Abstract
In the chapter I characterize argument-dialogues according to increasing levels of the complexity of the argument ingredient at each turn of a dialogue. I contend that at a certain stage in the increasing complexity of the argument turns, there is a qualitative change in the nature of the dialogue. The arguments in the latter “dialogues,” while addressed to another side, are solo performances. Such non-engaged, or quasi-engaged, dialogues are to be contrasted to the simpler types, like a Socratic dialogue, which are of necessity engaged. The arguments of such engaged dialogues are like duets. Solo “dialogue” arguments differ from duet “dialogue” arguments in at least three respects: the participation of the “respondent,” the composition of the “respondent” and the rules or norms that apply. For instance several of the discussion rules as the 10 “commandments” of the pragma-dialectical theory do not apply to “solo” dialogue arguments. It would help to distinguish the dialectical properties of arguments from their properties as dialogues.
Reprinted, with permission, from Argumentation 12 (1998) (pp. 325–339). Thanks to Erik Krabbe, whose commentary on an earlier version of this chapter contained many helpful suggestions. Thanks also to the participants in the discussion of that earlier version at the conference on Argumentation and Rhetoric at Brock University in May 1997
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I owe the characterization of argument as an invitation to infer to Robert C. Pinto. I have since found the same idea in Beardsley (1976): “To argue is to attempt … to change someone’s mind by getting him to make an inference’” (p. 5).
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Blair, J.A. (2012). The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument. In: Tindale, C. (eds) Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_17
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