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Atoms and Void

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The Metaphysics of Henry More

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Abstract

A first stab at More’s account of the nature of physical reality, which consisted in a plenum of figureless atoms, maybe finite and maybe infinite—More vacillated on that particular question—with a vacuum possible but not actual.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A few fragments from Democritus do seem to leave open the possibility that there might be enormous atoms, still meriting the title in virtue of their indivisible solidity. But the idea is problematic, and it does not recur in later discussions.

  2. 2.

    For the full history of atomism, from the classical period right up to the seventeenth century (and beyond), see Van Melsen 1952; Kargon 1966; Pyle 1995.

  3. 3.

    Plotinus 1992, p. 123 (ennead 2, tractate 4, ch. 7). See also pp. 174–175 (enn. 3, tr. 1, chs. 2, 3).

  4. 4.

    Aristotle 1984, vol. 1, pp. 516–518 (On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, ch. 2; 316a15–317a32); vol. 1, pp. 351–353 (Physics, bk. 3, ch. 6; 206b3–207a31).

  5. 5.

    Aristotle 1984, vol. 1, pp. 362–369 (Physics, bk. 4, chs. 6–9; 213a11–217b28).

  6. 6.

    Grant 1981, pp. 74–77; Van Melsen 1952, pp. 77–78; Pyle 1995, pp. 212–213.

  7. 7.

    For full discussion of these Medieval developments, see Grant 1981, chs. 5–6; Duhem 1985, chs. 4–6. Also, more briefly, see Grant 1976; or Grant 1977, ch. 5. For an equally thorough discussion, though here examining late classical positions more than Medieval ones, see Sorabji 1988, chs. 8–12.

  8. 8.

    Aristotle 1984, vol. 1, p. 320 (Physics, bk. 1, ch. 4; 187b17–187b21).

  9. 9.

    Van Melsen 1952, pp. 41–89, 116–118; Kargon 1966, pp. 71–72; Pyle 1995, pp. 210–231; Garber, Henry, Joy and Gabbey 1998, pp. 554–556.

  10. 10.

    Koyré 1957, chs. 1–2; Grant 1981, pp. 138–141, 182–190; Pyle 1995, 222–225.

  11. 11.

    From a review of Naturalium doctrina Andreae Pissini Lucensis in the issue for 18 July 1678.

  12. 12.

    Descartes 1991, pp. 13–14/AT 8A:14–15/CSM 1:201–202 (pt. 1, §§26–27).

  13. 13.

    Descartes 1991, pp 151–153/AT 8A:170–172 (pt. 3, §§121–122).

  14. 14.

    Descartes 1991, pp. 108–110; AT 8A:103–105 (pt. 3, §§48–52). See also AT 11:23–31 (Treatise on Light, ch. 5), translated in Descartes 1998, pp. 16–21.

  15. 15.

    Boyle 1999–2000, vol. 5, p. 325–326 (Origin of Forms and Qualities, Considerations and Experiments, sect. VIII.1).

  16. 16.

    See Shapin and Schaffer 1985. Also see Schmitt 1967 on certain hesitant steps in this direction during the sixteenth century.

  17. 17.

    Boyle 1999–2000, vol. 10, p. 469 (A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, sect. IV).

  18. 18.

    See Shapin and Schaffer 1985, pp. 45–46, 80–81, 119–121, 168.

  19. 19.

    Guericke 1994, p. 88 (bk. 2, ch. 3).

  20. 20.

    The Complete Poems, pp. 51a–b (Psychathanasia, bk. 1, cant. 2, sts. 52–59).

  21. 21.

    Compare the following from the Appendix to An Antidote Against Atheism, p. 222, although note that the context there is different: ‘… that it will amount to a number truly infinite, and that our Understanding can never go through it: But, though God’s Understanding can, that it does not follow that the number is therefore finite; for an infinite mind may well comprehend an infinite number.’ (Appendix, ch. 13, §4).

  22. 22.

    The Complete Poems, pp. 148b–150a (notes upon Psychathanasia, bk. 1, cant. 2, sts. 57–58).

