.

    Bieri, ‘Responsabilité’, pp. 521 et seq.; see also Seiler, pp. 144 et seqq.

  64. 64.

    Bieri, ‘Responsabilité’, p. 521; Fikentscher, p. 17; Richard A. Posner , pp. 167 et seqq.

  65. 65.

    BGE 117 II 563; BGE 120 II 148; BGE 130 III 193; BGE 133 III 124; BGE 137 III 359; Gauch, Schluep, Schmid and Emmenegger, N 2984 et seqq.; see also von Bar and Clive, pp. 3406 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Oftinger and Stark, § 1, N 65 et seq.

  67. 67.

    Supra, 9.2.2; Eidenmüller , pp. 422 et seq. and 437; Mathis, p. 204.

  68. 68.

    Collins, Contracts, p. 160.

  69. 69.

    Amstutz, Morin and Schluep, N 39; Cohen p. 130; Mackaay, p. 429; Perillo, p. 141.

  70. 70.

    Krell v. Henry, 2 King’s Bench 740 (C.A. 1903) 182; BGE 127 III 300; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 232.

  71. 71.

    Collins, Contracts, pp. 228 et seqq.

  72. 72.

    Crasswell, p. 89; Cooter and Ulen, pp. 227 et seqq. and 302 et seqq.; Polinsky, p. 29; Posner and Rosenfield, p, 89; Shavell , pp. 292 et seqq. and 339; with more nuances: Ayers and Gertner, pp. 92 et seqq. See also Kornet, pp. 289 et seqq., 315 et seq. and 366 et seq.; Hesselink, pp. 46 et seq.

  73. 73.

    Cooter and Ulen, pp. 220 et seq.; Kornet, p. 316. Behavioral LAE use the same criterion, but taking into account that parties not necessarily act in a rational way, see Vandenberghe, pp. 412 et seqq.

  74. 74.

    Cooter and Ulen pp. 220–222; Hesen and Hardy, pp. 84 et seq. and 89 et seqq.; Mackay, p. 429; Schäfer and Ott, pp. 280 and 299 et seq.; Smythe, p. 209.

  75. 75.

    See for example Taylor v. Caldwell, King’s Bench 1863, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309.

  76. 76.

    See for example Transatlantic Financing Corporation v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

  77. 77.

    Cooter and Ulen, pp. 221 et seqq. and 289 et seqq.; Eidenmüller , pp. 402 et seq.; Richard A. Posner , pp. 104 et seq.; Smythe, p. 209.

  78. 78.

    BGE 113 II 49; BGE 119 II 368; BGE 127 III 300; Gauch, Schluep, Schmid and Emmenegger, N 1254; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 125 et seq. See also Hesselink, pp. 63 and 83; Kramer, ‘Kommentar’, N 277.

  79. 79.

    Kornet, p. 317.

  80. 80.

    Kötz, pp. 10 and 177.

  81. 81.

    Amstuz, Morin and Schluep, N 41 et seq.

  82. 82.

    BGE 113 II 246; BGE 114 II 57; BGE 129 III 604; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 126.

  83. 83.

    Supra, 9.1.

  84. 84.

    BGE 107 II 144; BGE 115 II 484; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller, N 126.

  85. 85.

    See nevertheless Art. 2 para. 2 OR.

  86. 86.

    Supra, 9.1.2.

  87. 87.

    Collins, Contracts, p. 194; Eidenmüller , pp. 456 et seq.

  88. 88.

    Eidenmüller , p. 458.

  89. 89.

    Supra, 9.2.2.

  90. 90.

    Martenet and Heinemann, pp. 37 et seq. and 94 et seq.

  91. 91.

    Cf. Martenet and Heinemann, pp. 45 et seq. and 213 et seq. For example, it is more difficult to control standard clauses with Art. 7 para. 2 lit. c KG, based on efficiency considerations (cf. Art. 1 KG) than with Art. 8 UWG, based on fairness consideration typical of private law (cf. the explicit reference to good faith in Art. 2 and 8 UWG).

  92. 92.

    Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 475; Steinauer, N 442.

  93. 93.

    Cf. the references quoted supra and footnote 1; Di Matteo, Prentice, Morant and Barnhizer, pp. 48 et seq.; Grechenig and Gelter, p. 297; Hackney, pp. 164 et seqq.; Eric A. Posner, pp. 868 et seqq.; Smith, pp. 133 et seq.; von Bogdandy, p. 3.

  94. 94.

    See for example Ackermann, pp. 940 et seq.; Collins, Contracts, pp. 81 et seqq. and 118 et seqq.; Fezer, pp. 821 et seqq.; Hausman and McPherson, pp. 689 et seqq.; Hesselink, pp. 49 et seq.; Mattei, p. 244; Michaels, p. 794; Eric A. Posner , pp. 864 et seqq.; Stürner, pp. 22 et seq.; Oftinger and Stark, § 1 N.

  95. 95.

    Emmenegger and Tschentscher, N 480.

  96. 96.

    Fikentscher, pp. 16 et seq. and 117; Hatzis, pp. 176 et seqq.; Mattei, Law and Economics, pp. 69 et seqq. See also Michaels, pp. 786 et seq. and 792 et seq.; Peyer, pp. 110 et seq. This approach coincides with the limits of the influence of European law in the interpretation of Swiss law in the case of an autonomous adoption of European law, cf. ATF 129 III 335. Indeed: if an interpretation of Swiss law in the sense of European law is possible only inside the methodology of Swiss legal order, that should be all the more imperative when trying to use in Swiss law some theoretical developments from the field of common law.

  97. 97.

    Garoupa and Ulen, pp. 1619 et seqq.; Grechenig and Gelter, pp. 304 et seqq.

  98. 98.

    See for instance Ciacchi, pp. 304 et seqq.; Busch and Schulte-Nölke, pp. 27 et seq.; Mak, Fundamental Rights, pp. 25 et seqq.; Whittaker, pp. 372–380; Whittaker and Zimmermann, pp. 700 et seq. Further, see Michale Bäuerle, Vertragsfreiheit und Grundgesetz, and Horst Eidenmüller, Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip, for a detailed analysis of German law.

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  1. Faculté de droit, Centre de droit privé, University of Lausanne, Bâtiment Internef, Bureau 332, 1015, Dorigny, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Ariane Morin

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    Klaus Mathis

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Morin, A. (2014). Efficiency and Swiss Contract Law. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7110-9_9

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