Abstract
Legal argumentation has differing relations with the concept of normativity. On the one hand, normativity plays an important role in legal argumentation. This is because legal norms are elements of the arguments which go together to make up legal discourse. On the other hand, legal argumentation also plays a relevant role in grounding the normativity of legal norms. The normativity of legal norms is not only based on authority, but also on correctness, and correctness is achieved, at least in part, by compliance to rules governing legal argumentation. The aim of this paper is to analyse the most significant relationships between normativity and legal argumentation. To achieve this aim, the paper will consider four aspects: the normativity of the different kinds of legal norms, the rules of legal argumentation, the role played by the rules of legal argumentation in grounding the normativity of legal norms, and the role played by legal norms in legal argumentation.
The author thanks Eveline Feteris, Stanley Paulson, and an anonymous reviewer of Cogency for valuable feedback. This paper has been originally published in English in Cogency Vol. 3, No. 2, 2011
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Notes
- 1.
On these debates in ethics, see Korsgaard (1996:1 f).
- 2.
On the normativity of law, see: Bertea (2009:1 f).
- 3.
I refer here to the classification into primary and secondary norms according to Kelsen, and not to the differentiation between primary and secondary rules, as stated by Hart. According to Kelsen: “Thus, the norm that establishes sanction-avoiding behaviour – behaviour the legal system aims to bring about – is a legal norm only on the presupposition that it is saying something (in abbreviated form for the sake of convenience) that the reconstructed legal norm alone states fully and correctly: given as condition, behaviour opposite to that which the norm establishes as sanction-avoiding, then a coercive act is to be forthcoming as consequence. This reconstructed legal norm is the legal norm in its primary form. The norm establishing sanction-avoiding behaviour can only be regarded, then, as a secondary legal norm” (Kelsen 1996:30).
- 4.
Despite his tendency to consider that the weak thesis of normativity applies to all law, even Kelsen himself appears to defend the strong thesis on occasions, when he states that legal norms are mandates drawn up in a categorical, imperative form, and that they are addressed to the legal subject via a secondary norm. See: Paulson, An Empowerment Theory, 1998:60 f.
- 5.
The Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution states that: “(1) The following rights are recognised and protected: (a) the right to freely express and disseminate thoughts, ideas and opinions trough words, in writing or by any other means of communication; (b) the right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation; (c) the right to academic freedom; (d) the right to freely communicate or receive accurate information by any means of dissemination whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right to invoke personal conscience and professional secrecy in the exercise of these freedoms. (2) The exercise of these rights may not be restricted by any form of prior censorship. (3) The law shall regulate the organisation and parliamentary control of the social communications media under the control of the State or any public agency and shall guarantee access to such media to the main social and political groups, respecting the pluralism of society and of the various languages of Spain. (4) These freedoms are limited by respect for the rights recognised in this Title, by the legal provisions implementing it, and especially by the right to honour, to privacy, to personal reputation and to the protection of youth and childhood. (5) The confiscation of publications and recordings and other information media may only be carried out by means of a court order.”
- 6.
See, on this formula as a logical formula for the internal justification of jurisdictional decisions in general: Alexy, Die logische Analyse juristischer Entscheidungen 1995:20 f.
- 7.
This is called by Alexy “Law of Competing Principles”. According to this rule: “The circumstances under which one principle takes precedence over another constitute the conditions of a rule which has the same legal consequences as the principle taking precedence”. See Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, 2002:54; Alexy, Logische Analyse der juristischen Entscheidungen 46.
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Bernal, C. (2013). Legal Argumentation and the Normativity of Legal Norms. In: Dahlman, C., Feteris, E. (eds) Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 102. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4670-1_7
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