  23. 23.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 63/AT 5:241–242 (More to Descartes, 11 December 1648).

  24. 24.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 69/CSMK 364/AT 5:273–274 (Descartes to More, 5 February 1649).

  25. 25.

    CSM 2:103/AT 7:145 (Second Replies).

  26. 26.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 76/AT 5:303 (More to Descartes, 5 March 1649).

  27. 27.

    An Antidote Against Atheism, pp. 14–15 (bk. 1, ch. 4, §2). Having referred to the same geometrical and optical paradoxes as in Psychathanasia, More also repeated their proofs in the scholia to this passage, pp. 143–144.

  28. 28.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. iii (The Preface, §3).

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. 20 (bk. 1, ch. 6, §5). The Oxford English Dictionary prefers to spell the term as ‘indiscerptibility’, and it lists ‘indiscerpibility’ as an obsolete form: but, since the word itself is pretty obsolete anyway, we might as well follow the spelling that More himself invariably employed.

  31. 31.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. 20 (bk. 1, ch. 6, §5).

  32. 32.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. iii (The Preface, §3).

  33. 33.

    The Immortality of the Soul, pp. xiv, xv (The Preface, §3, note).

  34. 34.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. xv (The Preface, §3, note).

  35. 35.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. 20 (bk. 1, ch. 6, §5).

  36. 36.

    See Ablondi 2005, p. 27–29. Cordemoy did not actually use the terminology of ‘atoms’, but instead drew a distinction between imperceptible and indivisible ‘bodies’, and the sensible and divisible ‘matter’ that arose out of their juxtaposition. Regarding the former, he wrote: ‘in each particular body, the extremities and the middle are but the same substance, which cannot be extended without necessarily having all of these parts: so that, being no different from the body, they also cannot be separated from it, and by this means it will remain indivisible.’ Cordemoy 1666, pp. 7–8 (discours 1).

  37. 37.

    Koyré and Cohen 1962, pp. 123–126.

  38. 38.

    Edwards 1980, p. 208 (‘Of Atoms’, prop. 1). See also the editor’s introduction at pp. 63–65. It is important to note, however, that Edwards did proceed to explicate the notion of indiscerpibility (which he spelt ‘indisserpibility’ in the manuscript) as pertaining to an object that no finite power could divide: More’s own notion was considerably stronger than that.

  39. 39.

    Newton 1983, p. 341. I am here using the expanded text provided by the editors.

  40. 40.

    Newton 1983, passim: see the various references both in Newton’s text and in the editors’ commentary, as listed in the index. Also see Westfall 1962, p. 174; Westfall 1971, pp. 327–328.

  41. 41.

    Conjectura Cabbalistica, pp. 189–191 (Appendix to the Defence of the Philosophick Cabbala, ch. 9).

  42. 42.

    The Complete Poems, pp. 54a–b, 77a (Psychathanasia, bk. 1, cant. 3, sts. 23–24; bk. 3, cant. 3, st. 12).

  43. 43.

    The Complete Poems, p. 163a (The Interpretation Generall: ‘Monad’).

  44. 44.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 71 (ch. 9, §3).

  45. 45.

    See, for instance, Saducismus Triumphatus, pp. 224–226 (An Answer to a Letter of a Learned Psychopyrist, §17); Two Choice and Useful Treatises, second part, pp. 211–212 (Annotations upon the Discourse of Truth, The Digression).

  46. 46.

    Descartes 1991, p. 48/AT 8A:50/CSM 1:231 (pt. 2, §18).

  47. 47.

    One such example was Nathaniel Fairfax in the 1670s, who responded with an even more surprising alternative suggestion: that the sides of the evacuated vessel would actually get further apart. When there had been a space between the sides, it would have been possible to traverse this space in order to get from one side to the other along a straight line. But, without anything there to traverse, the only way to get from one side to the other would be to take the long way round, around the perimeter. See Fairfax 1674, pp. 91–95.

  48. 48.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 63/AT 5:240–241 (More to Descartes, 11 December 1648).

  49. 49.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 69/CSMK 363/AT 5:272–273 (Descartes to More, 5 February 1649).

  50. 50.

    Descartes 1991, p. 27/AT 8A:28/CSM 1:213 (pt. 1, §60). The translators bracket the words ‘which can be’, to signal that these are drawn from the 1647 French edition: AT 9B:51.

  51. 51.

    Descartes 1991, pp. 27–28/AT 8A:29–30/CSM 1:214 (pt. 1, §61).

  52. 52.

    In a later defence of Descartes’ position in this area, Antoine Le Grand anticipated an imaginary opponent’s objection along the lines of More’s, and he expressed this objection in a way that got somewhat closer to the heart of the matter—namely, the real distinction between different bodies, and the logical independence of their motions that would seem to follow from this. ‘But you will say, that the Body which is conceiv’d to be in the Chamber or Vessel, is something different from the sides that surround it, and therefore the one may be separated from the other by the Divine Power, forasmuch as we clearly and distinctly understand the one, not to be the other.’ Le Grand 1694, p. 113b (bk. 1, pt. 4, ch. 13, §10). Needless to say, the Cartesian Le Grand was not moved by the objection he was voicing on behalf of his imaginary opponent: see n. 54 below.

  53. 53.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 63/AT 5:241 (More to Descartes, 11 December 1648).

  54. 54.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 68/CSMK 363/AT 5:272 (Descartes to More, 5 February 1649). Le Grand’s response to the objection I quoted in a note just above was almost identical.

  55. 55.

    Conway Letters, p. 487 (More to Conway, 5 May 1651). See also Remarks upon Two Late Ingenious Discourses, pp. 149–150 (remark 38, upon Difficiles Nugae, ch. 17).

  56. 56.

    Conway Letters, pp. 487–488 (More to Conway, 5 May 1651). More later presented similar or identical arguments in the Appendix to An Antidote Against Atheism, pp. 200–201 (Appendix, ch. 7, §§4–5); and in Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, pp. 38, 51–52 (ch. 6, §2; ch. 7, §13). Broadly similar arguments had already been presented in some Medieval discussions of these issues, e.g. by Henry of Ghent: see Grant 1981, pp. 124–125.

  57. 57.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 78/AT 5:309 (More to Descartes, 5 March 1649).

  58. 58.

    He did also discuss Boyle’s experiments in An Antidote Against Atheism, bk. 2, ch. 2, but not until the 1662 revised edition of that work. The sections numbered §§7–13 were all new in that edition (pp. 43–46). See §§8–13 in particular.

  59. 59.

    The Immortality of the Soul, pp. 166, 167 (bk. 3, ch. 2, §§6, 8).

  60. 60.

    Remarks upon Two Late Ingenious Discourses, pp. 98–100, 100–101, 104, 132 (remarks 17, 18, 20, 33, upon Difficiles Nugae, chs. 8, 9, 16).

  61. 61.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 2, p. 23 (ch. 12, §4).

  62. 62.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 44 (ch. 6, §11).

  63. 63.

    Plotinus 1992, p. 123 (enn. 2, tr. 4, ch. 7).

  64. 64.

    Ficino 2001–2006, vol. 1, p. 245 (bk. 3, ch. 2). See also p. 311 (bk. 4, ch. 2). More generally, on the finiteness or otherwise of the cosmos, from Nicholas of Cusa to More and beyond, see Koyré 1957.

  65. 65.

    The Complete Poems, p. 87a (Psychathanasia, bk. 3, cant. 4, st. 35).

  66. 66.

    Descartes 1991, p. 84/AT 8A:80/CSM 1:248 (pt. 3, §1).

  67. 67.

    From Herbert’s De causis errorum, here as translated in Ward 2000, p. 217.

  68. 68.

    In Psychozoia More had again implied the finitude of the corporeal universe, conjecturing that its figure was a round one (The Complete Poems, p. 15a: cant. 1, st. 19). In the 1647 edition, More added a note on this passage, although there he expressed a less firm commitment to the world’s infinity than he did in Democritus Platonissans itself: ‘It is too too probable the world is round if it be not infinite, the reasons be obvious; but to conclude it finite or infinite is but guesse, mans imagination being unable to represent Infinity to Reason to judge on’ (p. 139a).

  69. 69.

    The Complete Poems, p. 90b (Democritus Platonissans, To the Reader).

  70. 70.

    Descartes 1991, pp. 13–14/AT 8A:14–15/CSM 1:201–202 (pt. 1, §26).

  71. 71.

    The Complete Poems, p. 90a (Democritus Platonissans, To the Reader). On the ‘indefinite’/‘infinite’ distinction in Descartes and More (which also came up in their correspondence), see Koyré 1957, pp. 104–109, 114–121.

  72. 72.

    The Complete Poems, p. 93a (Democritus Platonissans, st. 20).

  73. 73.

    The Complete Poems, p. 142b (notes upon Psychozoia, cant. 2, st. 12). For Lucretius’ own presentation of the argument, see Lucretius 1994, pp. 33–34 (bk. 1, lines 968–985). Lucretius was, however, neither the first nor the last philosopher prior to More to use this argument. It seems to have originated with Archytas the Pythagorean; it had first become known in the West through William of Moerbeke’s 1271 translation of Simplicius’s commentary on De caelo; and it cropped up fairly frequently in seventeenth-century discussions. On the history of the argument (and for some of the objections that were raised against it), see Jammer 1969, pp. 9, 12–13; Grant 1976, p. 143; Grant 1981, pp. 106–108; Sorabji 1988, pp. 125–129; Pyle 1995, pp. 79–80; and Lennon 1993, p. 278. For a couple of examples of seventeenth-century uses, see Guericke 1994, pp. 96–97 (bk. 2, ch. 6) or Locke 1975, pp. 175–176 (bk. 2, ch. 13, §21; cf. Locke 1936, p. 95, entry for 16 September 1677).

  74. 74.

    The Complete Poems, p. 94b (Democritus Platonissans, sts. 37–38); Epistolae quatuor, p. 80/AT 5:312 (More to Descartes, 5 March 1649).

  75. 75.

    The Complete Poems, p. 93a–b (Democritus Platonissans, sts. 21–22, 24).

  76. 76.

    The Complete Poems, p. 93a (Democritus Platonissans, st. 21).

  77. 77.

    The Complete Poems, pp. 92b–93a, 93a–94a (Democritus Platonissans, sts. 18–19, 23–32).

  78. 78.

    The Complete Poems, p. 93b (Democritus Platonissans, st. 26).

  79. 79.

    The Complete Poems, p. 90a (Democritus Platonissans, To the Reader).

  80. 80.

    The Complete Poems, p. 94b–95b (Democritus Platonissans, sts. 39, 42, 45, 50).

  81. 81.

    See the discussion in Ward 2000, pp. 213–218.

  82. 82.

    Opera omnia, vol. 2.1, p. ix (Praefatio generalissima, §11). A translation of this particular passage is included in Jacob’s edition of Enchiridion metaphysicum (i.e. Manual of Metaphysics, 1995), vol. 1, pp. xxvi–xxvii.

  83. 83.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, pp. 84–85 (ch. 10, §6); and see pp. 85–89 for the rest of these arguments and rejoinders (§§7–15).

  84. 84.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 86 (ch. 10, §8).

  85. 85.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 88 (ch. 10, §14).

  86. 86.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 89 (ch. 10, §14).

  87. 87.

    Remarks upon Two Late Ingenious Discourses (published 1676), p. 150 (remark 38, upon Difficiles Nugae, ch. 17); Opera omnia, vol. 2.1, p. 574 (Ad V.C. epistola altera, written 1677, §20); Refutation of Spinoza (written 1678), pp. 94, 100; 1679 notes upon The Immortality of the Soul, p. xv, and p. 7 (The Preface, §3, note; and bk. 1, ch. 2, §8, note).

  88. 88.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, pp. 51, 56 (ch. 7, §13; ch. 8, §5).

  89. 89.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 52 (ch. 7, §15).

  90. 90.

    Descartes 1991, pp. 40–41/AT 8A:42/CSM 1:224 (pt. 2, §4).

  91. 91.

    Descartes 1991, p. 23/AT 8A:25/CSM 1:210 (pt. 1, §53).

  92. 92.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 85/CSMK 372/AT 5:342 (Descartes to More, 15 April 1649). On impenetrability in Descartes, including discussion of his correspondence with More, see Garber 1992, pp. 144–148; Pasnau 2007, pp. 301–304 (but, for my part, I would not actually go along with everything that Pasnau says here—see n. 96 below).

  93. 93.

    On this latter point, see Epistolae quatuor, p. 67/CSMK 361/AT 5:269 (Descartes to More, 5 February 1649).

  94. 94.

    The Complete Poems, p. 20a (Psychozoia, cant. 2, sts. 10, 12).

  95. 95.

    The Complete Poems, p. 60a–b (Psychathanasia, bk. 2, cant. 2, sts. 13–14). I am glossing over some of the details of this particular argument.

  96. 96.

    Pasnau denies this: Pasnau 2007, p. 302. As I here explain, I disagree with him on this point.

  97. 97.

    Descartes 1991, pp. 43–45/AT 8A:45–47/CSM 1:227–228 (pt. 2, §§10–12). See the first section of Chap. 4 below (pp. 107–109), for the details of Descartes’ theory of place/space.

  98. 98.

    The Complete Poems, p. 94b (Democritus Platonissans, st. 36).

  99. 99.

    The Complete Poems, p. 60a (Psychathanasia, bk. 2, cant. 2, st. 12).

  100. 100.

    The Complete Poems, p. 160a (The Interpretation Generall: ‘Body’).

  101. 101.

    Epistolae quatuor, pp. 62–63/AT 5:239–240 (More to Descartes, 11 December 1648).

  102. 102.

    Epistolae quatuor, pp. 66–67/AT 5:268–269/CSMK 360–361 (Descartes to More, 5 February 1649).

  103. 103.

    Epistolae quatuor, p. 74/AT 5:301 (More to Descartes, 5 March 1649).

  104. 104.

    The Second Lash of Alazonomastix, pp. 71, 128 (upon page 24, line 11; and upon page 59, line 1, observation 24). Cf. Descartes 1991, pp. 41–42/AT 8A:43–44/CSM 1:225–226 (pt. 2, §§6–7).

  105. 105.

    Observations upon Anthroposophia Theomagica, and Anima Magica Abscondita, p. 24 (upon Anthroposophia Theomagica, pag. 21).

  106. 106.

    Remarks upon Two Late Ingenious Discourses, pp. 55–60 (remark 1, upon Difficiles Nugae, ch. 2).

  107. 107.

    The Immortality of the Soul, pp. 5, 8 (bk. 1, ch. 2, §§10–11; ch. 3, §1).

  108. 108.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. iii (The Preface, §3).

  109. 109.

    Divine Dialogues, pp. 61, 64 (dial. 1, §§29, 30).

  110. 110.

    Saducismus Triumphatus, p. 196 (An Answer to a Letter of a Learned Psychopyrist, §1).

  111. 111.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum vol. 1, p. 118 (ch. 28, §2).

  112. 112.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 71 (ch. 9, §1).

  113. 113.

    Westfall 1962, p. 174. See also Westfall’s almost identical characterisation of Morean atoms in Westfall 1971, p. 328.

  114. 114.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. xv (The Preface, §3, note).

  115. 115.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. iii (The Preface, §3).

  116. 116.

    The Immortality of the Soul, pp. 20–21 (bk. 1, ch. 6, §7), and elsewhere.

  117. 117.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. iv (The Preface, §3).

  118. 118.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. xiv (The Preface, §3, note).

  119. 119.

    The Immortality of the Soul, p. 20 (bk. 1, ch. 6, §7).

  120. 120.

    Ibid.

  121. 121.

    The Immortality of the Soul, pp. 21, 23 (bk. 1, ch. 4, §7, and note).

  122. 122.

    Enchiridion metaphysicum, vol. 1, p. 72 (ch. 9, §3).

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    Jasper Reid

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Reid, J. (2012). Atoms and Void. In: The Metaphysics of Henry More. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 207. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3988-8_2

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